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i. 
PREFACE 
The subject of this thesis is a case study of the expansion of 
an extremist sect in Medieval Islam. The popular name of this sect 
has made an indispensable contribution to almost every language of 
western Europe, and is still able to conjure up a range of fantastic 
associations. Medieval chronicles, both Latin and Arabic, depicted 
these sectaries as a desperate band of fanatical killers of kings 
and princes, and Medieval travellers gave currency to tales of drugs 
and paradisaical gardens used to induce young men to become devotees, 
of unhesitating death-leaps to impress visitors with their blind 
obedience to their leader: their unswerving devotion has been a 
source of allusion for Provencal love poems and as great a poet as 
~ 
Dante, while at least one 11modern 11 writer has seen in them the 
archetypal revolutionary secret society, the embodiment of all evil, 
duplicity, and moral corruption. (J. von Hammer, Geschichte der 
Assassinen aus morgenlandischen Quellen, Stuttgart, 1818, English 
translation, The History of the Assassins, by o.c. Wood, London, 
The legend which has grown up around the so-called sact of the 
Assassins easily obscures their historical reality. Accordingly, 
the first two chapters of this thesis attempt to indicate the out-
lines of this reality, to dispel any lingering wisps of legend, to 
trace the movement's heritage in Islam, showing its origins, its 
aims, the nature of its beliefs and organization and a little of its 
early history in Persia. 
ii. 
The Persian Nizari Ismacilis, as they should properly be called, 
expanded their propaganda campaign into Syria at about the same time 
as the First Crusade, in the closing years of the eleventh century. 
The comparison is instructive; the Nizaris were only just securing 
permanent bases in Syria by the time the Crusaders had lost their 
first major territorial acquisition, the principality of Edessa, 
in 1144. Why did the sectaries take so long to get established? 
Was it simply because of the strength of the opposition they met, 
or were there unforeseen disadvantages for them in the Syrian 
situation? Were they perhaps in some measure at fault themselves, 
in their handling of obstacles and reverses? 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the problem of the 
Nizari establishment in Syria, to find an explanation for its long 
delay. 
Though much has been written about the 11Syrian Assassins", 
probably a reflection of their proximity to the crusaders, the early 
phase of their establishment has not received the detailed examin-
ation it deserves. By far the best account is that contained in 
the chapter by Bernard Lewis entitled "The Ismacilites and the 
Assassins" in A History of the Crusades, editor-in-chief, K.M. Setton, 
volume i, The First Hundred Years, ed. M.W. Baldwin, published by the 
University of Pennsylvania, (Philadelphia, 1955). The footnotes here 
are much fuller than those for Chapter 5 of Lewis's more recent The 
Assassins, A Radical Sect in Islam (London, 1967), which, aside from 
a few fresh items, is a word-for-word repetition of his chapter in 
iii. 
the Pennsylvania History. The best monograph on the whole sect was 
written by the late Marshall G.S. Hodgson; The Order of the Assassins; 
the Struggle of the J2~arly Niza.r1 Ism& c111s against the Islamic World 
(The Hague, 1955). His focus, naturally enough, is on the parent 
Persian sect, and he candidly admits that for Syrian affairs he has 
relied heavily.on already-published studies. (See pp.89, n.20; 
185, n.1). 
Recent work by Ismacili scholars in the Middle East has dealt 
with the Syrian Nizaris, but centres mainly on the rule of the 
famous "Old Man of the Mountain", Rashid al-Din Sinan (c.1162-1193). 
The writings ofclrif Timir and Mu~tafi Gilib in particular are said 
to enhance our understanding of the Nizaris in Syria (see Lewis's 
remarks in Arabica, XII (1966), p.226) but being in Arabic, they are 
for the moment closed to me. 
The most recent unpublished study in English betrays a similar 
tendency to concentrate on Sinan's rule. In his Ph.D. thesis 
(Durham, 1963), 11The Syrian Ismacl.lis at the time of the Crusades 11 , 
Nasseh Ahmad Mirza treats the period of establishment very briefly 
in an introduction which adds virtually nothing to Lewis or Hodgson. 
To my mind, these works leave unanswered the question I have 
set myself in this thesis; how did the Nizaris establish themselves 
in Syria and why did they take so long to achieve permanent 
establishment? 
iv. 
The sources for the early history of the Nizaris in Syria are 
less than satisfactory. No works of Syrian Nizari provenance exist 
for the period prior to Rashid al-Din Sinan's rule, and we are 
forced to rely on notices of Nizari activjty in the general chronicles 
and biographical dictionaries. Few of these are exactly contemporary 
with our period, the information they offer is usually brief and 
fragmentary, and most of the writers, being Sunnite, are heavily 
prejudiced against the sectaries. The nature of the sources is such 
that a critical bibliography seemed called for, and though one was 
actually prepared as a guide during research, it was thought too 
pretentious to add it to an M.A. thesis which is already longer than 
it ought to be. There are in any case two very useful guides 
available elsewhere. The first is Bernard Lewis's article "The 
Sources for the History of the Syrian Assassins'', in Speculum, XXVII 
(1952), pp.475-489, which offers a brief survey of the sources for 
each broad "period" of Syri§.n Nizari history and useful examples of 
conflicting reports of selected events. Much of this article is 
derived from the masterly and detailed analysis in Claude Cahen's 
La Syrie du Nord a l'epoque des Croisa~es (Paris, 1940), pp.1-100, 
which examines in some detail the whole corpus of source material, 
Latin, Arabic, Syriac, Greek, and Armenian, for the history of 
northern Syria in the crusader period. 
I should, however, mention the collection which made it 
possible to undertake this study here in New Zealand. 
The monumental Recueil des Historians des Croisades, (sixteen 
v. 
volumes, Acad~mie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Paris, 1841-
1906) is extremely useful for the student who has no Arabic, but it 
has a number of serious limitations. Its main weakness is that it 
does not offer complete versions of the Arabic sources it translates 
into French. Passages relating to the crusaders are given in full, 
and there is a wealth of material on Muslim Syria, but the editors 
give no indications of lacunae, and these abound. Furthermore, the 
French translations are not to be regarded as fully detailed literal 
versions of the Arabic; they are intended merely to convey the 
general sense of the original. 
As an indication of the care with which I have used the Recueil, 
I should mention that I have checked its conversion of Muslim dates 
wherever possible, using the tables of G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville, 
The Muslim and Christian Calendars, (Oxford, 1963). The extent to 
which I have been able to supplement the Recueil with other trans-
lations may be judged from the Bibliography. Though it is obvious 
that I have not had access to each and every relevant source, I 
personally regard my inability to read any of them in the original 
Arabic as a more serious stricture on this study. 
vi. 
ABBREVIA'l'IONS 
I have used the following abbreviations in my footnotes: 
BSOAS 
EI 
EI2 
JAOS 
JA 
JBBRAS 
JRAS 
REI 
RHC 
Occ. 
Or. 
Ar. 
ROL 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 
(as the School of Oriental Studies, 1916-1938) n.s. 
London (1938)-
Encyclopaedia of Islam, First Edition 
4 volumes and supplement, Leiden, 1913-1948 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition 
(in progress) Leiden and London, 1960-
Journal of the American Oriental Society 
New Haven, 1(1843)-
Journal Asiatique (from the 3rd series onwards) 
Paris (1836)-
Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 
Bombay, 1(1846)-
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland. London, 1(1834)-
Revue des Etudes Islamiques 
Paris, 1(1880)-
Recueil des Historians des Croisades 1 
Acad~mie des Inscriptions et des Belles-Lettres 
Paris, 1841-1906 
Historiens Occidentaux, 5 volumes, 1844-1895 
Historians Orientaux, 5 volumes, 1872-1906 
Documents 1\rmeniens, 2 volumes, 1869-1906 
He vue de l'Orient Latin 
Paris, (1880-1911, discontinued.) 
1. For an analysis of the contents of each volume, see A.S. Atiya 
The Crusade, Historiography and Bi~liography (Bloomington, 
1962) pp.29-47. 
vii. 
GLOSSARY 
Note on transliteration of Arabic names: 
Specialists in written Arabic will detect a number of in-
consistencies in my spelling of Arabic names, so I take this 
opportunity to explain myself. There are several different systems 
of transliteration to be found in the secondary sources. Where I 
had access to the original, I attempted my own transliteration, 
using the International System for Transliteration of Arabic, 
(Geneva, 1961). Where the original was not available, I followed 
the spelling of the Encyclopaedia of Islam (second edition). In the 
few cases where even this failed, I have adopted the spelling most 
consistent with the secondary sources available to me. 
Some simplifications have been made in order to render the 
text less formidable in appearance. For example, - dj - is 
rendered - j -. Nearly all diacritical points and vowel markings 
have been omitted; the only survivors are the glottal stop, hamza (l), 
and the gutteral, ain ('). 
Where a more familiar Anglicized form exists, this was some-
times preferred, for example in the names of towns such as 
Damascus (Dimashk) and Aleppo (Halab). The only indefensible choice 
of nomenclature is the author's preference for Persia instead of 
Iran. 
viii. 
GLOI:lSARY of Arabic words used in the text: 
as as 
banu 
bat in 
dac i · 
dar 
dacwa 
fida' i 
hisn 
hujja 
imam 
(foundation) the first of a series of silent imams. 
sons of, or the family of. 
jabal 
jazira 
kadi or qadi 
kasr 
mahdi 
mawla (pl. mawali) 
nahr 
nass 
natiq 
ra>is 
satr 
tac.lim 
ta>rikh 
ta>wil 
umma 
wadi 
wazir or vizier 
zahir 
esoteric. 
missionary, propagandist. 
house. 
mission, propaganda. 
assassin, agent of the Nizari Isma ilis. 
fortress. 
proof (of God) 
leader; religious and secular head of the 
umma. 
mountain or range of hills. 
island. 
judge. 
castle. 
the guided one. 
client, freedman; a non-Arab Muslim. 
river. 
designation of successor. 
prophet; a speaking imam. 
civic leader. 
concealment (of the imam). 
instruction, mystic knowledge. 
history. 
esoteric interpretation. 
people, community. 
valley of a non-perennial river. 
chief minister. 
exoteric. 
Two terms of Turkish origin also require explanation: 
askar 
atabeg 
the "household cavalry 11 of a Turkish amir 
or general. 
a 11 father-chief 11 or guardian to a Saljuk 
princeling, responsible for his military 
education and the government of his 
province until he comes of age. 
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CHAPTER I 
ISMAciLISM 
Unlike Medieval Christendom, Medieval Islam knew of no 
theoretical separation between church and state. The umma or 
community, built on a revealed law and religion, was ruled by a 
caliph who had power to administer but not to change or interpret 
the God-given polity. In terms of this conception, any open 
revolt against established authority was a sin as well as a crime. 
Social or political dissent could find permanent expression within 
the~ only in religious forms, and no religious deviation from 
the sunna, or accepted custom of the orthodox majority, could 
escape political significance. 1 
The sect famous to Western Europe as the Assassins came of a 
long heritage of radical dissent in Islam. In keeping with that 
heritage they possessed distinctive socio-political aims, yet 
remain inexplicable unless viewed primarily as a religious sect. 
As a religious sect they are properly called Nizari Ismacilis, 
and this name at once identifies them as part of the Shica, the 
oldest and most important formation of non-orthodox belief jn Islam. 
The purpose of this introduction is simply to trace the origins 
of Nizari Ismacilism within the Shica. This may sound a formidable 
1. B. Lewis. "Some Observations on the Significance of Heresy 
in the History of Islam", Studia Islamica I (1953) pp.43, 
58-9. (Hereafter cited as I,ewis, "Heresy •.• ".) 
2. 
task, covering some four and a half centuries, but I have adopted 
a method rather resembling the tracing of one's ancestry on a 
family genealogy. While the eye follows as direct a path as 
possible, much of the rest of one's forebears remain in decent 
obscurity and must be taken for granted. 
The origins of the Shica must be traced from the death of 
Muhammad himself (632); or, more precisely, from the leadership 
crisis resulting from his lack of provision for a successor. The 
solution adopted became in time the historic institution of the 
Caliphate, but it seems to have been at the start little more than 
a co);!J?_ which had the support of most of the infant Muslim community. 
The later theoretical justification for the appointment of a 
khalifa or deputy to the Prophet was the principle of consensus 
opinion or . . c 1Jrna. We are here more concerned with what lay outside 
the majority consensus. 
There appear to have been several groups which did not readily 
smile upon the choice of Abn Bakr as khalifa. Each of the Companions 
of the Prophet had his own following, and foremost among these the 
following of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of the 
Prophet, seems to have been bitterly disappointed that cAli had not 
been chosen. This following gradually became a focus for those who 
genuinely felt that the leadership of Islam should have remained 
among Muhammad's descendants, for the only surviving male line from 
the Prophet issued out of ~Ali's union with Muhammad's daughter 
Fatima. 
This following was initially known simply as the party of 
'Ali, the shicatu cAli, whence came the shortened familiar name 
shica. 2 In its earliest stage, the Shica was no more than a 
political attitude towards the succession, a 11 1awful partisan-
ship11,3 whose adherents differed in no way from the rest of the 
umma in law, doctrine, or religious practice. They simply held 
that insufficient weight had been attached to what they regarded 
as Muhammad's specific designation of cAli as his successor when 
he paused at Ghadir Khum on the way back from his farewell 
pilgrimage to Mecca. 4 The significance of the Shica is of course 
that it did not long remain a purely passive political attitude. 
~Ali's claim to the succession seems to have been pressed 
more by his followers than bycAli himself. Most of the other 
Companions of the Prophet either opposed his candidacy or remained 
5 non-committal, and ~Ali may have shared their view at first. He 
was again passed over on Abu Bakr's death, but though the nomination 
of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab as Caliph was the obvious choice of a 
strong wise leader, the same could not be said of the third Caliph, 
app6inted in 644; LUthman ibn ~Affan of the powerful LUmayya clan. 
2. A useful general survey of early Shi'ism is D.M. Donaldson, 
The ShiCite Heligjon, (London, 1933), hereafter cited as 
Donaldson. For the discussion so far, see in particular pp.9-16. 
3. I,ewis, "Heresy ••• " p.54 (Arabic; tashayyuc~asan). 
4. Donaldson, pp.1-2. 
5. See IVJ.G • .S. Hodgson, ''How did the early Shic a become sectarian?" 
JAOS, LXXV (1955) p.2. 
cuthman's rule was weak, fraught with indolence and nepotism. He 
was perhaps unlucky in that he also reaped the whirlwind of social 
problems sown by the vast territorial acquisitions of the first 
brilliant campaigns of conquest. Dissatisfa6tion with cuthman 
seemed to confirm the murmured protests of the Shi~a that cAli 
would have been a better choice. 
Social distress and dislocation was naturally severest in the 
newly-won territories, and opposition to cuthman's indolent rule 
came primarily from the mawali or non-Arab Muslims of Egypt, 
Syria, Irak, and Persia. 6 Though notions of legitimism were alien 
to Arab experience at this time, they were familiar and deep-
rooted among most of the mawali, and it is possible that many of 
them saw in the Shica a more legitimate alternative to cUthman 1 s 
house. The Shica acquired increasing mawali support. 7 
LUthrnan's control weakened as disaffection grew, and in 656 his 
kinsman Mu'awiya thought it necessary to send forces from Syria to 
support the Caliph. Their arrival was anticipated by a revolt at 
Medina in which cuthman was murdered. This sparked off the civil 
wars which shattered the early unity of Islam. 
The insurgents had promptly acclaimed cAli as Caliph, though 
it seems he did not as yet enjoy widespread Arab support. Signif-
icantly, he moved to Irak, where mawali support for him was stronger, 
~·---·------------------·----------------------
6. B. Lewis, The Origins of Ism~Cilism, (Cambridge, 1940) p.24, 
hereafter cited as Lewis, Origins. 
7. Lewis, 11 Heresy ••• 11 pp. 47-8. 
and from his capital at Kufa sought to make good his claims by force. 
This failed, and the arbitration organized after the inconclusive 
and sanguinary conflict at Siffin (657) went against him. While 
cAli was coping with divisions in his following, Mucawiy~ \quietly 
consolidated his position in Syria, where he was proclaimed Caliph 
in 660. cAli himself was murdered in 661, yet his following did not 
disintegrate as expected. 8 cAli's two sons Hasan and Husayn 
dontinued to assert the cAlid claim, and in the generation after 
cAli's death the Shica began its gradual but momentous transformation 
from a political partisanship into a powerful movement of social and 
religious radicalism. 
cAlid conspiracies against the early ~umayyad caliphate at 
Damascus were generally fruitless and short-lived until the death 
of Mucawiya gave opportunity for a serious armed revolt against his 
successor Yazid in 680. Hasan had recently died and it was Husayn 
who led this rebellion. After some initial success, Husayn was 
finally surprised by a far superior 'Umayyad force at Karbala in 
Irak, and he and his male relatives were virtually wiped out. 
There was a solitary male survivor, the boy ~Ali Zayn al-Abidin. 9 
The tragedy at Karbala profoundly shocked even the orthodox 
in Islam, but it wrought a deep and significant change in the Shica. 
Hasan's descendants carried on the purely political aims of the 
Shi(a, spreading widely throughout the Muslim world and setting up 
8. Donaldson, pp.33, 35-41. 
9. Donaldson, pp.66-69, 73-79, 85-87, 101-2. 
cAlid dynasties as far afield as Morocco, but the remnants of 
Husayn's family retired into quiet inactivity at Medina, there to 
reflect on the themes of martyrdom and suffering engendered by 
Karbala. 10 
6. 
It is tempting and not unreasonable to perceive in this period 
of retirement and seclusion a phase of doctrinal incubation, in which 
a sense of separateness from the orthodox ~ began to grow. 
Already the name Shica had ceased to denote simply the predominantly 
Arab political party grouped around cAli's descendants. The move-
ment had become larger, more complex, and less easily described in 
generalizations. 
The influence of mawali support had made the Shica a focus for 
deep-running social discontent, especially in the garrison towns of 
Syria and Irak. Here, it had become entangled with a multitude of 
non-Muslim beliefs and ideas from Persian and Jewish-Christian 
11 
sources. It is possible that the movement was also influenced by 
the revolutionary propaganda of various Kharijite leaders of the 
time. One of the new ideas affecting Islam in this period which 
strongly influenced the .Shi'-a was the concept of the mahdi, "the 
guided one of God 11 , 12 who will one day lead a reform movement to 
end all injustice and fill the earth with righteousness. 
10. B. Lewis, article "cAlids 11 , ~ti::I2 pp.400-402. 
11. Lewis, Origins, pp.24-25. 
12. F. Rahman, Islam (London, 1966) p.133. 
Innovatory concepts such as the belief in a mahdi began 
increasingly to infiltrate the outer mawali fringe of the Shica. 
They not only redoubled the appeal of Shicism to the oppressed and 
miserable, but also speeded the undoubted transition of the movement 
after Karbala from a party to a religious sect. ~ven more significant 
for our present purposes, these ideas created a lasting tension in 
the movement between the moderate "legitimist" core which stressed 
the importance of its kinship with the Prophet, and an impatient, 
extremist, revolutionary wing. 13 
Though it is difficult to be precise in view of the fragmentary 
and conflicting nature of the evidence, the closing decades of the 
seventh century see the appearance of a confused medley of ephemeral 
extremist groups, calling themselves Shi<ite, characterized by the 
variety of their beliefs and composition, and impatient for more 
effective resistance to the authority of the orthodox ~ 
establishment. 
The abortive revolt of Mukhtar ibn Abu LUbayd at Kufa in 685-7 
is the prime example of this extremist revolutionary development. 
JVJukh tar hailed as mahdi one of <Ali 9 s sons by the Hanafi te woman; 
Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiya. Even after Mukhtar 1 s defeat and death, 
his followers retained their belief in Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiya as 
the mahdi. Once he died, however, (?OO) the following split up. 
Some of the splinter groups retained the Hanafite claim. One of 
these groups is very important. 
13. Lewis, Origins, pp.24-25. 
8. 
It was led by Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiya's son, Abu Hashim ~Abd 
Allah, who believed he had inherited the imamate from his father. 
Though the Hashimiyya, as his followers were called, also split up 
at Abu Hashim's death in 716, the main remnant was taken over by 
one Muhammad ibn cAli ibn Abd Allah ibn al-cAbbas. He adopted the 
original Hanafite claim to the imamate and developed this group into 
the most active and dangerous of all the revolutionary groups 
opposed to the cumayyad caliphate. In a hard-fought campaign cover-
ing the period 747-750 this revolutionary movement actually 
succeeded in overthrowing the cumayyads. 14 
The 'Abbasid revolution was of enormous significance for 
Islamic history; the establishment of the cAbbasid caliphate has 
often been taken to mark the final stage of the caliphate's trans-
ition from an Arab-dominated military regime to a truly cosmopolitan 
Muslim empire. The change was~arcely less significant for the 
Shi'a, because the 'Abbasids, on attaining power, swiftly shrugged 
off their CAlid pretensions and became ardent advocates of the 
Sunnite 'establishment'. 
The Hanafiya-cAbbasid movement had been by far the most success-
ful of the Shi'a, but the 'Abbasids' espousal of orthodoxy effectively 
terminated any Hanafite claim to the imamate. This narrowed the 
succession to the descendants of Husayn through CAli Zayn al-Abidin, 
14. S. Moscati, article "Abu Hi:ishim 11 , EI2, i, pp.124-125; and 
B. I1ewis, article 11 Abbasids 11 , EI2, i, p .15ff. 
but it also intensified the frustration and impatience of the 
remaining extremist fringe, who rightly saw the cAbbasid success as 
a betrayal of cAlid aspirations. 
The moderate core of the Shi&a now began to place increasing 
emphasis on the directness of their descent from the Prophet through 
cAli and Fatima. 15 This emphasis soon gave rise to the belief that 
there had always been a divinely-predestined succession of im~ms 
who inherited, by their descent from cAli, the authority of sole 
infallible interpreters of the true faith of Islam. This doctrine 
of the imamate, which indicates the development of the Shica into 
something approaching religious dissent, was to become as enduring 
a feature of moderate Shicism as the mahdi concept had of the 
revolutionary fringe. 
One vital point was not made clear, however; how was the true 
imam to be recognized? That there could be room for disagreement 
over the identity of the imam was demonstrated in the mid-eighth 
century by the Zaydi schism. Outside the moderate core of the Shica. 
were not only extremists and revolutionaries but ultra-conservatives 
as well. One group of these conservatives, made anxious by 
doctrinal innovations, declared their allegiance to cAli Zayn al-
Abidin' s son Zayd as imam in preference to his eldest son Ilfiuharnmad 
al-Bakir. Zayd accordingly led a revolt at Kufa in 740, which 
failed. His sons Yahya and Idris, however, continued to uphold 
their father's claims elsewhere. The Zaydis finally achieved open 
15. B. Lewis, The Assassins; A Radical Sect in Islam (London 1967), 
p.25, hereafter cited as Lewis, Assassins. 
10. 
success in Tabaristan and the Yemen. Their conservatjsm may perhaps 
be judged by the fact that they differ from Sunnite orthodoxy in only 
a few very minor details; they thus preserve the old purely political 
A b f f ~h·c· 16 ra . orm o:: ;:, 1. lEc;m. 
The Zaydi secession and the termination of Hanafite claims in the 
'Abbasid revolution left the majority of the Shica adhering to Muhammad 
al-Rakir as imam. When he died in 732, his son Jacfar al-Sadik was 
accepted as imam without question. Under Jacfar al-Sadik, the old 
tensions between moderates and impatient extremists came to a head in 
the serious schism which finally determined the sectarian subdivision 
of the movement. 
The imamates of Muhammad al-Rakir and Ja'far al-Sadik appear to 
have been a period of considerable fermentation of ideas within the 
Shica. Beliefs formerly to be found on the revolutionary fringe now 
began to be studied by the moderates, and much testing of opinion 
seems to have gone on. 
The name primarily associated with these developments is that of 
one of JaCfar's leading missionaries, the daCi Abu 1 l-Khattab al-
17 Asadi. Predictably, many moderates found that they could not 
wholeheartedly approve of the ideas prominent in Abu 1 1-Khattab 1 s 
preaching, and Ja( far was finally moved to repudiate hio chief £a' i,. 
Abu'l-Khattab had attracted a following, however, and through it his 
doctrines became firmly entrenched in certain sections of the Shica. 18 
16. F. Rahman, Islam (London, 1966), p.171. 
17. See Bernard Lewis, article 11 J\bu.'l-Khattab 11 , E:12, i, p.134. 
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One of the doctrines attributed to him is that of the ta'wil or 
----
allegorical interpretation of scripture, which emphasizes a hidden 
batin or esoteric meaning ahead of the zahir or apparent literal 
meaning. This doctrine was later to become very important for the 
branch of the Shica with which we will be concerned. 
Though Abu,l-Khattab's following split up when he died (about 
755) it did not disintegrate. Many of his supporters appear to have 
rallied to a new leader, the controversial Maymun al-Kadda. 19 It 
is likely that Maymun was closely involved with the Khattabiya, 
perhaps helping to shape its beliefs and organization, and that he 
was responsible for encouraging its revolutionary aspect. The 
movement ultimately took its name from its most notable adherent, 
Ja'far al-Sadik's eldest son, Ismacil. 
Ismacil was in line to succeed his father as imam, but is 
20 known to have been dispossessed. The usual explanation is that 
this was for drunkenness, but it could have been because of Ismacil's 
association with the revolutionary Maymun al-Kadda. The extremists 
naturally refused to recognize any arbitrary alteration to the 
succession and continued to uphold Ismacil as the imam-designate. 
19. The historicity of this figure seems now to be generally 
accepted, though the evidence remains fragmentary and incon-
clusive. W. Ivanow was anxious to deny any association between 
Maymun and Ismacilism, dismissing him as a myth. (See Ivanow, 
Isma~ili Tradition Concernin the Rise of the Fatimids (London, 
1942) and The Alleged Founder of Ismicilism Bombay, 1946), but 
for the more usual view see Lewis, Origins, pp.54-57.) 
20. Donaldson, pp.152-153. 
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At this point, a most unexpected event occurred; Ismacil 
predeceased his father, in 762. The extremists were thrown into 
confusion, for Maymun al-Kaddah also appears to have died at this 
time. 
When Jacfar himself died in 765, his second son Abd Allah was 
accepted as imam, but he died shortly afterwards, and the succession 
passed to a third son, Musa al-Kazim. He was recognized by the 
m~jority of the Shica as the seventh imam from cAli. Most of the 
Shi'a continued to adhere to Musa's descendants down to the twelfth 
_;h~, I-'iuhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Askari, who disappeared in 874. These 
are the so-called Twelver Shicites, or ithna cashariya, who to this 
day await the reappearance of their twelfth imam as the messiah or 
mahdi. Their differences from Sunnite orthodoxy have become fewer 
and fewer over the centuries, and Twelver Shicism is today the 
ff .. 1 1· . f I 21 o 1c1a re 1g1on o ran. 
This. accounts for the bulk of the Shi'a, the moderates and 
conservatives of the movement, whom we now must leave in order to 
trace the subsequent development of the extremist minority. 
Having already recognized Isma'-il as their seventh imam, the 
extremists could not accept that the imamate would pass from brother 
to brother, and in time most of them appear to have rallied to 
Isma~il's son, Muhammad. This new grouping, in which Maymun al-Kadda's 
son Abd Allah figured prominently, became known as the Ismaciliyya 
or Ismacilis. Because they upheld Isma'il as the seventh imam from 
21. Lewis, Assassins, p.26. 
cAli, they were also later referred to as the Seveners, to distinguish 
them from the Twelver Shica. 
Islam had already seen many various kinds of extremist movements, 
but the Ismacilis were to become perhaps the most enduring and 
significant of these. Since their ultimate objective could have 
been nothing less than the undermining and overthrow of the 
orthodox "establishment" in order to bring universal recognition 
to their imam, the Ismacilis suffered repeated persecution from the 
tAbbasid authorities, and were of necessity conspiratorial. 
They did not stop at this political objective, however. Their 
innovations in belief were to be developed over the next few 
centuries by a succession of brilliant thinkers into a fully-articulated 
philosophical system, owing much to nee-Platonic influences and 
later attracting the serious consideration of the famous theologian 
and legist, Ghazali (d. 1111). 
Much of the Ismacilis 1 appeal must have come from their spirit 
of close-knit secretive fellowship and their posture of defiance 
towards the authorities, but it has often been remarked that their 
faith, infused with warm personal emotionalism, answered a popular 
need which the dry legalistic formalism of the orthodox schoolmen 
failed to satisfy. 22 
Their appeal was conveyed by a strikingly efficient propaganda 
organization. This consisted of a decentralized network of 
preaching missionaries (daCis) who were each assigned to a specific 
22. Lewis, Assassin~, p.27. 
14. 
province or j_azir~ (literally, island). Both the overall preaching 
and the individual ~ were called daCwa, signifying the call of 
the imam for men to adopt his cause. As the name ~zira suggests, 
each lJrincipal daci was left entirely to himself, to build up a local 
organization of converts and assistants which would then send its 
newly-ordained preachers into further adjacent areas. 23 
The ninth century seems to have been a period of intensive 
Ismacili activity, and it is likely that some pockets of sympathy 
may have been created in traditionally Shicite areas of Irak, Syria, 
and Persia. The evidence is fragmentary, however, mainly because 
the ~ovement worked in secret, from fear of <Abbasid persecution. 
Not surprisingly, this has come to be styled the period of the 
"Hidden Imams", though it is thought that their chief hiding place 
t t . C' l . . C' • 24 was a one 1me wa am1ya 1n vyrla. 
Confused genealogies make it difficult to trace a clear 
succession of imams. It has been suggested that there were in fact 
two recognizable lines which have been confused by later writers; 
one descended from Ismacil's son Fluhammad, the actual or ~stagarr 
line, and the other descended from 'Abd Allah ibn Maymun al-Kadda, 
a mustawda or 11 trustee 11 line. This plurality is partly explicable 
by the practice of "spiritual adoption" among the Ismacilis, whereby 
23. 
24. 
M. Canard, 11 Dacwa 11 , EI2, ii, pp.168-170; 
Organization of the Fatimid Fropaganda, 11 
pp.4-7, 10, 20. 
W. Ivanow, Ismacili Tradition concernin 
Fatimids, (London, 1942 , especially the 
on pp.157-223. 
W. Ivanow, 11The 
JBBRAS, XV (1939), 
the Rise of the 
sources translated 
a teacher-pupil relationship is more highly regarded than a 
physical father-son relationship. 25 
15. 
More recent work, without denying Lewis's interpretation, has 
suggested that the line of imams was not clearly defined because most 
of the Ismacilis were in fact awaiti.ng Muhammad ibn Isma'il's return 
as the . h hd" 26 mess1a or ma 1. This is plausible in view of the strength 
of the mahdi concept observed earlier in the Shi'a, and would account 
for the lack of close a.ttention to recording the line of i~. 
The only open success to crown Ismacili efforts in this period 
came in the Yemen. Elsewhere, their preaching failed to gain large-
scale popular support. 'I'he Yemeni dac~~ had its beginning.s about 
879 1 and seems to have been the work of two famous dacis of the time, 
eAli ibn Fadl and Ibn Hawshab. It was to remain a strongly Isma'ili 
area for many centuries, but it is mainly significant as the spring-
board for an even ~ore notable Ismacili success in North Africa and 
Egypt. Before going on to trace this important development, some-
thing needs to be said of the notorjous Karmatians. 
26. S.!Vi. Stern, 11 Heterodox IsmiFIJism in the time of al-Iviu<izzH, 
BS0l1.E), XVII (1955), pp.10-23, and 11 Early lsmac:Llj IVJission-
aries in North We.st Persia and in Khurasan and Tran.soxiania 11 , 
BSOAS, XXII (1960), pp.59-90. Apart from articles in EI2, 
I have not seen the work of W. Madelung, but some of his 
views on this point are represented in M. Canard, article 
11 Fatimids11 , EI2, ii 1 pp. 850ff. Unti 1 Stern's promised l'~arl,;y: 
Jsma."'il~. appears, his reinterpretation is conveniently out-
lined in a contribution to the 1959 Strashour6 Colloquy, 
published as ''Ismac'ilis and C.,)_armatians" i:ri L '.~~~~de 
~la_rr~ (Paris, 1961) pp.99-108. 
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The external history of this group, their unusual communal 
life at Bahrayn, their bloodthirsty invasions of Syria and Irak 
(902-3), their raids on Basra and Kufa (923-925) and their sack of 
Mecca in 928 when they absconded with the Black Stone from the 
2'7 Ka aba, is well known. As revolutionary extremism, this could 
scarcely be bettered, yet there has been much controversy about 
their relationship with Isma' ilism. What 1i ttle is known of the 
main Ismacili movement in this period points to a clandestine 
campaign of conversion rather than acts of premature violence which 
would only court repression. Entirely separate origins have been 
suggested for them, perhaps Hanafite, yet it is said that the Black 
Stone was returned to Mecca in 950 at the order of the then Fatimid 
. 28 1mam. 
Recent work has tended to confirm that the Karmatians were 
originally Ismacilis 9 About 877-878 an Ismacili daci named Husayn 
al-Ahwazi converted one Hamdan Karmat in the Kufa region of Southern 
Irak. When the ~ passed on, Hamdan and his brother Abdan appear 
to have taken over leadership of the new dacwa at K.ufa, making 
many converts among the peasants and Bedouin tribesmen. 
27. For English readers, mainly from such elderly versions as the 
account of W. r1uir, The CaliJ?hate, its Rise, Decline, and 
Fall, (London, 1883; revised edition~ Edinburgh, 1924), pp.558-
5b2: Probably the best early treatment is that of M.J. de 
Goeje, Mfmoire sur les Carmathes, (Leiden, 1888). 
28. Lewis, Origins, pp.79, 84-86. 
1?. 
After public protests at their activities in 891, the movement 
shifted to a new centre at Bahrayn, indelibly branded vvith their 
1 d I 29 ea er s name. 
Whether because of their isolation or Hamdan's charismatic 
leadership, or both, the Karmatians developed unusual and distinctive 
forms of belief and organization. It is to be assumed that they were 
still basically Isma'ili, but in 899 we are told that a clear break 
occurred between them and the central Isma~ili leadership. 30 Their 
relations thereafter range from cool recognition to outright war, 
so that it is perhaps advisable to regard them as lying outside the 
da'wa as a whole. 
Much more significant for our purpose is to trace Ismacili 
expansion from the successful Yemeni £~yta into North Africa. This 
followed the usual pattern of a one-man mission, the dac in question 
being Abu Abdallah al-Shici, who left the Yemen in 892 in the company 
of a group of Kutama Berbers. Among their kinsfolk in North Africa 
he found r~ady if volatile converts. He appears to have success-
fully exploited their internal rivalries and their animosity towards 
the regime of the Aghlabids, who had ruled most of North Africa in 
29. 
30. 
VJ. Madelung, article WHamdan J5-armat 11 , liJI2, iii, pp.123-L~, 
and S.JVI. Stern, article 11 cAbdan 11 , :E:I2, i, pp.95-96. (See IVlap 1). 
S .111. Stern, "Early Ismac:: ili ~!lissionaries in North West Persia 
and in Khurasan and Transoxiania", BSOAf:), XXIII ( 1960) pp. 69, 
?5. I have not seen r-·,adelung' s nl"atirniden und Bahrainqarmaten", 
Der Islam, XXXIV (1959). 
18. 
the name of the "Abbasid caliphs since 800. 
In less than a decade, Abu Abdallah built up a strong military 
force among the Berbers, with which he proceeded to attempt the 
overthrow of Aghlabid rule. At this juncture (902) the then 
Ismacili i!llam tUbayd Allah had to flee Syria in the face of the 
destructive Karmatian invasion. He tried to join Abu Abdallah, but 
was captured on his way by the Aghlabids. It took no fewer than seven 
years for Abu Abdallah and his Berber supporters to achieve the over-
throw of the Aghlabids. The capital, Rakkada, was taken in March 
909, and when cubayd Allah was finally rescued and openly proclaimed 
as imam in January 910 1 the Ismac ili.s found themselves in possession 
of a territorial state. 31 
cubayd Allah now emerges as a most capable leader, removing 
both Abu Abdallah al-Shici and his brother in 910 and going on to 
rule this nascent Ismacili empire for over thirty years. He had 
already dembnstrated his capabilities, however, long before he came 
to North Africa, and mention must now be made of this. 
As an extension of the view that the line of imams after 
Muhammad ibn Ismacil was not clear owing to belief in Muhammad's 
imminent return as mahdi, it has been suggested that cUbayd Allah 
wrought a momentous change in Ismacili outlook by declaring himself 
the first of a new series of visible . 32 1mams. His new interpretation 
31. s.!Vl. Stern, article 11 1\bu Abdallah al-Shiti 11 , f~I2, i, pp.103-10L~. 
32. S.JV!. Stern, "The l:O::arly Ismacl.li !Jiissionaries in North-West 
Persia and in Khurasan and Transoxiania 91 , BSOAS, XXIII (1960) 
pp.68-69. 
19. 
of the imamate consisted in regarding Muhammad ibn Ismacil as the 
first of a cycle of imams in satr or concealment. This might well 
be regarded as a solution to the problem of coping with followers 
who grow impatient that the mahdi seems never to be coming soon 
enough, for cycles of visible and invisible imams may alternate 
indefinitely before the final appearance of the mahdi. Stern dates 
this radical reinterpretation at about 899, and points to this as 
the cause of the Karmatians' severance from the main body of 
Ismacilis. If they refused to accept cubayd Allah's revision of the 
imamate, they would have persisted in awaiting Muhammad ibn Ism~il's 
return as mahdi. 'rhey would regard "Ubayd Allah and his successors 
not as _;Lmam§. but merely representatives of the awaited mahdi. 
Perhaps their violent campaigns in the early ninth century reflect 
their increasing sense of desperation and isolation. 33 
Though the Karmatians had driven cUbayd Allah out of Syria, 
they did not as yet threaten his achievements in North Africa. He 
built a new capital in 920 on the Tunisian coast, named for his 
honorific title as precursor of the mahdi, Mahdiyya. He and his 
successor Abu,l-Kasim al-Kacim gambled on a vigorous campaign of 
expansion into Morocco, Sicily, and adjacent territories, in search 
of a resource base adequate for their proposed challenge to the 
Abbasids. 
33. S.IVl. Stern, 11Early Ismacili Missionaries in North West Persia 
and in Khurasan and Transoxiania'', BSOAS, XXIII (1960) pp.68-
70, 75; and W. Ivtadelung, article 11 Hamdan JS.armat", EI2, i:ii, 
pp.123-124. 
20. 
Egypt had long been recognized as the ideal resource base, rich, 
easily governed, and strategically well placed for the leadership of 
Islam, but Ismacili attempts at invasion in 913-915 and 919-921 were 
unsuccessful. Abu'l-Kasim al-Kacim and his successor al-Mansur were 
hampered by difficulties in North Africa~ 34 but under the Ismacilis' 
fourth imam-caliph, a1-Mu<:izz, a carefully prepared invasion led by 
the brilliant ,J awhar al-RUi:1i swept into Egypt in 969., 
The Ismaci1i conquest of Egypt and the creation of a prosperous 
empire under the Fatimid caliphs was a major development, not just 
for Isma~ilism, but for the history of Medieva1 Islam itself. The 
external history of the Fatimids is well known and bears no repetition 
in detail here, 35 but the significance of the conquest needs to be 
noticed, because it resurrected within Ismacilism the old tension 
between moderates and extremists which originally split the movement 
away from the rest of the Shica. 
The goal constantly professed by the Ismacili preaching was of 
34. Notably the Kharijite revolt, 943-947, for which see S.M. 
Stern, article 111\bu Yazid al-1\lukka.rin, EI2, i, pp.163-16L~. 
35. A succinct up to date survey is the chapter by H.A.R. Gihb 1 
11 The Caliphate and the Arab States 11 , in the Pennsylvania 
Histo:r:.,;x:_ of the Crusades (general editor K·Jvi. Setton), I, 
The First Hundred Years (ed. M.W. Baldwin) Philadelphia, 1955, 
pp.81-99. See also ~ ... i. Canard., article 11 Fatimid.s 11 , E:I2, ii, 
pp. 850ff. S. Lane-Poole 1 ~stor,y~~l!!:_!he !Vliddle ~-~ 
(London, 1901) and G. Wiet, ~Y-Rt~J~..£b~ (Paris, ~e 
much more detailed. For the Fatimids' anti-Abba.sid political 
propaganda see Canard's article, 11 L 1 Imperialisme des FatimideE> 
et leur propaganda'', Annales de l 1 Institut d'~tudes orientales 
(Algiers) , IV ( 1942 -47T,P~~1~185;192 -.3 :--·-~-·----
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course the complete overthrow of the imposter caliphs of the 
<Abbasids and their replacement by rightful Isma'ili imams. Now 
that a rich resource base had been secured, it seemed only a matter 
of time before this goal was realized. From their new capital al-
Qahira (Cairo) the Fatimids extended their power into Syria, taking 
even the oldcUmayyad capital Damascus, and deep into Arabia where 
the holy cities of Medina and Mecca recognized Fatimid suzerainty. 
But there the expansion finally stopped. 'Abbasid power was 
too formidable elsewhere. The Fatimids failed to fulfil their 
mandate. 
This blunt truth caused much disillusionment among devoted 
Ismacilis, who began to think their leaders were more concerned to 
preserve and enjoy what they had so far won than to risk all in 
fulfilling their divinely-appointed task. In the words of H.F. 
Hamdani, the ~ which once aimed at the destruction of the 
cAbbasid caliphate now defended the claims of the Fatimids, and the 
writings of its dacis betray a drift from revolutionary and eclectic 
principles to 11 a liberal yet conventional conservatism11 • 36 It is 
well-known that the Fatimids failed to win their Egyptian subjects 
en masse to Ismacilism, despite the exertions of such outstanding 
religious leaders as the Kadi an-Numan (d. 974). 37 
The thinly veiled discrepancy between traditional Ismacili 
claims and the materialistic conservatism of the Fatimid caliphs 
36. H.F. Hamdani, "Some Unknown Ismaclli Authors and their works," 
JRAS (1933), p.366. 
37. See M. Canard, article 11 Fa~imids 11 , EI2, ii, p.859. 
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made it likely that militant extremists would sooner or later rise 
up in protest. Pos:::li bly, the maintenance of missionary .~as in 
Irak and Persia, working in the face of Abbasid persecution, 
provided an adequate outlet for such enthusiasts down to the end of 
the reign of al-Aziz (975-996). 
Under his successor, al-Hakim (996-1021), there appeared an 
extremist movement within Fatimid IsmaGilism which was to enjoy even 
greater longevity than the Fatimid state itself. Besides his notor-
ious persecutions of Jews and Christians, and the excesses which 
earned him the sobriquet "the mad caliph", al-Hakim may genuinely 
have desired some sort of Ismaeili reviviscence under his leadership. 38 
He seems to have regarded himself as something more than a mere 
imam, perhaps a semi-divine equivalent of one of the heavenly hierarchy, 
and he privately gave support to a radibal movement led by al-Darazi 
which was prepared to support his claims. Typically, Hakim also 
supported a rival to al-Darazi within the movement, Hamza ibn cAli, 
who soon ousted his rival. The movement retained the memory of the 
unfortunate al-Darazi in it.s name, ~~ better known today as the 
Druzes. 39 
This radical movement was most active from about 1017-18 but 
in 1021 its semi-divine patron disappeared, and so did its leader 
Hamza, shortly afterwards. The sect in Egypt did not survive this 
38. SeeN. Canard, article "al-I)akim bi-Amr J\llah", EI2, iii, 
pp. 78-82. In 1005 al-Hakim founded a dar al-cilm to promote 
Ismacili teachings in Cairo. 
39. See M.C:l.S. Hodgson, article 11 Duruz 11 , EI2, ii, pp.631-634. 
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double bereavement, and soon faded out. Converts had been made in 
Syria, however, and this smaller group maintained that Hakim was 
not dead but only concealed. The Druzes remain to this day a small 
eclectic community in the Lebanon, still awaiting Hakim's return 
as their mahdi. 
The episode illustrates that even in its prime Fatimid 
Ismacilism was open to tension between the easy-going and the earnestly 
devout, which, if given sufficient provocation, might issue in 
serious schism. 
The decline of the Fatimid caliphate seems to lead directly to 
such a situation at the end of the eleventh century. Mustansir's 
long reign (1036-1094) saw in its early stages the apogee of Fatimid 
power and influence, but in the middle of the reign, exceptionally 
low flood levels of the Nile crippled food production and a 
disastrous famine (1066-1073) seriously undermined the economic 
prosperity fostered by earlier caliphs. 40 Social distress contrib-
uted to popular risings in the provinces and serious faction 
struggles among mercenaries in the army. In desperation, Mustansir 
called on one of his loyal provincial armies to come and restore 
order in Egypt. This was the army of the governor of Acre, Badr 
al-Jamali, who from his arrival in 1074 steadily increased his 
personal control until the caliph was little more than the helpless 
figurehead of a military dictatorship. 
40. For details of the extreme social distress and dislocation 
caused by the famine, see I,ane-Poole, A Histor;y: '2-f _Eg;y:pt in 
the Middle , (London, 1901) pp.146-150. 
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Much the same thing had happened to the cAbbasid caliphs in the 
mid-tenth century when they were 11 adopted 11 by the Irantan dynasty 
known as the Buyids or Buwayhids. The Buyids had shown a casual in-
difference in matters religious, but in 1055 they were replaced at 
Baghdad by the Saljuk Turks, a recently-converted central Asian 
dynasty. Unlike the Buyids 1 the Saljuks were zealous for their faith 
and chose to commit their powerful war machine to the advocacy of 
Sunnite orthodoxy. By the end of the century, the Saljuks had spread 
themselves widely in the Muslim world, even wresting most of Anatolia 
from the Byzanti.ne empire. 
Badr al-Jamali had no such ambitions; he was to the Fatimids 
what the Buyids had been to thecAbbasids, and his military dictator-
ship lost relevance even to the ideals of conservative IsmaciJism. 
Yet the Saljuk invasions of Persia, Irak, and Northern Syria forcibly 
reminded the Ismacilis that their own proposed revolution had come to 
a dead halt while Sunnite orthodoxy had achieved a dramatic renewal 
of power. As the Fatimids became shackled to Badr al-Jamali's 
mi1itary regime, the zealous ~i.s outside E;gypt became increasingly 
concerned at the Saljuk-Sunnite revival. 
Circumstances .seemed ripe for yet another split within Ismacilism, 
and the .schism was not long in coming after Badr al-Jamali's death in 
1094. The occasion did not come from the Isma'ilis themseJves 1 
4oa however. 
Badr was succeeded by his son al-Afdal, who easi1y mainmned his 
father's firm and autocratj.c control over Egypt. Then, only a few 
4oa. See H.I\.R. Gibb, "The Caliphate and the Arab .State,slt, in K.1v1. 
Set ton ( ed.) l rrhe Penn.sylvania tlis~ory of the Crusades~ I I 
PP•9.5-96. ----~-~~---· 
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months after Badr, the aged imam-caliph J.Viustansir also died. Al-
Afdal seized this opportunity to extend his control into the religious 
life of his realm, and married his daughter to Mustansir's younger 
son Mustacli. He then appointed this pliant youth to be the new 
caliph. 
To do this al-JUdal had to ignore !VJustansir' s ~ or designation 
of succession on his eldest son Nizar. For al-Afdal's purposes, 
Mustacli was far preferable to Nizar, who already had a strong 
following. Predictably, his action broke the Ismacili community 
asunder. Nizar staged a futile revolt at Alexandria but it was 
crushed and he probably died in one of al-Afdal's prisons. However, 
while al-Afdal's military power ensured that Egypt accepted Mustacli 
as caliph, one of the outlying missionary dacwa refused to 
recognize Husta(li, and upheld Nizar as the rightful imam. 
This was by far the most active, the 11 Persian 11 da<-wa 41 under 
the daci Hasan-i .Sabbah. 'I'he f1Persian 11 Ismacili.s were acutely 
concerned at the power of the Saljuk advocacy of Sunnite Islam, and 
promptly severed all connexion with the Fatimids to carry on their 
lonely struggle against the Saljuks as an entirely autonomous sect. 
From their allegiance to Nizar, they were properly termed the Nizari 
Ismaciliyya. These are the :famous "Persian Assassins". 
Before looking more closely at Hasan-i Sabbah and the 11 Persian 11 
Ismacilis, a postscript might be added to round off the fate of the 
41. This convenient but not completely accurate designation is 
intended to cover Ismacili activity in Irak and Transoxiania 
as well as in Persia itself. 
26. 
Mustaclian form of Isma~ilism 1 because this figures briefly in the 
story of the Syrian Nizaris. 
The Nizaris, calling themselves proudly "the new preaching", 
derisively labelled the Flustaclians "the old preaching", and relations 
between the two appear to have been anything but cordial. Mustacli 1 s 
successor, al-•Amir, was in fact assassinated by the Nizaris in 1130. 
This caused a serious schism amongst the Ismacilis of the Yemen. 
What was left of the spiritual vitality of the Fatimid dacwa seems 
42 
to have been preserved there. 
Al!Amir's infant son, Tayyib, did not long survive his father, 
and only after a bitter confused struggle did the regent declare 
himself to be the new caliph, al-Hafiz. A large section of the 
Yemeni Ismacilis refused to recognize al-Hafiz and from th~ir 
adherence to Tayyib, presumed not dead but only hidden, they became 
known as the Tayyibi Ismaciliyya. 
While the remnants of Fatimid Ismacilism adhered to the Hafizi 
caliphs down to the Sunnite reconquest of Egypt and the death of 
their last caliph in 1171, the Tayyibis split into further opposed 
factions, one of which settled in India. These Indian Ismacilis are 
called Bohras, and from their rich libraries, only just being opened 
42. On what follows, see the detailed discussion in S.M. Stern, 
"The Succession to the Fatimid Imam al-cAmir, the claims of 
the later Fatimids to the Imamate, and the Rise of Tayyibi 
Ismacilism," Oriens, IV (1951), pp.193-255· 
27. 
to non-Ismacilis, have come many early texts which in this century 
have revolutionized Ismacili studies and given us a much better 
understanding of the origins and development of the movement. 
28. 
CHAP'rKR II 
HASAN~SABBAH AND NIZARI ISMA'ILISM 
Though the date of Hasan-i Sabbah's birth is not known, he 
was born in Kumm, an old ShiCite settlement in western Persia, and 
h . f th T 1 "h' <.. t 1 1s a. er was a. wever 0 1 1 e. Hasan spent his youth at Rayy 1 
where he was influenced by the preaching of an Isma<-ili daci named 
Amira Dharrab. Hasan began to read Ismacili treatises, but was 
suddenly stricken by a serious illness. He is said to have been 
terrified of dying without knowing what truth there was in their 
teaching, so when he recovered he at once sought out someone who 
1. M.G.S. Hodgson, The Order of Assassins; the Struggle of the 
Earl~ Nizar1 Is.~ c;111s as;ains t the Islamic World, (The Hague, 
1955 , p.43, hereafter cited as Hodgson. The fundamental 
sources for Hasan and the "Persian" Nizaris are the thirteenth 
century historians, Ata-Malik Juvayni and Rashid al-Din Fadl-
Allah. Juvayni accompanied the Mongol army which destroyed 
Alamut in 1256 and was given access to the library before it 
was burned. There he took copious notes from whatever seemed 
important, especially from a life of Hasan-i Sabbah entitled 
the Sargudhasht-i Saylid-na. He later included an extended 
account of Hasan and the Nizaris in his history of the Mongol 
conquest. My references are to the second volume of J.A. 
Boyle's translation, The Histor of the Wo£ld Conqueror, 
(Manchester, 1958). Rashid al-Din's account is remarkably 
similar but much more detailed in certain passages. It has 
been suggested (H. Bowen, 11The sar-g:;udh~sht-i say;yidna, the 
'Tale of the Three School-Fellows' and the wasaya of the 
Nizam al-Hulk,n JRAS, (1931), p.771.) that Juvayni's is a 
redaction of his original notes and that Rashid used these 
original notes more fully at a later date. It is possible, 
of course, that Rashid had access to other sources now lost. 
(See S.JVI. Stern, "The Early Ismacili Jlllissionaries in Northp· 
West Persia and in Khurasan and Transoxiania'', BSOAS, XXII 
(1960) p.85 n 2). There is no complete European trans-
lation of Rashid; I have relied on Hodgson, who makes very 
full use of the British Museum MS. Other brief extracts 
from Rashid are also translated in Lewis, Assassins; pp.38-39· 
. 2 
who could expound their doctrine to him more fully. 
One Abu Najim Sarraj finally converted Hasan to Ismacilism 1 and 
he took the oath of allegiance from al-Mu>min, the assistant to the 
head of the west Persian dacwa. Little is known of Hasan as a 
·--~· ~· 
youthful initiate, but in 1072 the head of the ~a 1 i\ bd al-JVlalik 
ibn 'Attash, visited Rayy and so approved of Hasan's progress that 
he promoted him to an assistantship and (perhaps at a later date) 
commissioned him to go to the jmam at Cairo as his personal 
representative.3 
Hasan left Isfahan about 1076, travelling north west to 
JVlayyafariqin, where he ran foul of the local k~ for his preaching 
activities. He next appeared in Damascus, where news of disturb-
ances on the overland route made him decide to continue his journey 
by sea. He arrived at Cairo on 30 August, 1078. 4 
li • t . .,., t 5 Zew details survive of hls hree year stay 1n ~gyp • It 
seems that he did not even meet the ~-caliph Ivlustansir, and there 
is nothing to support Juvayni's story that he had to leave because 
2. Hodg.son, pp .l+l+-4·5. Hodgson's chapter, ''The Isma<>:LJ.i State" in 
~ambride;e His~ory of I~, Volume V; The S~:l~2E2_~~ 
~di:>,Ted.) J.A. Boyle, (Gamb:ddge, 1968) pp.422-482, 
sharpens some of the detail and interpretation of his 1955 
monograph. 
Hodgson, p.'-f5. See also B. Lewis, article "Ibn cAttash 11 , Ji:I2~ 
iii, p.725. Rayy is now Tehran, the modern capitai' of Iran. 
Hodg.son 1 p. 46. ( See IV\Glps 1 ~l'lcl 2..). 
5. Hodgson, 11 I;Ta:?an-i :;;abbal;Jn, IGI2 1 iii, p. 253, v1hich corrects the 
shorter period g:iven in 9r~ 1 p. 47. 
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his preaching on behalf of Nizar incurred the wrath of Dadr al-
Jamali.6 We do not even know if he had any dealings with Nizar or 
his following, but Mustansir's or designation of Nizar as his 
successor would have been public knowledge. Whatever the reason, 
Hasan finally left fl:gypt and was back in Isfahan in June, 10R1. 7 
The next nine years were devoted to missionary traveLs in 
Persia on behalf of the dac , mostJy near his home territory in 
the north-west, though some sources take him as far afield as Yazd 
and Kerman in central and southern Persja. His standing in the 
~ rose steadily j n these years 1 for he is soon depicted as h<w-
ing a la.rge number of ~~ under his command. R It is pos,sible that 
a l.arge scale campaign of some sort against the Saljuks was already 
being planned, because Hasan was reputedly searching for suitable 
t h d t f 'or the move~_ent. 9 permanen ea quar ers w 
To continue as before with cJ.andestine cells in towns and 
cities was not secure enough, for these were at all times vulnerable 
to discovery and extermination by Sunnites, if not by the Saljuk 
authorities. Far preferable would be to follow the example of 
numerous brigand chieftains of the time and seek a self-contained 
defensible site in a remote area difficult of access for regular 
6. Juvayni/Boy1e, pp.668-669. 
7. Juvayni/Boyle, p.66g. 
8. Juvayni/Boyle, p. 669. 
g. Hodg,son, p. L1-7. 
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troops. Such an ideal was readily attainable in the traditionally 
Shi'ite mountainous district of Daylaman, just north of Hasan's 
home territory. The warJ.ike and independent villagers of this 
region had scant love for either Sunnite or Saljuk, and the area 
abounded in strongly fortified hill-top settlements. 10 
Hasan concentrated his attention on one of the finest of these 
fortified sites, in the heart of the Elburz mountains. This was the 
rock of Alamut, a lofty steep-sided ridge rising several hundred 
feet above the valley which it dominates. Alamut already had 
strategic importance as the key to Daylaman province; it was a 
control point on the shortest road between Kazvin and the shores of 
the Caspian (' 11 •::Jea. 
Alamut was obtained by stratagem. From Kazvin, Hasan sent the 
daci Husayn to assess the possibilities for seizure and to convert 
the villagers who were living atop Alamut. Husayn even tried to 
convert th~ governor who was holding the place in the name of the 
supreme Saljuk Sultan, Malik-Shah. This governor pretended to be 
10. Hodgson, p.74; W. Ivanow, 11 Alamutn, Ge2._gra~~~LI£~rn~L 
LXXVII (1931) p.43. 
11~ Hodgson, pp •. 73-74; Lewi.s, ~:2.:-~~p_£, p.43; J,. Lockhart and 
l'1.G.S. Hodgson, 11 Alamut", Ea2, i, p.353. See also; the 
article by Ivanow cj ted 1:1bove; T,. J,ockhart, 11 Hasan-i Sabbah 
and the Assassinsll 1 BSOA.S, V ( 1928~ 30), pp. 689-696; Freya 
Stark~ 11 The Assassins 1 Valley and the ,:)a1ambar Pas.s 11 , 
Geogr.~E~...1.._i!~~' LXXVII (1931) pp.48-6o, and '_r~h·~--·'--·--''-­
of the AssaR.sins, (I,ondon, 1934); P. Willey, ;,.;.'11.:..h:_e:._~;,.;.~;:_;_;;:;..:-;;;;__.;..;;;;.. 
1E:~::J~:§§~s~, (J,ondon, 1963), especially pp.211+·~2z:;. 
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converted, then sent Husayn and his followers down to the valley 
on some pretext, shutting the gates against their return. For 
whatever unknown reason, he later readmitted them, and found to 
h . d . f . th . 12 1s _espalr no way o remov1ng em aga1n. 
Hasan quietly sent small groups of his men up to Alamut and 
established himself nearby to direct the conversion of neighbour-
ing villages. He finally entered Alamut in disguise on 4 September 
1090, and remained hidden there until his following was so strong 
13 that the governor had no alternative but to relinquish the place. 
Hasan-i Sabbah lived at Alamut from 1090 until his death in 
1124. His rule shows him to be a gifted leader, characterized by 
extreme asceticism and piety. What Hodgson calls ilan intense and 
severe logic" extended even to the execution of his own sons for 
misdemeanours. 14 Hasan's immediate tasks at Alamut appear to have 
been the strengthening of the walls, amassing of provisions, and 
digging of irrigation channels to improve both water supply to the 
castle and irrigation for the farms in the valley. 15 
In seizing Alamut, Hasan was not making a bid to take over the 
dac: wa; he acted merely as the agent of the chief ~~ Abd al.,.~1lalik 
ibn cAttash, and his allegiance was still directed to the Fatimid 
12. Juvayni/Boyle, pp.669-670. 
13. Rashid al-Din, translated extract in Hodgson, p.49. 
14. Hodgson, p.51. 
15. Hodgson, p.50. 
3.3. 
caliph Mustansir as imam and supreme head of the whole IsmaCili 
. ----
movement. Nonetheless, the acquisition of Alamut marked Hasan as 
he became head of the 11Persian 11 dacwa on the death of Abd al-
Malik ibn cAttash. 16 
With Alamut as their citadel, the "Persian" Ismacili movement 
began to redouble its activities. Juvayni tells us that Hasan 
11 di.spatched dacis in all directions and devoted the whole of his 
time to spreading his propaganda and perverting the short-sighted 11 • 17 
At the same time, Hasan made every attempt to secure further 
fortified places, if not by persuasion or assault, then by building 
them; "he took such castles as he could and wherever he found a 
suitable rock he built a castle on it 11 • 18 Sanamkuh, west of Kazvin, 
was one of these. It was taken soon after Alamut, in 1091. 19 
For lack of evidence, it is difficult to be precise about the 
extent of the Isma<ili preaching network prior to the taking of 
16. Lewis, Assassins, p.49; the date is not known. 
17. Juvayni/Boyle, p.671. 
18. Juvayni/Boyle, pp.673-67L~. W. Ivanow, "Alamut 11 , Geographical: 
Journal ( 1931), p .4.3, points out that the translation 11 castle 11 
is perhaps misleading for this area. Many of Hasan's 
11 castles 11 would have been, not massive structures in the 
medieval European sense, as Alamut undoubtedly became, but 
simply fortified villages, or refuge places used only in 
times of danger and ordinarily left empty. 
19. Hodgson, p.?4. 
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Alamut, but it is possible that the groundwork for Ismacili 
expansion after 1090 had already been laid to some extent. Hasan's 
agents seem to have been most active in the districts surrounding 
Alamut, in Rudbar and Daylaman. These were areas of long-standing 
Shi'ite influence, which had produced, among others, the Shicite 
d t f th B 'd 20 ynas yo. .e uy1 s. 
But attention was given to other areas as well, and striking 
success was had in one of these. 
Juvayin tells us that in 484 / 1091-2 Hasan sent the daci 
Husayn of Qa'in to his home territory of Kuhistan, there to conduct 
21 propaganda. Husayn seems to have stumbled upon if not actually 
fomented something of a popular rising, for we soon find town after 
town in this mountainous south-eastern province rising in revolt 
against the unpopular Saljuk governor and declaring for the Ismacili 
22 
cause. Hodgson suggests that where there were no previous local-
ized Isma'ili roots, such mass accretions may have helped centralize 
the "Persian" dacwa around Hasan at Alamut; a subtle shift away 
from the traditional Ismacili pattern of autonomous localized da~~. 23 
Unlike previous da'is, independent while owing general allegiance to 
the imam as head of the whole dacwa, Hasan's 2:.~ appear to have 
20. Hodgson, p.74. 
21. Juvayni/Boyle, p.6?4. 
22. Lewis, Assassins, p.45. Hodgson, p.74. 
23. Hodgson, p.71. 
3.5. 
displayed unusually close allegiance to their Persian centre at 
Alamut. Perhaps this is a reflection of the remoteness of Cai.ro 
as much as of any unsettled feeljngs about the fatimid caliph's 
subjection to Badr al-Jamali's military regime in ~gypt. 
Ismacili successes around Alamut and in Kuhistan caused no 
little anxiety among the .Saljuk ~ at the court of the Sultan 
Malikshah. Even while Hasan was directing the seizure of Alamut, 
we are told that he had to avoid his home town, Rayy, because the 
Sultan's able chief minister Nizam al-Mulk had charged its governor, 
24 Bu-Muslim Razi, to lay hands on Hasan as soon as he could. 
As the new vigour of the Persian da~~~ under Hasan became more 
apparent, the anxiety of the Saljuk authorities showed itself in 
sterner measures. The most notable example which can be placed in 
th . db f 1092 . th . 'd t t c: 2 5 _ e perle e.: ore .. lS , .e J.nc1 en a .,awa. · Eighteen Ismacilis 
were arrested there for conducting festival prayers in competition 
with the Sunnites. They were later released, but it seems that they 
forthwith murdered the muezzin of the town. Perhaps they had told 
him too much of their plans while trying to convert him. Nizam al-
Mulk at once sent strict orders for the execution of the culprit, 
26 
one Tahir, a carpenter. 
24. Juvayni/Boyle, p.669. 
25. Hodgson, p.48. Ibn al-Athir gives the date 494 /1100-1101 
yet sAys it took place in Malikshah's reign (d. 1092). Thus 
his date may he a simple copyist~ error of 494 for 484 /1091. 
It was obvious, however, that the efforts of village policemen 
to curb IsmaCili expansion were at best unco-ordinated, at worst 
clumsy and ineffectual. Military action was needed. This came in 
1092, when Malikshah sent two armies, one into Daylaman and the 
other into Kuhistan. Surprisingly, both expeditions were utter 
failures. The army against Alamut commenced its siege in Jumada I 
(June-July) 1092. Hasan's garrison was at the time depleted, probably 
by the intensive propaganda campaigns elsewhere 1 but his ~-~§. were 
able to rally a useful force of Ismacilis from the neighbouring 
districts, and in a surprise night attack in Shacban (September-
October) 1092, the Saljuk army under Arslantash was routea. 27 
Perhaps it was this brilliant success which emboldened Hasan to 
attempt what seems to be his first essay in the technique later to 
characterize his movement. An Isma'ili named Bu Tahir Arrani 
assassinated Nizam al-Mulk on Friday, 16 October 1092 1 as he was 
being carried on a litter through the sultan's camp at Shahna 1 in 
"·'. h d 28 1'l a.va.n • 
Nizam al-Mulk's death was followed only a few weeks later by 
27. Juvayni/Boyle, p.675. 
28. Juvayni/Boyle, p.676; Rashid al-Din, extract translated in 
1 p.47. See also ]vi. Th. Houtsma, "The Death ~"-~._;,,.~_:.:..,.:..;.;.~-;;. 
and its Consequences 11 1 ,Journal of Indian 
Hi.story, series 3, II ( 1924) 
1 
pp. 147-16o·:~--~-~.--.~· -~~"" 
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that of the supreme Saljuk sultan Malikshah, in November, 1092. 
The news of the Sultan's death halted all activity against the 
Ismacilis; the army besieging the Kuhistan Isma'ilis at Dara with-
drew and dispersed. 
The death of Sultan and minister spelt the end of Saljuk 
unity. The empire they had both striven to preserve rapidly dis-
integrated into a patchwork of princedoms and virtually autonomous 
prOvinces and districts. The Ismacilis had been given a breathing 
space, and no doubt anticipated many opportunities for expansion 
while the Saljuk princes and governors struggled for power amongst 
themselves. 
Accordingly, in or about 1093, two more areas of expansion 
were added to Rudbar and Kuhistan, namely the eastern end of the 
Elburz range and the mountainous district between Fars and Khuzistan 
fur to the south. 29 
Though open success seemed to come easily in such remote hilly 
districts, often traditionally Shi'ite anyway, Ismacili dac.is were 
still active in the lowland areas of Sunnite and Saljuk predominance. 
The earliest Ismacili acquisition in an area of Saljuk 
dominance was the castle of Takrit in Irak, but this was small and 
exposed and does not appear to have troubled the Saljuks unduly. 30 
29. Hodgson, p.?6; Lewis, Assassins, p.45. 
30. Ibn al-Athir, cited in Hodgson, p.95. 
38. 
Yet when the Saljuks would not bestir themselves, the zealots 
among the Sunnite citizenry took matters into their own hands. The 
Sunnite response tended towards occasional massacres of Ismacilis, 
indicative of their mingled rage and terror. At Isfahan, in 1093, 
there was a massacre of IsmaCilis in the city. 31 In the same ·year, 
the citizens of Rayy attacked an Ismacili fort near Alamut, being 
beaten off only with difficulty.32 But apart from these isolated 
outbursts, the Ismacilis were relatively free from serious opposition 
after 1092. 
Then, in the midst of rising fortunes, came the shattering news 
from ~gypt of Nizar's deposition after Mustansir's death and 
Musta(li's installation as the imam-caliph. As we have already 
observed, the 11Persian11 Ismacilis chose not to recognize JVJusta c li, 
upholding rv:rustansir Is ~~ and proclaimed their allegiance to Nizar. 
All connexion with the Fatimid dacwa was severed. This action 
made the Nizaris, as they now should be called, an autonomous 
movement, but they had already been independent of Cairo in fact if 
not in theory for some time. It is noteworthy, for example, that 
the leadership of the dacwa before Hasan's time had been Persian, 
---
not sent from Egypt as might have been expected. 
This de facto autonomy of the Persian daCwa is perhaps rerrected 
31. Hodgson, pp.77, 85. 
32. This was Taliqan. Rashid al-Din, year 486 / 1093, cited in 
Hodgson, p.78. 
39. 
in another important respect. It is striking that Nizar's death 
without successor went without official recognition, explanation or 
reassurance from Alamut, yet Nizari activity in Persia shows no 
lapse of vigour. How Hasan solved the problem of the Nizari imamate 
is still not clear. At no time did he ever claim to be more than 
the ~~ja or 11 proof 11 of the imam. The commonest explanation, that 
a posthumous son of Nizar by a concubine was brought to Alamut where 
the line was preserved in secret, is late and unreliable. 33 The 
silence of our fundamental sources, Juvayni and Rashid al-Din, is 
surely significant; Hasan made no claim to possess the imam. 
If, as seems likely, there was no imam at Alamut, there may 
have been an alternative explanation which emphasised Hasan's role 
as hujja. Such an explanation could easily be misconstrued by out-
Yt 
siders into a belief that the imam was actually hidden at Alamut. 
The imam IViustansir would already have been little more than an 
~bstraction to ordinary initiates in Persia, who gave practical 
obedience not to the imam himself but to his representative, Hasan. 
Nizar's death would therefore have made little difference to the 
realities of life in the Persian dacwa. 
Differences did appear, however, and it is now necessary to 
digress so~ewhat in order to understand the changes Hasan-i Sabbah 
made in traditional lsmacili beliefs and organization. These were 
33. Hodgson, p.66 
34. Hodgson, pp.67-69. 
4o. 
not sweeping, but they were nonetheless effective, and are important 
for our understanding of the sources of Nizari cohesion through 
their later trials and exploits in Syria.35 
Though orthodox Sunnites accused them of apostasy, it would be 
wrong for us to regard the Ismacilis as non-Muslim simply because 
they were not orthodox. Sunnite and Ismacili alike adhered to certain 
basic elements of Islam. This is most evident in their mutual 
acceptance of the shahada or profession of belief in God's oneness 
and the mission of His Prophet, l-1uhammad. Both regarded the ~~ 
as divinely-inspired and an indispensable guide to the faithful, 
though their use of the text differed markedly. Close similarities 
exist even in the obligations of faith which are held to extend 
beyond the shahada. No Sunnite would quibble with this extract from 
an Ismacili creed; 11 1 believe • that prayer, and alms, and 
fasting, and pilgrimage, and holy warfare, and justice and benefice, 
and the giving to a relative are obligatory on the be1ievers. 1136 
35. What follows is not intended to be a complete summary of Ismacili 
doctrine. My purpose is simply to indicate those features of 
belief which seem most distinctively to characterize the move-
ment. My understanding has in general been derived from Lewis 
and Hodgson, but in especial from Nasseh Ahmad Mirza's unpub-
lished Ph.D. thesis, "The Syrian Ismacilis at the Time of the 
Crusades", (Durham, 1963). (Hereafter cited as l'flirza). Dr 
Mirza tells me he is himself an Ismacili, from Salamiya, one-
time Syrian residence of the so-called "Hidden ~ms" of the 
ninth century. (letter, 27 !ll[arch, 1969.) 
36. E.E. Salisbury, ttTranslation of two unpublished Arabic documents 
relating to the doctrines of the Ism"E{Ilis and other Batinian 
sects", .,TAOS, II (1851), p.309; cited hereafter as Salisbury. 
Hodgson, p.332, describes these two fragments as "systematic 
expositions of doctrine." 
In addition to ritual cleansing, the Ismacilis added a further 
obligation which is distinctively theirs, namely devotion to the 
Perhaps it was because they held so much in common that the 
Lr 1 • 
') r7 
imam.~ 
orthodox regarded the b~ or innovation of the Ismac ilis aB doullly 
pernicious. Though Ghazali was finally moved to declare the Batiniyya 
or esoteric sect~ apostate and worthy of death while the rest of the 
ShiCa was merely in error and astray, it should not be forgotten that 
the Ismacilis could take the same deadly legalistic view of Sunnites 
38 
who refused to join them after hearing their message. 
The doctrine of the imamate is probably the fundamental point 
of difference between the orthodox and the Ismacilis. The very 
essence of the Sunnite position is that the umma can rule itself and 
attain truth by the agreement (Lipa<) of its learned men on the mean-
ing of the Kur>an and traditions. The Ismacilis, however, could not 
believe that God would leave the faithful without an infallible 
leader, and extended the orthodox doctrine of the succession of 
prophets into a great cyclical system which assumes virtually 
continuous God-sent guidance • 
. 37· S.lv>. Stern, 11 Abu'l-~{i'isim al-Busti and hir> RefutBtion of 
Ismacl1ism 11 , JRI\S (1961), p.24, quoting from a .standard 
Ismaeili law book, the Da~a>im al-Islam of the ~adi an-Numan. 
38. Hodgson, pp.12Lf-133. 'rhere is a useful J•:nglish translation 
of Ghazali's fatwa (or decision on the theoretical application 
of the law) though not his more detailed Repudiation concerning 
the Batiniyya in A. Jeffery, Reader in Islam (The Hague, 1962), 
pp.254ff., taken from I. Goldziher' .s Str~~chriil_deL~zalJ:. 
~"kJ.::..:.;;__.:;.:;;:;..:;__.~;;;:;;:~w,;.._~a:.;.-_;"_se;;;_k:.:,t;: . .;:.e CLr e i den ' 1 9 m ' eXtract 2 4 • 
The basic pattern was set by the succession of great prophets 
( nati;.9_), Adam, Noah, Abraham, Jl!loses, Jesus, and Muhammad, Each 
~iJl (revealer or speaker of true doctrine) vvas believed to have 
a helper, variously termed wasi (executor) or asas (foundation), 
who was entrusted by the nati~g_ with a deeper inner meaning of the 
divine revelation to man. cAli, of course, was regarded as Muhammad's 
asas. 
39 Thiscilm (science or interpretation of religion) was handed 
on to a succession of i~ by a personal but divinely predestined 
designation, or Between each natig_, any number of cycle.s of 
imams may occur, the ~, alone po.ssessing ta c1if!! (authoritative 
teaching), for which the faithful owe them unhesitating obedience in 
al.J things. 40 
This taclim which made the imam so vita1 to the Ismacili 
system rested chiefly on the doctrine which ~ave them one of their 
popular names; the belief in a bati:t]; or hidden inner meaning of 
literal meaning, every detajl in the ,ran was awarded a symbolic 
meanj. ng. H'or example 1 11 fasting is thE" abstainin.e; from disclosure 
of the verities 11 • 41 Even the stages in the pilgrimage at JVlecca 
were given symbolic significance. Number and letter symbolism was 
39. .s. Guyard, nFragments relatifs 8. la doctrine des Ismaelies", 
~-~~ E:xtrait~, XII (187Lf), p.189. 
40. Hodgson, pp.52-53· 
41. Salisbury, p.318. 
freqtHmt ly uEJed; the cycles of .:tma!!~ aJ ways run in sevens, for 
instance. Thic; process of isolating the b~~ti£ meaning from the 
literal (z~~) was called .,;,t.,;,a~)_;;_;,;;..;;::;,' the esoteric interpretation 
possessed only by the a -. . ljZ, and his succeedJng J!Yl.~ms. 
Another leading feature of Ismaeili belief was the system of 
the universal divine order, an attempt to identify the basic 
principles of the cosmos and the ranks of the heavenly hierarchy. 
With God as originator, the first principle of the universe was the 
Universal Intellect (al Caql al-kull), from which emanated the 
Universal Soul (al-nafs al-kull). These were the First and Second 
Cosmic principles 1 whose interaction brought about the Creation.
43 
Hanked below these two were the rest of the heavenly hierarchy. 
Finding earthly equivalents for each supposed rank was one of the 
chief preoccupations of Ismacili philosophy, and was called the 
. . • I+LI. d calam a , or principles of religious obl1gat1on. Thus 
the gatiq would be the earthly counterpart of the F'irst Co,smic 
Principle, and the asas of the Second Principle, and so on. This 
equivalence was thought to demonstrate the predestination of the 
succession of natios and imams. 
These leading features of Ismacili belief were inherited by 
42. lvJ.G.s. Hodgson, article 11 I:3atinjyya 11 , EI?, i, pp.1098-1099. 
See also Salisbury, p.280, where non-Ismaeilis are repeatedly 
designated as 11 the People of the Outward Sense 11 • 
43. Mirza, pp.137, 151-152. Salisbury, pp.299-303. 
~-4. W. Ivanow, 11 'I'he Organization of the Fatimid Propag;anda 11 1 
JBBRAS, XV (1939), p.8. 
44. 
the Nizaris. Though it must be assumed that no sweeping changes 
were made in actual doctrine, certain changes in emphasis created 
what was virtually a new belief. The responsibility for this is 
usually given to Hasan-i Sabbah himself, though he may have inherited 
some ideas from his predecessor as head of the 11 Persian11 dacwa, 
'Abd al-Malik ibn cAttash. 45 
We are fortunate to possess what purports to be a summary of a 
treatise by Hasan himself on the subject of taclim, preserved in 
ash~Shahrastani (d. 1153). 46 Hasan's subtly-reasoned critique, 
paradoxical and elusive (perhaps because of the conciseness of the 
summary), goes far beyond any previous Ismacili works on the subject. 
All that he does is to develop four propositions which seem to 
destroy the usual Sunnite and ShiCite arguments on the need for an 
authoritative guide, and to resolve the negation in such a way that 
the Nizari imam appears to be the only possible guide for Islam. 
This places immense importance on Hasan's own role as hujja or "proof" 
of the imam. 
One of the neat demonstrations which Hasan advances to support 
his critique is the old saying that unity testifies to truth while 
multiplicity indicates error. Certainly, one of the leading features 
of the Nizaris was their extraordinary unity. Shahrast~ni notes that 
45. Hodgson, pp.52, 60. 
46. His al-Milal wa-u-nihal; translated as Appendix II, Hodgson 
pp.325-328.- See also the older translation in the Introduction 
to Salisbury, pp.263-272. 
Hasan ''prevented ordinary persons from delving into knowledge, and 
likewise the elite from investigating former books 11 • 47 
This suggests that Hasan may have discouraged traditional 
speculation on the batin and imposed instead a strictly authoritarian 
conformity. It is known, for example, that the usual allurements of 
the Muslim paradise, conveyed through richly imaginative portrayals 
of a many-mansioned heaven replete with precious stones, good food, 
and dark eyed female companions, were gradually dried up as the 
Nizari neophyte progressed through the rigorous degrees of initiation, 
until he was left with a stark and simple quest for proximity to 
the ~'s understanding. 48 This was, it seems, heaven enough for 
the truly devout. 
It is obvious that the Nizaris' unusual degree of unity and 
cohesion, their "group spirit", had a spiritual or doctrinal source, 
but this was strongly reinforced by the traditional Ismacili 
organization of the sect, to which we now must turn. 
47. Hodgson, p.427. 
L~8. S. Guyard, "Fragments relatifs ~ la doctrine des Isma'8lies 11 , 
Notices et Extraits, XXII (1874), pp.399-402. Compare the 
earlier translation by M. Rousseau in Annales des Voyag~s, 
1re serie, XVIII (1812), pp.236-237, which Guyard frequently 
corrects. On the degrees of initiation, originally seven 
but apparently later increased to nine, see Guyard, "Un 
grand ma'itre des Assassins 11 , JA, 7e serie, IX (1877), pp.332-3, 
but cf. Ivanow, "The Organization of the Fa timid Propaganda'', 
JBBRAS, XV (1939), p.11, n.3. 
At first sight, the evidence for Ismacili organization seems 
wonderfully abundant; few Ismacili writers fail to discuss the 
hudud calam al-din. However, as we have seen, the hudud is not a 
straightforward listing of ranks, but a form of abstract theory 
seeking to establish ideal correspondences between the heavenly 
hierarchy and its earthly counterpart. It is extraordinarily 
difficult to decide whether the earthly ranks offered in hudud 
treatises are actual or ideal. 49 Besides, there was more than one 
system of earthly gradation. Aside from the hierarchy of dacis 
----' 
there were recognized degrees of initiation and also a system of 
stages by which the convictions of would-be converts were broken 
down and replaced by Ismacili dogma.5° 
Faced with this potential degree of confusion, our apparent 
abundance of evidence shrinks almost to nothing. More reliable are 
incidental references in non-hudud fragments such as the Mujizatu>l-
Kafiya of Sayyid-na Ahmad an-Naysaburi.51 This is believed to have 
been written in the early eleventh century and is a short~eatise 
on the qualities and duties of the ideal daci. It is an ideal 
picture, and life in the dacwa in Fatimid times may perhaps have been 
less exacting than this treatise suggests, but it at least offers 
49. W. Ivanow, "The Organization of the Fatimid Propaganda", 
JBBRAS, XV (1939), p.5; hereafter cited as Ivanow. 
50. Hodgson, p.18 n.17. 
51. Extract translated in Ivanow, pp.18-35. 
sufficient insight into the organization of the dacwa to enable a 
a tentative outline of the system of ranks. 
The imam of course crowns the earthly hierarchy. Below him, 
the term daci is applied to all commissioned preachers, but within 
this large category various titles indicated seniority. 'l'he hlQ.;i~ 
or "proof 11 of the imam was highest of all the daci , while the bab 
or "gate" to the imam probably came next. This name would be used 
of chief dacis in outlying daCwas as well. Below the senior dacis, 
who alone could rece~ve the oaths of those who had passed all the 
degrees of initiation, were the licensed preachers. There are the 
ma)dhuns. Two other names are closely related to them; the muk~~r 
(persuaders) whose task was to break down neophytes' previous 
convictions, and the ~whose functions are not known. These 
constituted the active preaching da~ of the daCwa. Of the laity, 
ordinary initiates were called ~~staji£, while would-be converts 
were called muh~ir.52 
It must be assumed, for want of specific evidence, that this 
basic gradation of ranks was in use in the Persian ~ before 1094 
and that the Nizaris made no radical alterations to the system they 
inherited. Indeed, there is reason to believe that a system of 
ranks would be more strongly emphasised by Hasan, just as the degrees 
of initiation were apparently made more rigorous. 53 It is unlikely 
52. Naysaburi, in Ivanow, pp.9-11, 25, 26-28, 30-31. 
53· Hodgson, p.6o. 
48. 
that the Ni~aris would have abandoned such ready-made means of 
securing what they now so desperately needed; internal discipline. 
IGven under the J:<'atimids, reducti.on of rank was a severe form of 
punishment, which the ~adi an-Numan equates with excommunicatjon and 
f l . l. 54 ~,ay:tng a .. Jve. That the Nizaris retained the basjc Fatimid 
structure of ranks is confirmed by the appearance of Fatimid names 
jn the Nizari texts known as the Guyard fragments. 55 
'.rhe first fra[jment uses the terms h~i.ia. and ba£ in the 
traditional Fatimid sense, and offers a third equivalent senior rank, 
namely, ~.· The second fragment offers a list of ranks, namely 
dacj. 56 Finally, another synonym for 
_£aci is offered, namely ~ll or wing, which also occurs in the 
refutation of Abu'l-Qasim al-Busti. 57 Juvayni offers yet anoth0r 
when speaking of Husayn, the founder of the 
Kuhistan dac this is the term lib or deputy, which appears 
58 
nowhere in Nizari or Fatimid sources relating to ranks.· 
The most striking organizational innovation of the Nizaris was 
of course that of the notorious .fida'is who actually performed the 
54. Ivanow 1 translated extract from the Kitabu)l-Himma, p.17; see 
also p.31, for similar point in Naysaburi • 
. 55. 'I'ran.sla ted S. Guyard 1 11 Ji,ragmen tG re latifs ~ la doc trine de,s 
I.smaelies 11 , ices et J>;xt , XXII (1874) pp.275-Lt·28. 
56. Guyard, op.cit., pp.188, 275, 282, 314-315. 
57. .S.Jv[. Dtern, 11 Abu 1 1~Q,8sim 
JRAH (1961) p.23. 
58. Juvayni/Boyle, p.674. 
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assassination assignments. Both the organizational significance 
of this group and its reflection of the policies and political 
methods of the Nizaris need to be discussed at some length. 
It would be idle not to assume that the Nizaris after 1094 
saw themselves as sole guardians of the truth in Islam, and at the 
same time realized their extreme isolation and vulnerability, 
hopelessly outnumbered as they were by both Sunnites and Twelver 
Shica and threatened by the power of the Saljuk amirs. The 
Nizaris were too fewto mount successful military campaigns on 
anything other than a limited local scale, yet their aim was still 
nothing less than the replacement of Saljuk-Sunnite dominance with 
universal allegiance to their imam. How could they hope to achieve 
this grand aim? 
It is easy for the legend of the "Assassins 11 to obscure the 
fact that the Nizaris' primary task at all times must have been the 
winning of converts by intensive preaching campaigns. Only the 
creation of strong local followings could enable an outbreak of 
simultaneous small-scale popular revolutions, which together would 
paralyse Saljuk power. This policy was most appropriate to the 
fragmentary nature of the Saljuk domains after Malikshah's death. 
It is impossible to estimate the numerical success of these 
preaching campaigns; such evidence does not exist. But it is 
very likely that the gross disparity between their numbers and the 
scale of their objectives, coupled with the urgency of their mission 
and the severity of the Sunnite response, turned the Nizaris to an 
50. 
increased use of what Hodgson calls 11 the weapon of desperation"; 
. t. 59 assass1na lon. 
Assassination was not new in Islam, and indeed was common 
practice among the Saljuk warlords. 60 Though the Nizaris began to 
make much freer use of assassination than any of their contemporaries, 
to describe their use of this technique as systematic is to beg the 
question. We have no evidence of any grand plot to remove all key 
personnel in the Saljuk empire at one blow; this was probably quite 
beyond the Nizaris 1 numerical capacity. Their killings were 
selective, and usually in retaliation for some specific hurt, such 
as the killing of an Isma cili. 'l'he kadi or ra >is of a town or village 
where the Sunnite populace had run wild and slaughtered local 
IsmaCilis would go in fear of his life for some time afterwards, and 
it is said that Nizam al-Mulk died to avenge the carpenter executed 
on h . d t S' 61 1s or .ers a "awa. The victims were invariably Sunnite, though 
they ranged in rank from princes and ministers to army commanders, 
governors of towns and fortresses, down to local village magistrates 
62 
and mayors. 
As a political weapon, assassination can only remove adversaries; 
59. Hodgson, p.83. 
60. Hodgson, p.82. Lewis, Assassins, pp.25-26, 128-130. 
61. Hodgson, p.75. 
62. Juvay~i/Boyle pp.678-679. One of Juvayni's remarks is suggestive 
of large numbers; 11 To record the names of all these persons 
[i.e. Nizari victims] would take too long". 
it cannot of itself increase the size of one's movement. Yet as a 
defensive weapon, it carried a huge indirect advantage for the 
Nizaris. This was the terror inspired by assassination. The 
Nizaris 1 reputation went ahead of them. 
To neutralize an adversary by terror was often far preferable 
to eliminating him 1 because a.s we have seen the normal Sunnitc 
response to the murder of a public figure was to blame it on tho 
local Ismacilis and to massacre as many as could be found. This 
is perhaps why the are often represented as wearing the 
b f th ., . t. t. h th (' f. 63 gar o some o. er a1s 1nc 1ve group, sue as e uu 1 1 · or 
equipped with a 11 cover~story 11 to deflect blame away from the NizariE3 
if the ~~:.:1 was que.stioned before his inevitable execution. 64 
There are a number of indications that the Nizaris chose merely to 
instil terror even when their 11 victim 11 could as easily have been 
killed. The Sultan Sanjar 1 for example, once had a warning daggar 
stuck in the e;round be.side him as he slept. 65 
The men who performed these deeds, the notorious 
probably constituted a new rank in the Ismatili organi~ation. The 
63, 'rhe assassin of Niz.arn aJ-Jvlulk was so ndisguisod 11 • ,Juvayni/ 
Boyle, p.677. 
6L1. 'J'his is .suggested by B. Lewis, 11 'I'he Sources for the History of 
the Syrian Ast3ai3Bins", .Speculum, (1952) p.489. Abu F'iras 1 in 
his co11ection of anecd~;~~~bout the .c:;yrian Ihz.ari leader 
Rashid al-Din Sinan (1162-1193) seems to describe such a 
11 briefi.ng11 serJsion in anecdote XXIX; S. Guyard, 11 Un e;ra.nd 
"t d ' · t d s 1 d' 11 ·rA 7 " · r·'{ mc:n. re .e.s Assas,sl.ns au ernps .u , a ... a 1.n , < _ 1 e ser1 e 1 _ .1 ~ 
(1877), p_l~L~8. 
65. Juvayni/Boyle, p.682. 
52. 
argument from silence leads Hodgson to doubt if they formed a 
separate group at first; he suggests that any willing Nizari.might 
66 be chosen. However, the extremely fragmentary nature of surviving 
Nizari evidence prevents such a silence from being completely con-
elusive. Hodgson himself admits that they may have formed a 
distinct band at Alamut by the thirteenth century. 67 Several con-
siderations incline me to think that the fida'is were an actual 
organizational innovation, though whether a trained elite or a pool 
of willing volunteers is impossible to decide. 
It seems unlikely that would-be assassins were chosen simply 
at random. Assassination was often the Nizaris' sole effective 
weapon of retaliation, and this needed to be used efficiently or 
their terror-inspiring reputation would suffer; they could not 
afford to bungle too many attempts. Even though these assignments 
were invariably suicidal, this is no support for the argument 
66. Hodgson, p.83. 
67. Hodgson, p.82, n.5. It is unfortunate that our most likely 
indication on this problem is not clear. This is a line in 
a twelfth-century IsmaCili ode where the Arabic is translated 
"three men from the committee (?) 11 • This seems to suggest a 
separate elite of some sort, but as the translator's question 
mark indicates, the precise meaning of this word is not known. 
(W. Ivanow, "An Isma<.:.1.li Ode in Praise of Fidawis 11 , JBBRAS, 
XIV (1938), p.67; Arabic text p.70.) The word is unusual, 
though the root shows it is related to the idea of a group. 
Perhaps it is significant that the poet, when speaking of the 
Ismacilis as a whole, uses the more common noun, ~macat or 
11 following 11 • (Arabic text, p.72 line 39). 
53. 
68 that fanatical simpletons were used. The Sunnites never fully 
understood the tremendous group purpose of the Nizaris, nor that 
their ruthlessness stemmed from devotion as much as desperation. 
The discipline and cohesion of the movement, and their deep commit-
ment to their cause, would have sufficed to carry the fida)is 
through their grisly deeds, especially when the victim had to be 
"stalked" for an extended period. 69 
Obviously, such missions were not proving trials leading to 
further promotion. They would have been regarded instead as a 
sought-after honour, for like all Muslims the Nizaris believed that 
death in the service of one's faith translated one straight to 
paradise. It does not accord with what is known of Hasan-i Sabbah 
to imagine that he would leave so vital an aspect of the movement 
entirely unorganized. Random selection of fida>is would have opened 
up opportunity for resentment and suspicions of favouritism which 
68. One must beware of being misled by biassed Sunnite sources 
here. Ibn al-Kalanisi, speaking of the attempt on Buri's life 
in May, 1131, describes his assassins as "two simpletons from 
Khurasan", "chosen from amongst the ignorant members of their 
brotherhood". (H.A.R. Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle of the 
Crusades", (London, 1932), p.202). 
69. Despite de Sacy's proof of the derivation of the western term 
11assassin 11 (from hashish, the narcotic derived from Indian 
hemp), there is no mention whatsoever of the use of drugs 
in any IsmaCili or reputable Sunnite source known to date, 
so that the earlier impression of the Assassins as drug-
crazed fanatics must be consigned, along with stories of 
gardens, white cloaks, and demonstration death-leaps, to 
legend and hostile gossip. For the most concise up to date 
discussion (with full references) see B. Lewis, 11 Hashishiyya 11 , 
EI2, iii, pp.267-268. See also Hodgson, pp.82-83, notes 6 
and 7. 
54. 
might have undermined Ha.san' s authority. 
As a separate rank, the fidalis could more easily and effectively 
be indoctrinated with a special sense of guardianship of the whole 
movement, creating a distinctive ~sErit de corEs not shared by 
ordinary initiates. This does not entail going so far as the 
imaginative overstatement of earlier writers regarding special train-
0 0 1 d do 0 70 1ng 1n anguages an 1sgu1se. Even the best example of this 
known to me, from the Syrian Nizaris, says no more than this; Sinan 
wanted a message conveyed secretly to Saladin, so he called on two 
of his men who could speak 11 the Frankish tongue" and gave them each 
Frankish dress and Frankish swords. 71 Whether as Franks or Sufis or 
Turks, the Nizari "disguises" seem remarkably elementary. 
In view of their special responsibilities, the fida>is may have 
occupied a rank immediately below that of the licensed preachers and 
somewhat above the bulk of initiated followers. The Nizaris appear 
to have kept the Fatimid distinction between ~ (ordinary 
initiates) and muhaji~ (would-be converts), while adding a variety 
of other names. The Guyard fragments offer such terms as "true 
70. For example, E.G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, 
(London 1906-1930),II,p.209, cited and criticised by Hodgson, 
p.83 n.7. For criticisms of Browne's description of Ismacili 
dacis, see Ivanow, "'I'he Organization of the Fa timid Propaganda", 
JBBRAS, XV (1939) p.2. 
71. This is from Abu Firas, anecdote VIII, translated by S. Guyard, 
"Un grand ma1 tre des Assassins au temps du .Saladin", ,J A, 7e 
serie, ix (1877), pp.408-4og. 
believers 11 1 "affiliates"! 11 those who respond to the r:alln, and 
ll h -· ] d " . !i 7 2 c. L_. r en • However, by far the commonest term in the sources is 
rafig, (plural, ;ru:faqa); 7
-z 
. d ) compan1on or comra e. - It i.s not cl. ear 
whether this represents any functional subdivision or, as is more 
likely, merely a style of greeting amongst the Nizaris. 
With this slightly more detailed awareness of Nizari beliefs 
and organization, it is now necessary to return briefly to the 
fortunes of the sect after 1094. Their wariness of premature over-
commitment jn the struggle against Saljuk-Sunnite dominance may be 
deduced from their careful acguisj.tion and consolidation of strong-
holds in new areas. Though we may be tolerably sure that major 
acquisitions would have been noted by the chroniclers, it is likely 
that numerous smaller strongholds, perhaps no more than fortified 
villages, were also taken in areas surrounding the important 
IsmaCili castles. 
Perhaps the most important acquisition after 1094 was Girdkuh, 
at the eastern end of the Elburz ~ountains. This fortress commanded 
the main road between western Persia and the eastern provinces of 
Khurasan and Kuhistan. Both Juvayni and Rashid al-Din relate how 
one of the Nizaris' secret converts high in the favour of the Saljuks, 
the ~is ~'iuzaf:far 1 governor of De.mghan 1 obtained permj ssion to 
72. 
73. Guyard, op.cit., p.278; Juvayhi/Boyle, p.679. See aJ.so 
Hode;son, p.82. 
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repair the old castle at G1rdkuh. He refortified the place and 
laid in provisions, obviously intending permanent occupancy. His 
i.mmediate Saljuk superior>the Habashi, even entrusted Muzaffar 
with his treasure when he went out to fight against Sanjar in 1100; 
the was killed, Muzaffar kept the treasure, and then declared 
. 75 his open alleg1ance to Alamut. -
Muzaffar held this valuable strategic site for many years, and 
his contribution to Nizari solidarity may perhaps be gauged from 
Juvay:ni' s comment that lvJuzaffar was 11 an impregnable wall and a 
mighty evi1 11 • 76 
A striking and unusual success for the Nizaris after 1094 was 
the acquisition of two fortresses, Shahdiz and Khalinjan, close by 
the seat of Saljuk power at Isfahan. Like Takrit i:n Irak, these 
lowland fortresses were rare exceptions to the usual Nizari pattern 
of expansion in remote hilly areas. These fortresses posed an 
acutely direct threat to Isfahan, and the Saljuks' nervousness is 
demonstrated by Barkyaruk's pern1ission for another massacre of 
74. JuvayniiBoyJe 1 p.679. Rashid, cited Hodgson, p.86, n.11. 
75. Hodgson, pp.86-87, with full references, Rashid (cited 
Hodgson, p.86, n.11) dated Girdkuh's acquisition as coming 
after the breach between Barkyaruk and Muhammad, i.e. 492 I 
1098-1099, and Habashi's death in 493 I 1099-1100, However, 
Lewis, Assassins, p.50 gives the date as 1096, also citing 
Juvayni~d-T<~id. See Flodgson, pp.75-76, n.4.3 for a 
discussion of Ibn al-Athir's evidence, which places Girdkuh 
and other castJ.es any time between Malikshah 1 s death and 
Lf94 I 1100-01 • 
76. JuvayniiBoyle, p.679. 
Ismacilis in Isfahan in 1101. 7 7 
The last notable stron~hold taken by the Nizaris in Persia 
was Lammasar, in the Rudbar district near AJ.amut. This castJ.e 
controlled the important Salambar pass across the Elburz, and with 
Alamut gave the Ni.zaris tight strategic control of the district. 78 
An assault-party led by Kiya Buzurgummid entered the castle one 
night in September 1102, and slaughtered the Saljuk garrison. Like 
Muzaffar at Girdkuh, Buzurgummid improved the defences and took up 
permanent residence which he interrupted only to go to Alamut as 
Hasan-i Sabbah 1 s successor in 79 1124. 
These major acquisi.tions mark the limits of Njzari expansion 
in Persia, so far as it is known. However, the Saljuks, so 
long preoccupied with the war between Barkyaruk and Muhammad, 
were gathering forces to deal with the Nizaris once and for all. 
The Sultan Barkyaruk died in 1104, and soon afterwards Muhammad 
Tapar mounted a major offensive against Nizari possessions. 
Kuhistan was ravaged and Nizari power there crushed but not 
completely eliminated. 80 Under pressure, Takrit was finally 
surrendered in 1107, but not to the Saljuks; a Twelver Shicite amir 
77. Hodgson, pp.85-86, 88-Bg. 
79. Juvayni/Boyle, p.679. 
80. Lewis, Assassjns, p.52. The Nj.zaris recovered, and there is 
to this -d~y~;-:..:;tronp; Ismac ili element in Quhistan, N;ped alJ.y 
See r~. ;:Jilley, nrrhe Assassins of Q,a) i n 11 , ~~h~ 
I XL (1968), pp.1294-1303. ~~-·--···~-'-.~··~ 
took it 81 over. Muhammad Tapar himself recaptured the two Nizari 
fortresses close by Isfahan, yet seems to have allowed the garrisons 
to escape back to Alamut; 82 perhaps a reflection of the Nizaris' by 
now formidable reputation as assassins. Nizari possessions in Fars 
and Khuzistan probably suffered si~ilar destruction at this time, 
for little more is heard of them. 83 
The main offensive, however, was against Alamut ~nd Lammasar. 
From 1108 on, the crops and villages of the district were devastated 
each year in a war of attrition until a full-scale siege could be 
mounted in 1117. This appears to be the gravest crisis yet suffered 
by the movement, and the chroniclers say that the garrisons were 
near exhaustion when, in March-April 1118, news came of the death of 
the Sultan Muhammad. As in 1092, the besieging armies at once with-
drew and dispersed, each amir anxious not to lose ground in the 
inevitable str~ggle for power around the new Sultan. They even left 
their siege-machines and provisions behind; a welcome bonus for the 
Nizaris. 84 The Saljuk counter-offensive had reached its limits for 
the time being, and the Nizaris set about consolidating what few 
possessions remained intact. 
There was, however, one area of Nizari influence with which the 
81. Ibn al-Athir, cited Hodgson, p.95 n.36. 
82. Hodgson, p.g6. 
83. Lewis, ~~ p.55; Hodgson, p.97 
84. Ibn al-Athir, RHC.Or., I, pp.304-306. Hodgson, pp.97-98. 
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Saljuk campaign had not concerned itself. Whether because of its 
remoteness, or because a greater foe existed there in the form of 
the crusaders, or because Nizari success there had just been cur-
tailed by a massacre, the Saljuks had not sent an army into Syria. 
It i,s time to concentrate our attention on the Syrian ~ 
of the Nizari Ismacilis. 
60. 
CHAPTER III 
THE SYRIAN da Cwa; ALEPPO TO '11 06 
Our narrative survey of the early history of the Persian 
Nizaris has dwelt upon that aspect of the movement which may loosely 
be termed political, namely, the identification of Ismacilism 1 s 
traditional anti-Sunnite mandate with special opposition to the 
power of the Saljuk Turks. Yet, as was observed at the outset and 
implied in our consideration of their beliefs and organization, the 
Nizaris remain largely incomprehensible unless viewed as a religious 
sect. Like that of nearly every religious movement before and 
since, the most elementary objective of Nizari Ismacilism was, quite 
simply, growth. Only by growth of numbers could their power be 
increased to encompass their grandiose objectives. Furthermore, they 
had a pressing religious obligation to rescue other sincere Ismacilis 
from what the Nizaris thought was the false leadership of an imposter 
imam, the Fatimid Caliph Mustacli. In short, the basic preoccupation 
of the Nizaris as a sect was to wean as many Ismatilis as possible 
away from the Old Preaching and win them to the New. 
Though Egypt was pre-eminently the centre of Ismacilism, there 
were few prospects for Nizari expansion there. Undoubtedly some 
sort of indigenous following survived Nizar's revolt, but the Fatimid 
government under both al-Afdal and al-Ma'mun took elaborate pre-
cautions against the infiltration of Nizari agents from Persia. 1 
1. Ibn Muyassar, Akhbar M:i.sr, cited in S.M. Stern, "The Epistle 
of the Fatimid Caliph al-Amir", JRAS (1950), p.22. 
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While these security measures were strictly enforced, as they were 
for at least two decades, Egypt remained closed to the New Preaching. 
Outside Egypt, and apart from Persia, the main areas of Ismacili 
influence had been the Yemen, North Africa, Syria, and Irak. Tunisia 
and the Yemen were not too distant for Nizari da'is to have reached 
them, but both these areas rejected the Nizari position and acknow-
ledged the continued spiritual suzerainty of the Fatimid caliphs. 2 
In any case, Saljuk power had not extended to these areas as it had 
to Persia, Irak, and Syria. From the start, the Nizaris had shown 
great interest in Irak as the focal point of Saljuk-Sunnite dominance, 
yet the only notable Nizari success there was the seizure of Takrit 
in 1095. 3 lrak would always be a target area for Nizari opposition 
to the Saljuks, but prospects for sectarian expansion there were not 
at all bright. Consisting mostly of flat river plains and wide 
tracts of desert, Irak was easily controlled by the Saljuk cavalry, 
and the cities, where any movement had to look if it hoped to win a 
significant following, were strongly Sunnite as well as being Saljuk 
citadels. Baghdad was both the seat of the orthodox Caliphs and the 
nominal capital of the Saljuk Sultanate. 
This left Syria as the most logical place for Nizari expansion 
outside Persia. 
In Persia the Nizaris found that their campaign worked best 
2. Hodgson, p.65. 
3. as Ibn al-Athir relates it, even this was an exceptional stroke 
of luck; see Hodgson, pp.76-7, 80. 
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against a background of religious and political fragmentation, 
preferably in areas of difficult terraj.n, awkward of access for 
regular troops. By the end of the eleventh century, Syria was 
just such a place; a land of "intense geographic, social, religious, 
and ethnic fragmentation 11 • 4 
Its profusion of mountain ranges, dissected plateau surfaces, 
enclosed valleys and fortified towns sheltered a remarkable 
diversity of religious minorities. Apart from Greek orthodox 
Christians, found mostly in and around Antioch, the Maronites formed 
perhaps the largest non-Muslim minority. They were settled on the 
north-west slopes of the Lebanon Mountains and in the Jabal Summak 
further north. 5 Other non-Muslim groups included Nestorians and 
Jacobites, while several North Syrian towns sheltered sizeable 
refugee communities of Armenian Christians. 6 
The Muslim population of Syria was far from being uniformly 
orthodox. Sunnite predominance lay in the south, especially in and 
around Damascus, but in northern Syria the orthodox were almost 
4. C. Cahen, 11The Turkish Invasion", in K.M. Setton (general 
editor), the Pennsylvania History of the Crusades, 
(Philadelphia, 1955), I, p.165. 
5. H.A.R. Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades (London, 
1932), Introduction, p.27; consult Maps 3 and 4 inside the 
back cover for these localities. On the Maronites, see A.S. 
Atiya, A History of Eastern Christiani!;t: (London, 1968), 
pp.391-403, with references. 
6. Atiya, op.cit., pp.169-208, 305-308, 329-334; see also c. Cahen 
"Introduction to the F'irst Crusade", Past and Present, VI 
(1954), and Cahan's La Syrie du Nord I l'€poque des Croisades 
et la Principaute Franque d 1 Antioche (Paris, 1940), pp.18Lt-
18B; hereafter cited as Cahen, Syrie du Nord. 
equalled in number by Shicites, the vast majority of whom were 
Twelvers. Some towns are known to have been mainly Shi'ite from 
as early as the ninth century. 7 The Twelvers were of course 
the most moderate of the Shi'a, and their divergence from Orthodox 
Muslims was so slight that there was rarely any sectarian rancour 
8 between the two. However, other heterodox groups were not so 
moderate and earned the enmity of Sunnites and Twelvers alike. 
The Isma'ili schismatics known to us as the Druzes had settled 
permanently on the northern slopes of Mount Hermon, especially in 
the Wadi,l-Taim, though at one time they attempted to infiltrate 
the Jabal Summak as we11. 9 Since their schism was still relatively 
recent, their attitude towards other Muslims was often hostile. 
Though Isma'ili in doctrine, they chose and changed their friends 
according to the purely practical dictates of surviva1. 10 
7. Lewis, Assassins, p.g8. 
8. H.A.R. Gibb, "'l'he Caliphate and the Arab States", in the 
Pennsylvania History of the Crusades, I, pp.96-7, reminds us 
that the Shicite-Sunnite division in Islam has been grossly 
overrated by some western writers as an explanation of 
Muslim disunity at the time of the first Crusade. The real 
source of the disunity which enabled the crusaders to 
establish themselves was, as we shall shortly observe, the 
local jealousy and short-sighted particularism of the Syrian 
arilirs. 
9. P.K. Hitti, History of Syria (London, 1951), pp.583-586. 
10. Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle, Introduction, p.27; see also 
Benjamin of Tudela's observations, trans. by T. Wright, (ed.) 
Early Travels in Palestine (London, 1848), pp.79-80. 
The Druzes had in fact partially displaced another heterodox 
group from the Mount Hermon area. These were the Nusayris or 
Alawis, an esoteric Shicite minority which took their name from 
Muhammad ibn Nusayr, a partisan of the eleventh cAlid imam, al-
Hasan al-Askari (d. 260 / 873-4). They were Twelver in origin and 
regarded the Isma'ilis with a deep sectarian loathing because of 
their opposing interpretations of the true line of imams. 11 By 
the 1090's, the Nusayris were mostly found along the northern 
slopes of the Lebanon Mountains, in the hinterland of Jabala and 
Lattakia, and in the Jabal Summak. 12 
Far more significant for the Nizari campaign, however, were 
the indigenous Syrian Ismacilis. Though we have no numerical 
evidence, it seems likely that the Ismacilis were one of the largest 
heterodox Muslim groups next to the Twelvers. This is suggested by 
the fact that Fatimid political control of Syria, secure by the 
second quarter of the eleventh century and diminished only since the 
appearance of the Turks (c.1070), was accompanied by an intensive 
11. see L. Massignon, article "Nusairi", EI, iii, pp.963-96?; 
Hitti, History of Syria, pp:585-7; S. Guyard~ "Un grand 
maitre des Assassins", JA, 7e serie, IX (1877), pp.349-
350, and "Le Fetwa d 1 Ibn Taimiyyah sur les Nosairis", 
JA, 6e s~rie, XVIII (1871), pp.158-162, 178-198. 
12. Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle, Introduction, p.28; large 
numbers of Nusayris were slaughtered in the course of the 
first Crusade; see Bar Hebraeus (Abu'l-Faraj), The 
Chronography, trans. E.A.W. Budge, (Oxford, 1932), p.235. 
propaganda campaign. 13 Fatimid dacis seem, ironically, to have 
had more success in Syria than among the peasants of Egypt itselr. 14 
In 1051 the Caliph Mustansir sent his chief daci to Aleppo to 
direct the campaign, which at that time was aimed against the 
1c:: 
'Abbasids. 7 As a result of this activity, the Fatimids created 
sizeable Ismacili communities, not only in the Shicite north, in 
Aleppo and the Jazr and Jabal Summak, but also in the coastal cities 
d th . t l d . D · t J f 16 un er e~r con.ro an even ~n amascus ~ se .• As early as 
1036-7 we hear of a Druze missionary hopefully appealing for converts 
17 
among the Ismacilis then established in the Jabal Summak. In the 
Jazr, the traditionally Shicite town of Sarmin seems to have become 
something of an Ismacili centre, so much so that before 1095 the 
leading Sunnites of the town, the Banu'l-Sufi 1 judged it prudent to 
13. Gibb, "The Caliphate and the Arab States", in the Pennsylvania 
History of the Crusades, I, p.89. 
14. see M. Canard, article "Fa~imids", EI2, ii, p.859. 
15. cArif 'ramir, cAn: Abwab Alamilt (Harisa, Lebanon, 1959), p.j', 
cited in Mirza, op.cit., p.12. See also M. Canard, 111' 
Imp~rialisme des Fatimides et leur propaganda'', Annales de 
l'Institut d'~tudes Orientales, (Algier), IV (1942-47), 
pp.169-185. 
16. Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle, Introduction, pp.16-17. 
17. S. de Sacy, Expose de la Religion des Druzes (Paris, 1838), I, 
dviii, cited by B. Lewis, 11 'l'he Ismaeili tes and the Assassins", 
in the Pennsylvania History of the Crusades, I, p.112. 
18 
remove themselves to Damascus. 
It is to be assumed that the Syrian Ismacilis adopted the 
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Musta~lian allegiance in 1094; loyalty to the Fatimids was strong in 
Syria for many years yet. 19 
With a considerable body of indigenous Ismacilis to be won from 
the Old Preaching, and with numerous other heterodox sectaries, 
some of whom might conceivably be persuaded to adopt Nizari Ismacilism, 
Syria obviously had great potential for the Nizari campaign. 
But this was not all. The extreme political fragmentation of 
late eleventh century Syria offered the Nizaris almost ideal working 
conditions. 
Saljuk power in Syria had been secured in a campaign launched 
by the Sultan Malikshah in 1077. This was led by the Sultan's 
brother, 'rutush, who was given a free hand to conquer all he could 
from Fatimids and Turkish adventurers alike. 20 He was strikingly 
successful; only Aleppo and the Fatimid coastal cities eluded his 
grasp. Indeed, Malikshah was so alarmed at his brother's power 
18. C. Cahen, ''Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans 
l'Asie musulmane du Moyen Age'', Arabica, V (1958), p.237, 
citing (in MS.) Ibn Asakir, Ta)rikh madinat Dimashk, and 
Kamal al-Din ibn al-cAdim, Bughyat at-talab fi ta,rikh Halab. 
19. Hodgson, p.70; when the Shicite citizens of Afamiya wanted a 
governor of their own faith in 1096, they sent to Cairo and 
were given a ruler who professed Musta'lian Ismacilism. 
(Ibn Muyassar, Akhbar Misr, extracts translated RHC. Or., III, 
pp.461.) 
20. Abu'l-Fida, Mukhtasar ta>rikh al-bashar; abridged translation, 
RHC. Or., I, p.1. 
21 
that he twice stepped in to prevent Tutush from occupying Aleppo. 
When Malikshah died in 1092, Tutush made a bid for the sultanate, 
but was distracted by the intrigues of the Syrian amirs. He finally 
routed their combined forces in 1094 and occupied in turn Aleppo, 
Edessa, and Mosul. He then entered Persia to make good his claims, 
22 
only to be defeated and killed near Rayy in February 1095. 
The death of Tutush initiated in Syria what French historians 
aptly describe as "le morcellement politique". 2 3 Aleppo fell to 
Tutush's son Fakhr al-Muluk Ridwan, and Damascus to Ridwan's younger 
brother Shams al-Muluk Dukak. Real power in both palaces probably 
lay with their atabegs, Janah al-Dawlah and Zahir al-Din Tughtakin. 
An intense rivalry which developed between the two sons of Tutush 
now took precedence in a situation already complicated by the 
jealousies and divisions of the lesser amirs. For example, the 
governor of Antioch, Yaghi Siyan, would have allied with Aleppo but 
he detested Ridwan's atabe~, so Antioch aligned itself instead with 
24 Damascus and waged war on Aleppo. Shifting patterns of conflict 
between Aleppo and Damascus and their respective allies characterized 
Syrian politics just prior to the first Crusade. Religion had long 
ceased to be a first cause; the realEolitik of self-interest and 
21. Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle, Introduction, p.20. 
22. Abu'l-Fida, RHC. Or., I, p.2; see also 'I'he Cambrid~ History of 
Iran, volume V, The Saljuq and Mongol Periods, ed. J.A. Boyle, 
(cambridge, 1968), pp.102-1o8". 
23. Cahen, Slrie du Nord, p.177. 
24. Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle, Introduction, pp.21, 23, 30. 
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particularism held the field almost completely. 25 
'l'he pattern changed slightly in 1097. Ridwan at Aleppo quarreJJed 
bitterly with his atabe~ who promptly went off and seized Hims, an 
important town midway between Aleppo and Damascus. Here, exploiting 
the conflict between the two cities, Janah created a small but 
enduring principality. 
Hims was not the only independent local principality. No more 
striking evidence of Syrian political fragmentation after 1095 is to 
be had than the survival of a group of petty Muslim principalities 
dotted between Antioch and Damascus. Most had been established by 
local Arab dynasties, and ranged in size and influence from those of 
the BanucAmmar at Tripoli or the Banu Munkidh at Shaizar to the tiny 
enclaves of the BanucAmrun at al-Khaf, the Banu Muhriz at Marqab and 
Qadmus, and the Banu Sulaiha at Jabala. 26 
The most recent of the petty principalities was that of Afamiya, 
created by the notorious adventurer Khalaf ibn Mulacib. He had been 
appointed by the Fatimid government in 1096 in response to a plea 
from the populace for a ruler of their own faith, but soon showed 
that he was interested in hunting and brigandage rather than good 
government. 27 
Before the end of the eleventh century, two further segments 
25. see H.A.R. Gibb, "Notes on the Arabic Materials for the History 
of the Early Crusades," BSOS, VII (1935), pp.7i+O, 743-Lt. 
26. Cahan, Syrie du Nord, p.180. 
27. Ibn Muyassar, Akhbar Misr, extracts transl. RHC. Or., III, 
p.461. See also N. 1hisseeff, article "Him?," EI2, iii, 
p.398. 
were added to the political mosaic of Syria and upper Mesopotamia. 
These were the creations of the first Crusade, two principalities 
named after the cities upon which their existence depended; Antioch 
and Edessa. Indeed, at first these Christian states consisted of 
little more than the two cities and a cluster of key towns and fortresses 
around them. Both principalities were short of manpower, and could 
control but never colonize their territories. The native peasantry 
remained, paying taxes to their new rulers just as they had to 
Byzantine, Muslim, and Turkish governors before them, and the commer-
cial life of towns and cities went on much as before. Edessa was a 
curiously shapeless creation, lacking natural boundaries, but its 
cities were wealthy and the crusaders (or Franks as they were called) 
enjoyed the support of widespread Armenian christian elements. 
Antioch was the stronger of the two, a vigorous and expansionist 
state under Bohemond I and his regent Tancred. Antioch's natural line 
of expansion was to thefoast and south, across the Orontes, where a 
group of fortress towns formed Aleppo's western outworks; Artah, 
Atharib, Zerdana, Kafarlata, Macarrat Misrin, Fua, Sarmin, Albara, 
Macarrat al-NuTman, to name but a few, This area between the two 
cities was to become a scene of constantly shifting border warfare 
in the next few decades. Aleppo was the focal point of the new 
balance of forces established in the north and constituted a major 
obstacle to Latin domination of northern Syria. The Franks never 
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succeeded in capturing the city. 28 
Though Antioch itself was larger, Aleppo was clearly the hub 
of northern Syria in our period, and it is scarcely surprising that 
when we first hear of a Nizari "presence" in Syria, it is at Aleppo. 
Since the Arab conquest in the seventh century, Aleppo had 
grown to be a rich and populous city, thriving on its industries 
and the long distance trade which flowed through it. Aleppo's 
fortifications were splendid. A massive wall encircled the city, 
while in the middle, making full use of the defensive potential of 
an ancient flat-topped~' stood a strong and impressive citadel 
surrounded by an immense ditch or fosse. As well as being a city, 
Aleppo was a vast fortress. 29 
Like Hasan-i Sabbah 1 s choice of Alamut, Aleppo was the most 
obvious and logical place to commence the Nizari campaign in Syria. 
In its religious composition, Aleppo was strikingly a microcosm of 
northern Syria. The Sunnites were almost equalled in number by 
Twelver Shi'ites, and taken altogether, ignoring the gulfs between 
Twelvers, Ismacilis, Druzes and Nusayris, the Shi'ites of Aleppo 
30 probably outnumbered the orthodox. Indeed, for a few years before 
28. Detailed accounts of the crusaders' establishment in northern Syria 
are available in Cahen, Syrie du Nord, pp.205-266; S. Runciman, 
A History of the Crusades (Cambridge, 1951-2), I, (hereafter 
cited as Runciman), especially pp.203-262, 318-322; and R. 
Grousset, Histoire des Croisades et du Royaume Franque de 
J~rusalem, (Paris, 1934-35}, tome I, pp.58-119, 359-395. 
29. J. Sauvaget, article 11Halab 11 , EI2, iii, pp.85-87; Cahen, Syrie 
du Nord, pp.154-5. 
30. Hodgson, pp.71, 91; Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.189; J. Sauvaget, 
Alep (Bibliotheque Arch~ologique et historique, XXXVI, Paris, 
191+1), pp.95-98, citing the evidence of Ibn al-Furat for the 
Shicite preponderance in Aleppo. 
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the Saljuks seized the place, Aleppo was ruled by a Shicite dynasty, 
th cu "l"d f M 1 31 e qa1 1 s o osu • 
Conditions within Aleppo at the end of the eleventh century 
could not have been much better for the Nizari campaign. The 
battles, changes of dynasty, and severe taxation wrought by the 
Turkish invasion had seriously disrupted the city's trade and food 
supply, even before the crusaders began their destructive raiding. 
By the close of the century, Aleppo's fabled prosperity had almost 
vanished, and economic distress was reflected in the increasing 
restlessness and turbulence of its populace. There is also evidence 
that the normal machinery of civic government was beginning to give 
way to vicious sectional self-determination. 32 We have already 
observed that the Ismacili preaching, with its promises of justice 
and an end to oppression and misery, possessed a remarkably strong 
33 appeal for victims of social and economic dislocation. 
Altogether, prospects for the Nizari campaign at Aleppo seem 
to have been good. The actual beginnings of the da'wa, however, 
remain shadowy. The sources do not tell us exactly when Nizari 
missionaries first appeared in Aleppo; nor can we reasonably expect 
them to. Initial Nizari activity would have been small-scale, and 
conducted quietly if not in secret. Hence our earliest direct 
31. C. Cahen, "The 'l'urkish Invasion 11 , in the Pennsylvania History 
of the Crusades, I, pp.151-2. 
32. Sauvaget, Alep, pp.107-8. 
33. See above, p.13. 
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3L 
references show the daCwa as an established functioning entity. f 
Obviously, the foundation of the dacwa occurred sometime earlier but 
how much earlier it is very difficult to assess, for the indications 
on this problem are contradictory. 
On the one hand, the Nizaris quickly became notorious in Persia 
for their use of selective assassination and this reputation spread 
far afield in the Muslim world, into areas where they were otherwise 
unknown. It could be argued from this that notice would be taken of 
them fairly soon wherever they appeared. On the other hand, we cannot 
judge how long it would take the pioneering daCis to build up a 
recognizable movement from clandestine small-scale beginnings. One 
wri terJ,hSts suggested that the Nizaris had something of a prolonged 
struggle against ingrained Fatimid loyalties in their efforts to 
convert the Syrian Ismacilis to the New Preaching. 35 
The question of dating the beginnings of the da'wa must 
therefore be approached open-mindedly; dacis from Alamut may have 
arrived in Syria only shortly before the sect is first mentioned in 
Syrian sources, but on the other hand, they may have been working 
quietly for some years before. 
34. B. Lewis, "The Sources for the History of the Syrian Assassins," 
Speculum, XXVII (1952), p.489. Our sources are almost entirely 
chronicles, which notice the Nizaris only when they are 
involved in some striking event, such as a battle, a massacre, 
an attempt on a castle, or an assassination. For the silent 
gaps between such isolated references, we have to rely on 
circumstantial evidence combined with whatever scraps of 
retrospective information the chroniclers choose to include 
from time to time. 
35. Hodgson, p.70. 
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The first mention of Nizaris in Syria, from the sources 
36 
available to me, occurs in A.B. 495 (1101-02). It is evident 
from the episode described and the chronicler's general observations 
that the sectaries were already well-established at Aleppo by this 
time. (We shall shortly return to this first mention in more 
detail.) From this date, most modern writers on the Syrian Nizaris 
have been content to suggest that the dacwa must have been established 
in or before 1100. 37 Earlier writers, however, were somewhat bolder 
than this. ~tienne Quatrem~re, in his pioneering essay on the Syrian 
Ismacilis, chose the very start of Ridwan's reign as the date for the 
dacwa's inception, and says that they had a place in Aleppo "pendant 
tou te la duree de son regne" _38 . Though Quatrem(he gives no 
references for this, his opinions still deserve respect; he made 
intensive use of early manuscript materials containing extracts from 
36. Kamal al-Din ibn al-'Adim, Zubdat al-Halab fi ta>rikh Halab; 
abridged French translation, RHC. Or., III, pp.589-590. 
(All subsequent references to Kamal are to the Zubdat 
unless otherwise stated.) 
37. Hodgson, p.89; Lewis, Assassins, p.99; Cahen, Syrie du Nord 
p. 189. 
38. E. Quatremere, 11Notice historique sur les Isma~liens," 
Fundgruben des Orients, IV (1809), p.341. (Hereafter cited 
as Quatremere.) The date he offers is manifestly a type-
setter's error; 498 is 1104-05. He may have intended 489, 
or 1095-6; the first year of Ridwan's reign"" 
';4. 
otherwise lost contemporary chronicles. 39 Nearly half a century 
after Quatrem~re, M.C. Defr~mery suggested that Hasan-i Sabbah would 
have sent dacis into Syria as soon as he was established at Alamut, 
and that Ridwan's support at Aleppo was obtained in the closing 
40 years of the century. Indeed, our information being so fragmentary, 
we must allow that informal contacts may have existed between the 
Syrian and Persian Ismacilis before the 1094 schism. Hasan-i Sabbah 
himself travelled through Syria on his way to Egypt in 10'?8 and 
probably returned to Persia that way. The opportunity was always 
there. 
The earliest possible dating for the inception of a Nizari 
dacwa in Syria would therefore be straight after the schism, in 1095 
or 1096. The gap between this dating and the earliest Nizari mention 
in our sources either indicates that progress was slow at first, that 
39. Lewis, "Sources •.• ", Speculum XXVII (1952), p.Lf78; see 
also C. Cahen, "Une chron.ique Chiite au temps des Croisades, 11 
Com.Jtes Rendus de l'Acad&mie des Inscriptions et Belles 
Lettres, 193 , pp.25 -2·9. The only support I have found 
for Quatrem~re's dating is a phrase in the chronicle of 
Abu 1 l-Mahasin, trans. RHC. Or., III, p.497, which says of 
Ridwan: "from the first, he constructed in Aleppo a 
propaganda centre'' (for the Nizaris). However, I suspect 
that this is either a stylistic flourish or a slip in the 
translation. A similar phrase appears in Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, 
HHC. Or., III, p.530, which is translated; (Hidwan) "was 
the first to build for them in that town a m:ission-house". 
l.J.o. M.C. Defr§mery, "Nouvelles recherche.s sur Jes Ismaeliens ou 
Batiniens de Syrie," Part I, Journal Asiatique, 5e s~rie, 
III (1854), p.376, hereafter cited as Defr~mery. His dates 
are also slightly in error here; he dates Ha.san1s occupation 
of Alamut as 1092 rather than 1090. 
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unforeseen problems and obstacles were encountered which delayed 
the open establishment of the movement, or that dacis did not 
arrive from Persia until about 1100. A closer look at what little 
we know of the early activity of the dacwa may suggest which is 
the likelier possibility. 
The daci credited with the founding of the Syrian dacwa is 
named in several of our sources, and in fact is the occasion for 
our first notice of the Nizaris in Syria. He apparently involved 
himself in the feud between Ridwan and Janah al-Dawlah, and was 
with Ridwan at Sarmin sometime in 1101-02 when Janah fell on their 
camp by surprise and sacked it. Ridwan and most of his entourage 
managed to escape and fled to Aleppo, though Ridwan's wazir 
Abu'l-Fadl was among those taken captive and later held for ransom. 
Our chronicler tells us that while Janah was sacking the camp, 
he searched in particular for "the Batinian physician-astrologer, 
but could not find him". We are further told that "it was this 
man who had caused him to quarrel with Ridwan'', and that the 
physician-astrologer was one of those who reached Aleppo safely. 41 
Kamal al-Din is not, of course, a contemporary witness, but he uses 
contemporary materials with remarkable fidelity and will be our 
major source for north Syrian affairs. Our main contemporary source, 
the Damascus Chronicle of Ibn al-Kalanisi, enlightens us a little 
further in an entry for the following year, which states that "the 
41. Kamal al-Din, RHC. Or., III, pp.589-590. 
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person known as al-Hakim al-~·Jana,jjim the Batini, a member of the 
entourage of the king Fakhr al-Muluk Rudwan, 1 lord of Aleppo, was 
the first to profess the doctrines of the Batiniya in Aleppo and 
Syria.n42 
These two brief entries contain virtually all we know about 
the founding da'i at this stage. We have his occupational surname -
al-Hakim al-Munajjim being literally translated as "physician-
astrologer" - but no personal name, no patronymics, no place of 
origin. However, the name is Persian, so we do know his nationality, 
and this confirms the assumption - there is no more direct evidence -
that the Syrian da<wa was led from the start by Persian daCis. We 
are given no further details of this man's role in the dispute 
between Ridwan and Janah, but the most significant piece of inform-
ation is that his centre of operations was Aleppo, where he was 
actually part of Ridwan's entourage. 
Nearly all our sources have something to say about Ridwan's 
support and protection of the Nizaris at Aleppo. This is of central 
importance to our estimation of the da<wa's achievement, for we are 
at liberty to wonder whether the Nizaris could have attained such 
rapid growth and early prominence in Syrian affairs without his 
support. Kamal al-Din continues his entry of A.H. 495 with this 
42. Ibn al-Kalanisi, Dhail Ta>rikh Dimashki; trans. H.A.R. Gibb, 
The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades (London, 1932), p.58 
(hereafter cited as Kalanisi). I suspect that Kalanisi may 
make earlier mention of the Nizaris than this, because Lewis 
(in "Sources ••• ", Speculum, XXVII (1952), p.48LI- n.50) has 
warned that Gibb's abridged translation contains "most, 
though not all'', of Kalanisi's references to the Nizaris. 
statement: 
"It was this prince who, being won over to the cause of 
the Batiniens, let them multiply in Aleppo. He declared 
himself their partisan and protector, giving them high 
positions, letting their power grow day by day. He even 
authorized the establishment of a house of propaganda 
for them in Aleppo. Deaf to the entreaties of other 
princes, Ridwan never abandoned these beliefs." 43 
77. 
Why should this Saljuk prince support and protect a group of 
heterodox sectaries whose manifest objective was the overthrow of 
Sa)jlk power? Kamal al-Din offers the simplest and most obvious 
explanation; that Ridwan was himself converted to Nizari Ismacil.ism. 
This would, of course, be the natural conclusion of orthodox con-
temporaries, at a loss to explain otherwise why Ridwan was friendly 
towards the Nizaris. The air was heavy with suspicion in these 
years, and many Twelver Shicites were unjustly accused bf dealings 
with the "Batinis 11 • 4·4 Since we cannot presume to investigate Ridwan 1 s 
personal convictions from this distance of time, we cannot categorically 
deny that he sympathised with their doctrines, but it is most unlikely 
that he ever professed them openly. He was unpopular enough with 
his orthodox and Twelver Shicite subjects, and his open conversion 
would almost certainly have provoked a major rebellion. Arguments 
which would justify his keeping such a conversion secret in fact 
43. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.590. 
44. One example is the destruction of the amir Saif al-Dawla Sadaka 
by the Saljuk governor of Irak, who managed to persuade the 
Sultan that this amir was a secret Nizari; our chronicler 
observes that he was-merely an ordinary Shicite. (Ibn al-Athir, 
al-Kamil at-Tawarikh; abridged translation, RHC. Or., I, 
pp.247-8.) 
?8. 
indicate a more plausible explanation, namely, that Ridwan's 
understanding with the Nizaris was a purely practical one, a classic 
mariage de convenance for both parties. To establish this, we must 
examine Ridwan's military and political circumstances at Aleppo. 
Tutush's expeditions into the Jazira and Persia in pursuit of 
the sultanate had drawn the main body of Turks away from Syria, 
leaving the Turkish amirs there with an acute shortage of troops, 
especially cavalry. 45 Ridwan's effective military power therefore 
rested as much on local levies as on the Turks of his easkar. This 
position was acutely worsened by his atabes's desertion in 1097, for 
Janah took many of the best troops with him. Ridwan's own forces 
could assert his authority well enough in rural areas, but by them-
selves were inadequate to meet serious invasion threats. Perhaps 
even more significant for our present subject, Ridwan's Turkish 
cavalry were too blunt an instrument for securing his authority within 
Aleppo itself. He could not afford to alienate the people from whom 
he derived his revenue because he relied on their local militia 
groups (ahdath) to supplement his caskar on campaigns and in time of 
siege. 
The ahdath were essentially the armed bands of the craft guilds, 
but they were also the instruments of various city factions. Because 
they combined military power with the expression of popular opinion, 
no ruler could afford to ignore them. 46 Indeed, in time of emergency, 
45. C. Cahen, "The Turkish Invasion", in the Pennsylvania History 
of the Crusades, I, pp.164-5. 
46. Sauvaget, ~lep, pp.96-7. 
79. 
the supreme commander of the ahdath was the virtual ruler of the 
city outside the citadel. This powerful role was traditi.onal1y 
that of the ralis of the city, who often drew his 1ieutenants or 
47 
sharifs from his own fami1y or faction. The riyasa at Aleppo was 
traditionally in the power of the leading Sunnite family, the Banu 11-
Bad¥, but they shared civic leadership with the leading Twelver 
Shicite family, the Banu 1l-Khashshab, who supplied the city with 
its kadis or magistrates. Whatever their personal rivalries, the 
loyalties of both families were intensely Al~ppine; they hopefully 
regarded Saljuk rule as no more than a sort of Turkish intermezzo. 48 
Their suspicion of Ridwan was so deep, and their control of the city 
factions so effective, that Ridwan was denied any popular following 
in Aleppo. 
Thus, in addition to his military weakness, Ridwan's authority 
in the city itself was narrowly circumscribed and his position was 
politically precarious. This meant that he could not afford to be 
fastidious in his choice of supporters; he would clutch at anything 
which would help shore up his power. 
An example of this, and a possible indication of how little 
doctrinaire religious loyalty mattered to Ridwan, appears in 1097. 
l1-7. C. Cahen, ".Mouvements populaires et au tonomisme urbain dans 
l'Asie musulmane du Moyen Age," Arabica, V (1958), pp.237-2lt1. 
48. Ibn abi-Tayy, from Ibn ash-Shihnah, ad-Dur al-Muntakhab; trans. 
J. Sauvaget, Les Perles Choisies d'Ibn ash-Shihnah (~eirut, 
1933), pp.27,b2-64; Ibn al-Furat, cited in Cahen, "Mouvements 
populaires ••• ", Arabica, V (1958), p.21+2. 
8o. 
When Janah left him, Ridwan sent to Cairo, offering his allegiance 
in return for aid. The imam-Caliph Mustfhi 's name was duly included 
in the khutba in place of the cAbbasid caliph's on 29 August 1097. 
But as time passed and no troops came, Ridwan testily switched 
49 
allegiance back to Baghdad. 
How could the Nizaris be of use to Ridwan? Quite simply, by 
providing him with an organized body of support within the city to 
counterbalance to some extent the armed bands of the guilds and city 
notables, and to provide Ridwan with levies whose loyalty would be 
to him rather than to the city in time of siege. 
Though the earliest direct reference to Nizari militia at 
Aleppo is not until 1111, 50 it is reasonable to assume that the 
sectaries developed a disciplined force at a very early date, both 
to prevent intimidation of sympathisers by the Sunnite ~ath, and 
simply to protect themselves. In the anarchic conditions prev~iling 
at Aleppo in these years, street fights and assaults on members of 
rival factions were apparently commonplace. 51 As their following 
grew stronger, the Nizaris could offer protection to Ridwan's agents 
49. Ibn Muyassar, Akhbar Misr; extracts trans. RHC. Or., III, 
pp.461-462, giving 17 Ramadan, 490. Abu 1-Mahasin, an-
Nujum az-Zahira; extracfs trans. RHC. Or., III, p.48bgives 
the wrong date and represents the initiative as coming from 
al-Afdal and Musta<li. P.K. Hitti, A Histor.l: ~ria (London, 
1951) p.575 states that the d~ration of Ridwan 1 s temporary 
Fatimid allegiance was only a month; but no references are 
given. 
50. Kalanisi, p~115. 
51. Sauvaget, .£!~, pp.107-108; Cahen, S.l:rie du Nord, pp.195-6. 
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and officials in the city and act on his behalf against critics and 
enemies. In return, his patronage and the ultimate threat of bloody 
subjugation by his Gaskar shielded the Nizaris from the violent 
opposition of Sunnite and Twelver factions. 
Ridwan therefore had sufficient grounds for welcoming the 
Nizaris' alliance without actually becoming one of their adherents. 
His military and political enfeeblement and his apparent lack of 
doctrinaire scruples are more than adequate to explain his attitude. 
There are other indications as well which make his conversion seem 
unlikely. The Shicite chronicler Ibn abi-Tayy states that Ridwan 
so feared the 11 Ismacilis 11 in Aleppo that he preferred not to use the 
main gateway to the citadel. Instead, he had an old tunnel which led 
from the courtyard to a cellar somewhere in the city secretly 
. 52 
renovated and fitted with a sta1rcase. 
If Ridwan's dealings with the Nizaris were on a purely practical 
mutual-aid basis, and were motivated as much by fear as necessity, 
we may hazard at last a guess as to the date of the dacwa's establish-
ment 9 Ridwan's need for support became desperate only after Janah had 
deserted him, when the Fatimids had failed to provide aid and the 
first Crusade had given him new, vigorous, and hostile neighbours. 
All this happened in 1097-8, so it is unlikely that the Nizaris 
achieved open power and recognition in Aleppo before 1098. In order 
52. Ibn abi-Tayy, preserved in Dhahabi and quoted from that source 
in Sibt ibn al-'Ajami, Kunuz ad-dhahab fi ta'rikh Halab; 
trans. J. Sauvaget, Les Tresors d'Or (Beirut, 1950), p.162. 
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for them to be useful to Ridwan, their numbers would have had to be 
sufficient to mount a force of militia, and it is doubtful if this 
could have been done in a short time. Therefore, while it seems 
safe to assume that the Nizaris were allied with Ridwan in 1099 or 
1100, the beginnings of the dacwa could date back to the early years 
of Ridwan's reign, to 1096 or 1097. 53 
The most obvious indication of Ridwan's support for the Nizaris 
would have been the town house he gave them as a dar al-dacwa or 
propaganda centre. Later Sunnite chroniclers hold this up in pious 
horror as evidence of Ridwan's depravity fully comparable to the 
murder of his two brothers when he came to power, but no date is 
given for this transfer to the Nizaris, nor any details of its size 
. 54 
or its location in the c1ty. Nevertheless such official recognition 
was indeed a triumph. This was the first time any Nizari dacwa had 
been able to work openly in a city that was under nominal Saljuk 
contro1. 55 Kalanisi has already informed us that al-Hakim al-Munajjim 
53. Ca~en, Syrie du Nord, p.189 thinks that Nizari activity began in 
Syria about the time that the first Crusade made its appearance; 
S. Guyard, "Un grand maitre des Assassins au temps de Saladin", 
Journal Asiatique, 7e s~rie, IX (1877), pp.347-8, also suggested 
this. 
54. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.590; Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, Mirlat az-Zaman; 
extracts trans. RHC. Or., III, pp.530, 548-9; Abu'l-Mahasin, 
RHC. Or., III, pp.496-7, who says Ridwan actually had it built 
for the Nizaris; Abu'l-Fida, RHC. Or., I, p.12; Ibn Taghribirdi, 
RHC. Or., III, pp.481-2; Ibn ash-Shihna, trans. Sauvaget, Les 
Perles Choisies, p.27. ---
55. See Hodgson, pp.77-8, 88-9; the Nizaris at Isfahan always had to 
keep underground, and even this did not prevent occasional 
massacres at the hands of Sunnite zealots. 
was one of Ridwan 1 s entourage; if Kamal's statement that Ridwan 
gave the Nizaris 11 high positions" is to be relied on, it would appear 
that the Nizaris were as much in evidence about the citadel as about 
their dar al-dacwa.56 
What little the chroniclers have to say of the Nizaris' every-
day activity in Aleppo takes the form of compaints at their arrogant 
and violent behaviour. We are told that they could commit crimes 
with impunity because those charged with the enforcement of the law 
were afraid of the sectaries' organized vengeance. There are tales 
of women and children being abducted from crowded streets, and of 
vicious attacks on individual members of rival sects or armed bands. 
Nobody would dare interfere on these occasions, and even the victims 
offered no resistance to the indignities or violence inflicted on 
them. Criminals would declare themselves Nizaris simply to take 
advantage of their reputation and to benefit from their corporate 
protection. 57 It seems that if you wanted protection from an enemy 
or an injury done to somebody, you called first on the Nizaris to 
58 
see what they could arrange for you! 
From the picture conveyed by such complaints it would appear 
that the Nizaris gained their following by intimidation and terror; 
56. Kalanisi, p.58; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.590. 
57. These details are from Kamal al-Din's Zubdat, quoted in 
., 4 / Quatremere, p.3 1, and Defremery, p.377; they are omitted 
from the abridged Recueil translation. 
58. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.603. 
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their detractors would have it that all their conversions were of 
this sort, if not of criminals or half-wits.59 Yet the extraordinary 
cohesion and vitality of the movement should restrain us from 
cynically denying them any sincere conversions at all. Undoubtedly, 
some may have feigned conversion or sympathy out of fear, but the 
core of the following could only consist of those persuaded by 
preaching and instruction and admitted through the degrees of initiation. 
It is impossible to make precise judgments about the mainsprings 
of response to any religious movement, human nature exhibiting itself 
in so many infinite variations, but in the case of the Nizaris we 
may be sure that there was a mixture of motivation. The traditional 
appeal of Isma'ilism,with its warmly emotional mystical style of 
belief, would be attractive to many Shiciteswho yearned for a more 
vibrant faith. Others may have been attracted more by the Nizari 
promise of social justice in a better order to replace that of Saljuk-
Sunnite dominance, Others yet may have been attracted by the methods 
the Nizaris employed in their struggle, by the prospect of subversive 
or even violent opposition to constituted authority. A few may have 
felt more secure in a group which jealously defended its members and 
exacted revenge for the smallest of injuries. Examples might be 
multiplied indefinitely. 60 What we do know, if our sources are to 
be believed, is that the number•o£ Nizaris in Aleppo grew rapidly 
under Ridwan's protection.61 However much threats or intimidation 
59. Kalanisi, pp.18o, 187-8. 
60. Defr~mery, p.377. 
61. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.590. 
contributed to this increase, we may envisage the Persian dacis 
at Aleppo engaged in a daily round of preaching, argument, refutation, 
discussion and planning, all directed towards the steady expansion 
and consolidation of the dacwa. 
The Syrian dacwa's first recorded essay in the technique which 
had made the Persian Nizaris notorious was not, it seems, the first 
l>low of a campaign against Saljuk power in Syria. It was rather the 
sequel to al-Hakim al-Manajjim's 1101 interference in the dispute 
between Ridwan and his former atabeg, Janah al-Dawlah, for it appears 
to have been intended primarily to gratify Ridwan and ensure his 
continued patronage at Aleppo. Janah's superior military strength 
had made Ridwan nervous of their continued estrangement, and he 
sought a reconciliation early in 1103. Janah was persuaded to make 
a brief visit to Aleppo, where Ridwan played the perfect host for 
~bout ten days. But Janah gave no assurances and no hin~ of any 
change in attitude before he returned to Hims. 62 
Perhaps al-Hakim al-Munajjim now saw a first-rate opportunity 
to show his usefulness to Ridwan and acted on his own initiative, 
or perhaps Ridwan, desperate that his peacemaking had failed, ask~d 
his only allies to employ their premeditated art. Whoever originally 
67. 
inspired it, fida>is were despatched on a mission to Hims. ~ 
62. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.590; who observes in passing that there 
could be no hope of reconciliation between such sworn rivals. 
63. Kamal's apportioning of the blame is characteristic of our 
sources; he blames al-Hakim al-Munajjim directly, but adds 
"it was said that this was done with the connivance if not 
at the order of Ridwan." RHC. Or., III, p.591. 
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The fida 1is chose a Friday for their attempt, when Janah would 
come down to the main mosque for the midday prayer, the leading 
congregational service of the Muslim week. Janah took the usual 
precautions when he ventured forth from the citadel; he was in full 
armour and surrounded by his officers and bodyguards. But when he 
came into the mosque, a shaikh in the congregation gave a pre-
arranged signal and three men dressed as religious ascetics leapt 
upon Janah and stabbed him to death before anybody realised what 
was happening. Janah's officers and guards rushed to defend their 
master, and the assassins managed to kill some of these as well 
before they were themselves hacked to death. 
Retribution followed swiftly, but upon innocent heads. Less 
than a dozen Sufis, Persians and other "foreigners" who happened 
to be worshipping in the mosque at the time were slaughtered by 
the guards as suspected accomplices. Probably the shaikh perished 
with them. The service could not be held for the citizens fled, 
panic-stricken, 'and everything in the city, we are told, fell into 
confusion. Significantly, all the Turk~ left the city in great 
haste. These would be mostly Janah's troops and their families, 
and their departure is more likely to reflect fear of being 
massacred as "foreigners" tban any widespread suspicion of Turkish 
or Saljuk instigation of Janah's death. The assassins appear to 
have been identified fairly readily as Nizaris from Aleppo, but it 
is of interest that they were Persians. 64 Was the Syrian dac.wa as 
64. Kalanisi, pp.57-8; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.591; Ibn al-Athir, 
RHC. Or., I, p.213; Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, p.5a5. 
See also, Quatrem~re, p.342; Defr,mery, pp.377-8; and Cahen, 
Syrie du Nord, p.236. 
yet too young to have produced its own fida'is? 
Though the sources are agreed on the essential features of 
the assassination, there is some slight difference of opinion as 
to the dating. Kalanisi gives only the year, A.H. 496 (1102-03) 
but Kamal says it occurred on Friday, 22 Rajab 496, which is 1 
May 1103. 6 5 He doubtless derives this from the contemporary and 
near contemporary sources he utilizes in his more detailed Bughyat 
at-talab fi taJrikh Halab. Here, Ibn Asakir and Murhaf ibn Usamah 
agree on A.H. 496, while Munqidh ibn Munqidh offers 28 Rajab, but 
Usamah ibn Munqidh is quoted as giving orally 22 Rajab, which 
Kamal prefers. The anonymous Bustan al-Jam~ and the TaJrikh of 
al-Azimi concur with Kamal's adopted dating. 66 In spite of this 
wealth of contemporary testimony, Ibn al-Athir assigns Janah's 
death to the previous year, A.H. 495 (1101-02) and relates it to 
the Franks' siege of Hisn al-Akrad, This earlier dating may be 
disregarded. Athir 1 s chronology is in evident confusion at this 
65. Kalanisi, pp.56-7; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.590; the Recueil 
conversion of this date is incorrect. 
66. All these references I owe to B. Lewis, "Sources . • • , " 
Speculum XXVII (1952), p.486, though I was able at least 
to check the year given in the Bustan from Cahen's edition 
of the Arabic, "Une Chronique Syrienne du VIe/XIIe siecle", 
in Bulletin d'~tudes orientales de l'Institut Fran·ais de 
Damas, VII-VIII (193 , p.115. The Recueil version of the 
Bughyat is heavily abridged, omitting all reference to 
Janah's death, and it is unfortunate that the extracts 
translated in J. Sauvaget, "Extraits du Bugyat at-talab 
d' Ibn al~Adim", RF!I, VII (1933), pp.393-409 do not 
include these passages; p.403 merely mentions Janah's 
assassination by Ismacilis disguised as Sufis. 
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point, 67 and two modern historians have charged him with deliberate 
misdating in order to heighten what the thirteenth century was as 
Ridwan's betrayal of Muslim unity. 68 This seems preferable to the 
ingenious solution of two others who have combined Kamal's date 
with Athir's year. 69 
The immediate consequency of Janah 1 s death was a race for the 
possession of Hims. Janah's widow, who was also Ridwan's mother, 
urgently sent to Aleppo, but Janah's officers, respecting his 
feelings towards Ridwan, secretly sent to Dukak at Damascus. In 
fact, Raymond of Toulouse was closer to Hims than anyone else when 
news spread of Janah's death, and he appeared before the city only 
a few days later. He was apparently content to receive tribute 
while he went to find a more defensible camp at al-Restan from 
which to conduct a regular siege. He had barely departed when 
troops from Damascus arrived and took possession of the city and 
the citadel. When Ridwan's advance party arrived a little later, 
they were denied access, and reported back to Ridwan at al-Kubba 
He treats as two different sets of events what are 
duplicate accounts of the same year, misled by a 
of dates in his sources, one of which is wrong. 
Stevenson, The Crusaders in the East (Cambridge, 
p.46 n.1, hereafter cited as Stevenson. 
in fact 
difference 
See W.B. 
1907)' 
68. Le~is, "Sources ••• , 11 Speculum, XXVII (1952), p.486; N. 
Elisseeff, article "Him?," EI2, iii, p.398. 
69. Producing 12 May 1102; Defr~mery, pp.377-8; R. Grousset, 
Histoire des Croisades et du Royaume Frall9,UB de J'Brusalem 
1Paris, 1934-6), I, pp.338-340. 
that Dukak had forestalled them. The Franks also heard of the 
Damascene occupation, and after keeping at a discreet distance for 
a time, gave up their plans for a siege and withdrew. 70 
The result of Janah's death was thus not at all what Ridwan 
or al-Hakim al-Munajjim doubtless hoped for; Hims became a dependency 
of Damascus, not Aleppo. Yet the Nizaris could congratulate them-
selves on an effective display of their potential usefulness, and we 
may be sure the lesson was not lost on Ridwan. Janah's elimination 
definitely eased Ridwan's position, which was to be increasingly 
threatened over the next decade by the Franks of Antioch. 
The founder of the da'wa and chief daci of the Nizaris at Aleppo 
did not long survive his first notable victim. The death of al-
Hakim al-Munajjim was reported just a few weeks after the episode at 
Hims. 71 Though it is to be assumed that he died of natural causes, 
his death was apparently sudden, and at least one source hints at 
foul play. 72 Whatever the truth of the matter, the solidarity of the 
dacwa does not seem to have been affected by his death. 
He was succeeded as chief daci by a close companion, another 
Persian, who is also described as one of the dacis who pioneered 
the New Preaching in Syria. This was Abu Tahir, whose surname 
70. This seems the logical sequence of events 1 given the details in 
Kalanisi, pp.57-8, and Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.591. 
71. Kalanisi, p.58 has fourteen days; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.591 
has twenty-four; Quatrem~re, p.342, follows Kamal. 
72. Defremery, p.379 reports, 11selon une autre version", that he 
was murdered, but gives no references. 
90. 
identifies him as a goldsmith,or, as some translations have it, a 
. 11 73 JBWe . er. 
Concerning Abu Tahir's immediate activities in Aleppo, we are 
told virtually nothing, but it is evident that the Nizaris' 
reputation in the city was growing. In the same year as Janah's 
assassination, Aleppo's kadi .F'adl Allah as-Suzaini was also 
assassinated. The citizens at once blamed the Nizaris, for the kadi 
was known to have spoken out against them, and even though he was 
attacked on leaving Ridwan's presence nothing was done to apprehend 
his assailants. That is strongly suggestive of Nizari culpability, 
for Abu Tahir surely inherited al-Hakim al-Munajjim's place at court. 
But while it is tempting to regard this as a chance insight into 
otherwise unrecorded assassinations and intimidation, in the absence 
of further evidence we must admit the possibility that a rival 
faction killed the kadi and that the Nizaris had nothing to do with 
"t 74 ~ . 
Outside Aleppo, considerable effort seems to have been devoted 
to the towns and villages of the Jazr and Jabal Summak, where the 
majority of indigenous Syrian Ismacilis were to be found. We know 
of this activity only by the results which appear in the next few 
73. Kalanisi, pp.73, 145; Athir, RHC. Or., I, pp.233, 235; Sibt, 
RHC. Or., III, pp.530, 549; Abu'l-Mahasin, RHC. Or., III, 
p.495. Defr~mery p.379 points out that some MSS. have as-
Sa'igh, the goldsmith, while a few have Ibn as-Sa'igh, son 
of the goldsmith. The sources available to me all have Abu 
Tahir as-Sa)igh. 
74. Kamal, cited in Defr~mery, p.380; not mentioned in the Recueil 
version. See also Hodgson, p.90. 
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years, but it is reasonable to assume that activity began about 
this time, if not earlier. Aside from Ismacili elements, these were 
areas of strong Shi'ite influence, sheltering, as we have seen, 
minorities such as the Druzes and Nusayris. 75 Here, where Sunnite 
opposition may have been feeble, the Nizaris seem to have met with 
a significant response. Kalanisi says that both al-Hakim al-Munajjim 
and Abu Tahir were supported by 11 a great host" of Ismacilis from 
Sarmin, the Jazr, the Jabal Summak and the tribe of the Banu cUlaim. 76 
A later chronicler who uses his sources carefully offers a similar 
list which includes Sarmin, the Jabal Summak, Ma'arra, and "else-
where nearby. 1177 
Sarmin, from being a centre of Fatimid Isma'ilism, seems to 
have become something of a Nizari retreat. One writer has even 
suggested that Sarmin may have had its own dar al-da'wa.78 The 
importance of Sarmin for the Nizari campaign in the Jazr suggests 
that Sibt's Macarra, of the three localities bearing the name in 
this area, was probably Ma'arrat Misrin, which is closest of the 
three to Sarmin.79 
75. See above, pp.63-4. 
76. Kalanisi, p.145; under A.H. 507 (1113-14) but his reference 
to al-Hakim extends this observation at least to 1103. 
77. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, p.549. 
78. Cphen, Syrie du Nord, p.190; no references are given. 
79. See the articles by E. Honigmann, "Macarrat Mi?rin", and 
"Ma'arrat al-Nuf-man 11 , EI, ii, pp.58-62. 
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Because we have no more than a strong likelihood of Nizari 
activity in the Jazr at this time we cannot say for certain what 
role, if any, Nizari elements played in the interesting events of 
May 1104. A combined Frankish army had suffered a disastrous defeat 
at Harran earlier that month, 80 and while Tancred and Bohemond 
hastened to secure Edessa, Ridwan saw an opportunity to recover some 
of the territory he had recently lost to Antioch. Curiously, he 
achieved this without himself entering the area. 
From his camp near the Euphrates he issued orders for the 
inhabitants of the Jazr to rise in rebellion and drive out the 
depleted Frankish garrisons there. We are told that the inhabitants 
of Fua, Sarmin, Ma'arrat Misrin and nearby places ran to arms and 
actually captured a few F'ranks, while the remainder fled to Antioch. 
But these were the only towns to take direct action. The garrisons 
at Latmin, Kafartab, Albara and Macarrat al-Nucman withdrew of their 
81 
own accord. 
Ridwan had no direct control over these areas and the~pulace 
could easily have preferred the better part of valour, yet it is 
80. See Cahen, Syrie du Nord, pp.236-8; the sources available to 
me vary considerably in their accounts of this engagement; 
see Kalanisi, pp.60-61; Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, trans-
lated Tritton and Gibb, JRAS (1933), pp.78-8o; Athir, RHC. 
Or., I, pp.221-3; Matthew of Edessa, RHC. Arm., I, pp.71-2; 
Albert of Aix, Liber christianae expeditionis, lx, 38-42, 
RHC. Occ., IV, pp.614-617; William of Tyre, X, 29-30, trans. 
E.A. Babcock and A.C. Krey, A History of Deeds Done Beyond 
the Sea (New York, 1943), I, pp.456-9. u 
81. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, pp.592-3; Hodgson, p.91, corrects a 
confusion in the Recueil translation at this point. 
93. 
perhaps more than passing coincidence that those places which did 
respond were the very places in which the Nizaris would appear to 
have been gaining followings at this time. 
It is also conceivable that Nizari militia formed part of the 
army which Ridwan led out to relieve Artah in April 1105, for 
Kalanisi makes special mention of the Aleppine infantry. He says 
it was made up mostly of the ahdath or armed bands of the city; as 
Ridwan's most loyal supporters, we may justifiably guess that the 
Nizari ahdath figured prominently here. The sources tell us that 
Ridwan suffered a heavy defeat when his Turkish cavalry fled; only 
the ahdath bands held firm,enabling Ridwan to escape,before they 
82 
were annihalated by the superior weight of the Frankish cavalry. 
This defeat led to the reoccupation by Tancred of the 
territories Ridwan had temporarily recovered in the Jazr. Some of 
the towns which had driven out their Frankish garrisons were treated 
rather harshly, parts of their defences being dismantled and their 
inhabitants being forcibly expelled. 83 Foremost of these was Sarmin. 
Ibn al-Athir says that its 11 zealously Shicite 11 inhabitants dispersed 
to Aleppo and other places, and that the kadi of the town went down 
to Afamiya to seek shelter with Khalaf ibn Mulalib. 84 
82. Kalanisi, pp.69-70; Kamal, RHC. Or., p.593; Athir, RHC. Or., I, 
pp.227-9 says that 3000 of Ridwan's 7000 infantry were 
volunteers; Albert of Aix, IX, 47, RHC. Occ., IV, pp.620-621; 
William of Tyre, XI, 2, trans. Babcock and Krey, I, pp.463-4. 
83. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.594; Cahen, Slrie du Nord, p.242. 
84. Athir, RHC. Or., III, p.233. 
Here we have a rare indication of the extent of Nizari success 
outside Aleppo, because the~ of Sarmin, one Abu 1 l-Fath, is 
· t · 1 · d t · f · d · th as a N1' zar·4 dac;. 85 pos1 :tve y 1 en 1 :te :tn ano er source k ~ 
Sarmin in our period was much more than a mere village, and for 
the local Nizari daci to be appointed itskadi was a remarkable 
achievement for the dacwa. Theoretically charged with deliberation 
and judgement in all civil disputes, for which he was first resort, 
the kadi of a Muslim community was not merely a stipendiary 
magistrate. He occupied a key position, together with the ra>i;, 
in what we would term the local government, advising and supervising. 
Accordingly, he was usually a leading citizen, an important and 
t d t b 1 . th f 11 . . t h . t 86 respec e no a e w1 some · o ow1ng 1n , e commun1 y. 
Abu'l-Fath's elevation to the magistracy could ha~e had any one 
of a number of causes. If one thinks that the Nizaris freely used 
intimidation to gain their ends, then it might appear as if they had 
terrorized the citizens to accept their leader. A more charitable 
and in fact more likely explanation is simply that the Nizaris had 
succeeded in winning over a majority of the Ismacilis and Shicites 
85. Kalanisi, p.73. This is probably what prompted Cahen, 
(Syrie du Nord, p.190) to say that the Nizaris had a 
dar al-dacwa at Sarmin. 
86. Cahan, ''Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans 
l'Asie musulmane du Moyen Age", Arabica, V (1958), pp.231-2. 
On the kadi 1 s duties see also 1. Gardet, La Cit~ Musulmane 
(Paris,~1), pp.136-9, and R. Levy, The Social Structure 
of Islam, second edition, (Cambridge, 1957), pp.338-347. 
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in the town, and were able to outweigh those who had traditionally 
controlled the office. 
No information concerning Abu'l-Fath's activities in Sarmin 
has yet come to light. 
Though the fortunes of the da<wa appear to have been rising 
fairly steadily up to this point, the reoccupation of the Jazr by 
the troops of Antioch and the expulsion of the populace of Sarmin 
would have seriously interrupted the Nizari campaign outside Aleppo. 
If we admit the possibility that Nizari militia were present at 
Artah in 1105, we must also count this as the dacwa's first serious 
loss of manpower, for as we have seen, the infantry there were all 
slaughtered. Such reverses would have demonstrated yet more clearly 
what must have been obvious to the Nizari leadership all along; 
that Ridwan was a valuable ally inside Aleppo, but he was simply 
not powerful enough to safeguard Nizari gains outside the city. 
The initial concentration of the dacwa at Aleppo should not 
obscure the likelihood that its leaders had the same ultimate goals 
in mind as the parent dacwa in Persia, namely the seizure of key 
fortresses to serve as propaganda centres for their campaign and 
refu~es in time of distrubance or Saljuk retaliation. 
With this in mind, Abu'l-Fath's choice of Afamiya as a place 
of refuge may have been calculated and not merely fortuitous. 
Afamiya was well-known for the Shicite predominance in its mixed 
population of Muslims and Maronite Christians, and its ruler had 
obtained his appointment originally from the Fatimid government, 
but Afamiya was also a strategically well-placed, strongly-
fortified hill-top town, with a compact citadel. 87 The Franks 
considered Khalaf to be a friendly and generous neighbour, as well 
as very powerful. 88 
Khalaf received Abu'l-Fath warmly and we are told that he took 
him into h±s personal retinue, allotting him an allowance as if he 
were one of his officers. Secure in Khalaf's confidence, Abu'l-
Fath soon got in touch with Abu Tahir at Aleppo, and also perhaps 
with remaining Nizari dacis in the Jazr. Their letters doubtless 
discussed ways and means of securing Afamiya for the dacwa. However, 
Khalaf's sons found out about Abu'l-Fath's correspondence, and warned 
their father that it might be unwise to confide in the kadi. We are 
told that Abu'l-Fath met this challenge boldly; Kur>an in hand, he 
successfully convinced Khalaf of his innocence and good intentions. 89 
It was now evident that the plans for seizing Afamiya needed 
to be executed without further delay. Abu'l-Fath resumed his 
correspondence with Abu Tahir and asked for Ridwan to provide some 
of the Nizari refugees from Sarmin with captured Frankish horses 
and equipment. They were then to appear at Afamiya and present these 
to Khalaf as spoils from a raid. Khalaf with his usual generosity 
87. Also known as Qal)at al-Mudiq; see H.A.R. Gibb, article 
"Afamlya", EIZ, i, p.215, and Cahen, Syrie du Nord, pp.163, 24·3. 
88. Albert of Aix, X, 17, RHC. Occ., IV, p.639. 
89. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.233; Albert of Aix, X, 17, RHC. Occ., 
IV, p.639. 
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would probably extend hospitality to them, and this would provide 
Abu'l-Fath with the necessary manpower to stage a coup. 
The ruse worked exactly according to plan. The party of 
Sarminese Nizaris was welcomed by Khalaf, and installed in a house 
adjoining the citadel. 90 There is some disagreement as to what 
happened next. Athir says that when darkness had fallen and the 
guards were asleep, Abu'l-Fath let down ropes to enable the Nizaris 
to climb up into the citadel; other sources say a hole was made in 
the wa11. 91 For once, Athir's version sounds more likely if the 
Nizaris wanted to avoid unnecessary delay. 
Once inside the citadel, the Nizaris worked fast. They 
slaughtered the garrison where they slept, and Abu'l-Fath led a 
party to Khalaf's chambers, where his family and relatives were 
likewise slaughtered. Khalaf was found in bed with his wife; he 
awoke and begged for mercy, but Abu 1 l-Fath himself stabbed him to 
death. The Nizaris then raised their battle cry on the tower of 
the citadel and proclaimed their allegiance to Ridwan of Aleppo. 
Khalaf's sons and officers rushed in from the walls but could not 
dislodge the Nizaris. One of Khalaf's sons then fled to Shaizar, 
where he was given refuge on account of his friendship with a son 
90. Athir RHC. Or., I, p.234 says the party numbered 300; Kamal, 
in the Bughyat (extract translated in Lewis, Assassins, 
p.102) by contrast puts their number at only six, and says 
that they claimed to have killed a Frankish knight and 
seized his animals and equipment. 
91. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.234; Kalanisi, p.73; Kamal, RHC. Or., 
III, p.594; Sibt, RHC. Or., III, p.530. 
of the Banu Munkidh. News of this affair at Afamiya reached 
Damascus on 3 February 1106.92 
The Nizaris had succeeded in seizing their first fortress in 
Syria. Their tenure, however, was precarious in the extreme, for 
they held only the citadel and not the town or its walls. The 
citizens were dismayed at the prospect of Ridwan's tutelage, and 
Abu'l-Fath was nervous of what the Christians in the town might do. 
Sure enough, while Abu'l-Fath sent appeals for aid to Aleppo, the 
Christian and Armenian citizens sent to Tancred at Antioch. 93 
Abu Tahir was the first to arrive. Athir has a curious story 
that Abu'l-Fath refused him entry until he agreed to submit to his 
authority. If there is any truth in this, it could indicate that 
Abu'l-Fath wanted the da'wa to free itself from dependence on Ridwan. 
Perhaps he had repented proclaiming Ridwan 1 s name from the battle-
ments, because he saw Afamiya as a convenient replacement for Sarmin. 
Whatever our speculations on this intriguing item, we should 
remember that Abu'l-Fath did not have possession of the town or 
outer walls, and the citizens would naturally refuse entry to any 
Nizari reinforcements from Aleppo. 94 Abu Tahir retired and set up 
camp nearby to await developments. 
92. Kalanisi, pp.72-3; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.594; Sibt, RHC. Or., 
III, P·530; Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.234; Abu'l-Mahasin, RHC. 
Or., III, p.495; Ibn Muyassar, RHC. Or., III, p.466. See 
also Quatremere, p.342; Defremery, pp.382-4; Cahen, Syrie du 
Nord, p.243; and E. Rey, 11 R~sume chronologique de l'histoire 
des princes d'Antioch 11 , ROL, IV (1896), pp.336-7. 
93. Albert of Aix, X, 17-18, RHC. Occ., IV, p.64o. 
94. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.235; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, P·594. 
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Developments soon occurred; Tancred of Antioch arrived with a 
large army, and with him as a prisoner was Abu'l-Fath's brother, 
doubtless captured at Sarmin the year before.95 Whether for his 
brother's sake or not, we are told that Abu'l-Fath now negotiated 
with the citizens, and conciliated them with bribes and flattery. 96 
But despite his large army, Tancred seems to have been unwilling to 
commence a full-scale siege, and after imposing tribute on the town, 
he withdrew. 97 
The situation at Afamiya apparently remained unchanged until 
after Easter (25 March, 1106) when Tancred returned, well-equipped 
for a siege. After three fruitless weeks he was called away to 
relieve his garri<3on at Lattakiah, which was blockaded by Byzantine 
98 forces. Tancred might indeed have lost interest in Afamiya were 
it not for Khalaf's two sons, the one who had fled to Shaizar and 
another who had been in Damascus at the time of the Nizari coup. 
They pressed Tancred to resume the siege, prOmising him ai~ and 
advising that they doubted if there would be more than a month's 
provisions left within the town. 99 
Accordingly, Tancred resumed the siege, his forces swelled 
95. Kalanisi, p.73. 
96. Albert of Aix, X, 19, RHC. Occ., IV, p.64o. 
97. Kalanisi, p.73. 
98. Albert, X, 19-20, RHC. Occ. IV, p.640; which has Laodicea, in 
error; see also Cahen, S;rrie du Nord, pp.243-4. 
99. Kalanisi, p.74; Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.235; Albert of Aix, X, 
21, RHC. Occ., IV, p.641. 
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by the hundred Turkish and Arab troops promised by Khalaf's sons. 
This time, the siege was pressed with great vigour; we are told that 
the mango~ls hurled stones unceasingly, and that a great ditch was 
dug which completely encircled the town. 100 The blockade was main-
tained until the town's food supplies were exhausted. Tancred's 
troops may also have wearied because when the defenders offered terms 
Tancred promptly accepted them. Afamiya surrendered on 14 September, 
1106, on condition that its inhabitants be spared. 101 
Abu Tahir and the Nizaris from Aleppo were also captured, but 
whether they had joined Abu'l-Fath in the citadel or were still 
encamped a short distance away, we do not know. 
Our sources are not in agreement over the fate of the Nizaris. 
In one place, Ibn al-Athir says that both Abu'l-Fath and Abu Tahir 
were captured and killed, but notes that others give the date of 
Abu Tahir's death as A.H. 507 (1113-14). 102 Our sole Latin source, 
which has an unusually detailed account of events at Afamiya, says 
that Tancred agreed to spare Botherus (Abu'l-Fath) taking him and 
his companions captive to Antioch, but that the rest were tortured 
by Khalaf's sons. 103 However, most of the Muslim sources state 
that it was Abu'l-Fath who was put to death by to~ture, Abu Tahir 
and his companions being taken prisoner to Antioch where they soon 
100. Albert of Aix, X, 22, RHC. Occ., IV, p.641. 
101. Kalanisi, p.74; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.594. 
102. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.235. 
103. Albert of Aix, X, 23-4; RHC. Occ., IV, p.642. 
101. 
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ransomed themselves and returned to Aleppo. This seems the most 
likely solution; it would be easy for our Latin chronicler to 
confuse the two Nizari leaders, and Athir is clearly uneasy about 
Abu Tahir's fate, for he offers Kalanisi 1 s explanation in a later 
entry. 105 It would appear, therefore, that Abu'l-Fath and the 
Nizaris from the Jazr were virtually destroyed, while Abu Tahir and 
the Aleppine Nizaris returned to Ridwan more or less intact. Ridwan 
was no doubt pleased at Abu Tahir's safe return,for he is described 
in this year as one of the chief notables of Ridwan's court. 106 
The episode at Afamiya is most instructive of the difficulties 
facing the Nizaris in Syria. The very conditions of intermittent 
warfare and social dislocation which seemed to enhance the prospect 
of conversions also contained serious disadvantages. In Persia the 
Nizaris had seized castles in areas remote from the main campaigns 
of the Saljuk amirs. But in Syria the Nizaris found their best 
response in precisely that border territory west and south of Aleppo 
across which rolled the conflict between crusaders and Muslims. 
In Persia, there was rarely anybody else actively competing for the 
control of remote mountain fortresses; in Syria, there was fierce 
and constant competition for key strongholds between forces far more 
numerous and better equipped than the Nizaris. 
The Syrian dacwa had shown that it had sufficient manpower and 
104. Kalanisi, p.74; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.595. 
105. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.291. 
106. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.233. 
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ingenuity to seize castles, but once in possession it apparently 
could not withstand the combined threat of the Franks on one hand 
and the indifference or hostility of Syrian Muslims on the other. 
Until the dacwa was very much stronger, or could find castles not 
directly threatened by the Franks, the policy of castle-seizure 
would be held in abeyance. This seems the likeliest explanation 
for the Syrian dacwa's continued concentration on Aleppo, and its 
diligent cultivation of the alliance with Ridwan. His protection 
was still the best available means for the dacwa to expand and 
consolidate its strength, and for the moment Ridwan could not 
afford to dispense with Nizari support. 107 
107. H.A.R. Gibb, "Zengi and the fall of Edessa", in the 
Pennsylvania History of the CrusadesL I, p.449, observes 
that the local strength of Aleppo in Ridwan's reign lay 
precisely in its alliance with the "Assassins". 
103. 
CHAPTER IV 
ALEPPO 1106-1114 
The failure at Afamiya may have been a more serious blow to the 
Syrian d~wa than it perhaps appears to us, for very little is heard 
of Nizari activity in the years immediately following 1106. Our 
earliest piece of information refers to 1107 and is in fact one of 
those retrospective items occasionally included by the chroniclers 
in their accounts of much later events. This item tells us that a 
new daci, another Persian, was sent to Syria from Alamut in 110'7 or 
shortly afterwards. This was Abu Muhammad, who soon became one of 
the leading daCis in Syria and actually succeeded to the leadership 
of the daCwa some thirty years later. His chosen area of operations 
was the Jabal Summak, of which we have already made mention. 1 
Whether immediately or over the next few years, he is said to have 
begun acquiring forts from the Nusayris in this 2 area. It is 
scarcely surprising that no mention of this is made in the major 
chronicles. The area was much more heavily populated then than it 
is today, 3 and the forts Abu Muhammad acquired were probably little 
more than refuge towers o~ khans (fortified travellers' resting 
place~. 
1. See above, pp. G2- 65 ; 90- 91 . 
2. Dhahabi, Ta>rikh al-Islam, cited in Defremery, pp.399-400; 
see also Hodgson, p.93. 
3. Cahen, Slrie du Nord, p.163, testifies to the remains of 
innumerable small villages, and says the area was "bien plus 
vert" in the time of the Crusaders. 
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In Aleppo, the Nizari alliance with Ridwan presumably continued, 
there being nothing to suggest that it would have stopped. Ridwan's 
military weakness had seen no significant amelioration, and in 
addition to the threat from Antioch he now faced complications to the 
east, mostly created by the Turkish adventurer Jawali Saqawa. Jawali 
had occupied Mosul in 1107 and governed it badly before being driven 
out, to Qalcat Jacbar on the Euphrates. He had in his possession a 
valuable Frankish prisoner, Baldwin of le Bourg, whom he now ransomed 
on generous terms in order to cultivate a possible alliance. 
Jawali in combination with the Franks of Edessa would be a 
serious threat to Aleppo, and Ridwan's fears seemed realized in 
September 1108 when Jawali attacked Balis, just a few miles upstream 
and across the Euphrates from Qal'at Ja'bar, and slaughtered Ridwan's 
garrison. Ridwan was forced to ask for help from his arch-enemy, 
Tancred of Antioch, which had the bizarre result that in the following 
month a battle was fought near Manbij between the forces of Ridwan 
and Tancred from the west and Jawali, Baldwin of le Bourg, and 
Joscelin. Though Ridwan's contribution was very small, Tancred 
virtually swept the eastern allies from the field, losing nearly all 
4 his infantry and some of his cavalry in the process. Rid wan 
recovered Balis, but he was now little more than Tancred's client, 
4. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.595; Athir, RHC. Or., I, pp.263-267; 
Matthew of Edessa, RHC. Arm., I, pp.86-7; Anonymous Syriac 
Chronicle, trans. Tritton and Gibb, JRAS (1933), pp.B1-B2; 
Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, trans. E.A.W. Budge (Oxford, 
1932), pp.241-3; Cahen, Syrie du Nord, pp.247-250. 
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paying regular tribute to keep the troops of Antioch at bay. 
Fortunately for Aleppo, Tancred was soon involved in campaigns in 
the south, against Shaizar. 
More than ever, Ridwan's survival depended on how delicately 
he could balance supporters against adversaries. His anxiety not 
to alienate his major potential source of support, his Saljuk 
cousins further east, was made evident in 1108. His patronage of 
the Nizaris at Aleppo had not gone unnoticed by other Saljuk ~irs, 
and the sources speak of Ridwan being deaf to their entreaties, 5 so 
it is likely that he was repeatedly reminded of his cousins' dis-
approval. This criticism took a more serious turn in 1108 when 
Ridwan heard that accusations against him were being made before the 
Sultan. 
Ridwan's response is most interesting. He did not cast off the 
Nizaris altogether, but as a gesture he had a few of them arrested 
and executed for known crimes and expelled from the city one Abu'l-
Ganim, who is variously described as a brother or nephew to the 
unfortunate Abu'l-Fath executed by Tancred at Afamiya. Satisfied 
with this display, which was doubtless accompanied by secret re-
assurances to the Nizari leaders, Ridwan returned to his old policy 
of alliance, and once again turned a degf ear to the remonstrances 
of other Muslim princes. 6 
5. The earliest of these references being Kamal, RHC. Or., III, 
p.590. 
6. Quatrem~re, p.342, and Defr~mery, pp.385-6; no references are 
given, but this episode may have come from Ibn abi-Tayy 
through Ibn al-Furat, whom Quatrem~re uses intensively. 
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The next two years of the dacwa's existence are completely 
blank, but Abu Muhammad's work in the Jabal Summak may have been in 
part responsible for a single laconic entry, confirmed in no other 
source, to the effect that Tancred captured the fortress-town of 
Kafa,rilat.afrom the 11 Isma'ilis 11 in A.B. 504 (20 July 1110 to 9 July 
1111).7 Kafarlata is only a few miles south west of Sarmin, so we 
may reasonably expect Nizari daCis to have been active there even 
before Abu Muhammad. That no source notices the Nizari acquisition 
of this important stronghold could indicate that it was held only 
briefly before Tancred recaptured it, and this may be inferred from 
the movements of Tancred and Ridwan in 1110. The new ruler of Mosul, 
Sharaf al-Dawlah Mawdud, besieged Bdessa in the early summer, and 
Tancred was involved in the relief of the city in July. He was also 
involved in the disastrous Frankish retreat across the Euphrates 
which ended this campaign. As in 1104, Ridwan hoped that Tancred 
was sufficiently preoccupied to enable him to recover territories 
in the Jazr, and Kafarlata was probably one of the fortresses he 
recovered at this time. If, as seems likely, Nizari militia assisted 
him in this, they may have been assigned to Kafarlata as Ridwan's 
garrison. 
Tancred had not been immobilized, however, and he soon 
retaliated. Beginning with the siege of Atharib in December 1110, 
he forced Ridwan to surrender all his recent gains in the Jazr, 
before moving south to threaten and extract tribute from Shaizar and 
7. Ibn al-Furat, cited in Quatrem~re, p.342, and Defr~mery, p.387; 
see also Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.243. 
Hims. Kafarlata would most likely have been taken from the 
"Isma'ilis 11 at this time. 8 
Ridwan was once again left with little more than the city of 
Aleppo itself, and Kamal tells us that he sold off some sixty lots 
of property in an attempt to conciliate the murmuring populace. 9 
That the Nizaris were still prominent in Ridwan's service is made 
abundantly clear in the events of the following year. 
The able and energetic ruler of Mosul, the amir Mawdud, was 
ordered by the Sultan to resume holy war against the Franks, an~e 
invaded Edessene territory and besieged Turbessel in July, 1111. 
Some part of the motivation behind this second campaign may be 
attributable to disturbances at Baghdad fomented by a party of 
10 Aleppine merchants and Sufis at the start of that year. Though 
their noisy demands for holy war against the Franks represented 
popular feeling in Aleppo, Ridwan himself had also formally requested 
aid from Mawdud against the Franks. 
By the time Mawdud appeared before the city in August 1111, 
however, Ridwan had changed his mind. Perhaps he realized he would 
8. Kalanisi, pp.101-106; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, pp.596-8; other 
accounts are somewhat muddled; Athir, RHC. Or., I, pp.281, 
287; Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, p.540; William of 
Tyre, XI, 7, trans. Babcock and Krey, I, pp.472-4, (under 
1168). 
9. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.598. 
10. Kalanisi, p.111-112; Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.261; it is an 
indication of the importance of the BhiCite element in Aleppo 
that this important mission to ask for aid against the Franks 
was led by a sharif of the Banu'l-Khashshab. 
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bear the brunt of Tancred's vengeance once Mawdud had returned to 
Mosul, or perhaps his Nizari friends had prevailed on him, fearing 
Aleppo's subjection to Sunnite influences. Whatever his reason, 
Ridwan refused Mawdud and his army entry to the city. 
He shut himself in the citadel, and took hostages from the 
townsfolk to neutralize the city notables, who were furious at this 
insult to Mawdud. As an added safeguard we are told that Ridwan 
organized the Nizari ahdath together with his Turks to man the walls 
and to keep the townspeople aw~y from the citadel. 11 Kamal adds 
that he was so nervous he refused to admit any citizens to his 
presence, but kept the Nizaris about him at all times. It has been 
suggested that Ridwan feared a conjunction between the Sunnites and 
Twelver ShiCites of Aleppo and Mawdud's army, which his Turks and 
the Nizaris would be incapable of containing. The Banu'l-Khashashab 
had in fact been negotiating with one of Mawdud's amirs, the Kurd 
12 Ahmad- Yal, to oust Rid wan and hand Aleppo over to IV!awdud. 
Mawdud blockaded the city for seventeen days, and devastated 
the surrounding countryside, but then moved south, to encamp before 
Shaizar on 15 September, 1111. 13 
Ridwan's action not only convinced Mawdud of his perfidy; it 
11. Kalanisi, pp.114-115. 
12. Cahen, Syrie du Nord, pp.261-2. 
13. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.600; Albert of Aix, XI, 38, RHC. Occ., 
IV, p.681; Defr~mery, p.385; see also the article by H.S. 
Fink, "Mawdud I, Precursor of Saladin, 11 'I'he IvJuslim World, 
XLIII (1953), pp.18-27, for a useful outline of Mawdud's 
successive campaigns in Syria. 
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induced the atabeg and ruler of Damascus, Zahir al-Din Tughtakin, 
to cultivate Mawdud's friendship; Ridwan had isolated himself even 
further. He vainly tried to sow dissension between Tughtakin and 
the eastern army, and there is mention of a plot with one of the 
amirs to have Tughtakin assassinated. 14 But a firm friendship 
between Mawdud and Tughtakin was taking root, and continued even 
after Mawdud's return to Mosul, probably in October 1111. 15 Tancred 
now resumed raids against Aleppine territory, and Ridwan's weakness 
and isolation were such that he was ag~in forced to humble himself 
and ask for protection from his southern rival, Tughtakin. 16 
Ridwan's unpopularity with his subjects in Aleppo was raised 
to an unprecedented peak by these events, and an incident in the 
following year, A.H. 505 (1111-12) provided the occasion for an 
outburst of pent-up resentment against both Ridwan and his favoured 
Nizaris. In September or October 1111 there arrived in Aleppo one 
Abu Harb Isa ibn Zaid, a rich jurisconsul from Transoxiania, with a 
camel-train of five hundred, laden with merchandise for trade. This 
man was a declared enemy of the Ismacilis, and gave large sums to 
their enemies. He had been followed from Khurasan by a Nizari called 
Ahmad ibn Nasr, a Persian from Rayy, whose brother had been killed 
by Abu Harb's men. At Aleppo, Ahmad sought out Abu Tahir, who soon 
persuaded Ridwan that Abu Harb could be eliminated with no small 
14. Kalanisi, p.117. 
15. Kalanisi, p.119. 
16. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, pp.601-602. 
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profit for Ridwan's exchequer. Ridwan accordingly contributed some 
of his Turks and Abu Tahir gave Ahmad some of the Nizari militia so 
that he could raid and sack Abu Harb's camp. As the Nizari troop 
approached, however, Ahmad was recognized, and in a sharp engagement 
the Nizaris were all killed. Abu Harb complained bitterly to Ridwan, 
who ignored him, so the citizens assu~ed Abu Harb that they would 
wreak vengeance for him. One of the armed bands later fell upon 
a group of young Nizaris and slaughtered them all. Ridwan would 
neither condemn nor condone this action, so Abu Harb wrote letters 
of protest to Tughtakin and other Muslim princes. In reply to 
their remonstrances, Ridwan feebly protested his innocence of any 
complicity. The episode destroyed any remaining shreds of local 
confidence in Ridwan, and also demonstrate~ that the Nizaris were 
only as powerful as Ridwan's support allowed. From this time on, 
we are told, the citizens had no fear of attacking solitary Nizaris. 17 
Similar anti-Nizari resentment seems to have found expression 
in the Jazr at this time. We are told that Twelver Shicites were 
involved in disturbances with some Nizaris at Macarrat Misrin in 
A.H. 505 (1111-1112). 18 No further detaiJs are given. We cannot 
decide what caused them or indeed what form the distrubances took, 
but it is possible that for once the Nizari preaching unexpectedly 
17. Ibn al-Furat, cited in Quatremere, pp.342-3, and Defr~mery 9 
p.387-8; see also Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.268. 
18. Ibn al-Furat, cited in Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.268; cf. 
Hodgson, p.93. 
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met with determined resistance from the local populace. 
At the end of the following year, Ridwan was relieved of his 
most dangerous adversary; Tancred of Antioch died in December, 1112. 19 
There is a striking pause in the activity of the Franks of Antioch under 
Tancred's nephew and successor Roger (1112-1119), but Aleppo con-
tinued to pay the same tribute as it had to Tancred. 20 Ridwan was 
doubtless glad of the respite, for his attention was increasingly 
drawn southwards, to Damascus, and eastwards, to Mawdud at Mosul. 
Mawdud was the first of the Mesopotamian amirs to commit him-
self to regular campaigns against the crus~ders in Syria and at 
Edessa. He invested Edessa for the third consecutive year in April, 
May and June of 1112, but had to withdraw with no signifigant gains. 
In May 1113, however, he entered Syria with his largest army yet, to 
pursue holy war against the Franks. 21 Tughtakin met him at Salamiya 
in June, and together they went to besiege Tiberias beside the sea 
of Galilee. They defeated a relieving army from Jerusalem on 28 
June, and kept Baldwin's troops marooned on a hill for more than 
A 22 three weeks, before retiring into the Hauran early in ugust. 
19. Kalanisi, p.132 has 11 December; Matthew of Edessa, RHC. Arm., 
I, p.103 has 5 December; Fulcher, II, 45, RHC. Occ., III, 
p.425 has 12 December; see also E. Rey ''R6sum~ chronologique 
de l'histoire des princes d 1 Antioch'', ROL, IV (1896), p.340. 
20. Kalanisi, p.132; Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.266. 
21. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.288. 
22. Kalanisi, pp.134-6; Athir, RHC. Or., I, pp.288-9; Sibt, RHC. 
Or., III, p.546; Fulcher, II, 49, RHC. Or., III, pp.425-7; 
William of Tyre, XI, 19, trans. Babcock and Krey, I, pp. 
493-5. 
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Mawdud and Tughtakin had asked Ridwan for aid; in mid-August, when 
the Muslim army was preparing to go home, there arrived a mere one 
hundred men from Ridwan's askar. 23 Tughtakin was so disgusted at 
this empty and belated gesture that he had Ridwan's name removed 
from his coinage and from the invocations in the khutba, thus 
terminating a truce which had been established between them in 
24 October 1111. 
Ridwan could ill-afford so serious a breach between Aleppo 
and Damascus. He was probably even more deeply disquieted when 
news came that Mawdud was to spend the winter at Damascus as 
Tughtakin's gue~t. This was ostensibly to await fresh orders in 
reply to the report Mawdud had sent back to the Sultan when his 
troops dispersed eastwards early in Beptember, 25 but Ridwan no 
doubt feared that Mawdud and Tughtakin were planning retaliatory 
action against him, perhaps to submit Aleppo to Damascene control. 
Mawdud had been at Damascus about a month when, on Friday 2 
October 1113, he came in from his camp as usual to take part in the 
midday prayer. At the completion of the service, Tughtakin and 
Mawdud left the mosque, Tughtakin walking some distance ahead as a 
mark of respect. The courtyard of the mosque was crowded with people 
gathered to witness the sped:wcle of the amir 's procession. Mawdud 
23. Kalanisi, p.137. 
24. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, pp.601-602, g1v1ng 16 August for 
Tughtakin's action; Sibt, RHC. Or., III, p.545. 
25. Kalanisi, pp.138-9. 
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was surrounded by a host of his Turkish and Persian bodyguards with 
their swords unsheathed and held aloft, so that our chronicler says 
they presented the appearance of a tangled thicket of intertwined 
spikes. As they advanced across the courtyard, a man emerged from 
the crowd and approached Mawdud. Nobody took any notice of him, 
for it was common enough to see people bless and beg alms of a ruler 
after the service. But this man's purpose was qu~te otherwise; he 
seized the belt of Mawdud's riding cloak and stabbed him twice below 
the navel. One thrust entered Mawdud's flank and the other his 
thigh. On the second blow, the assassin was hacked to pieces by 
Mawdud's bodyguards, yet Mawdud himself continued walking, and the 
people thought he had escaped injury. He got as far as the north 
gate of the courtyard before he collapsed. He was carried directly 
to Tughtakin's residence, where a surgeon sewed up his wounds, but 
he died about mid-afternoon. The assassin's head had been cut off 
and displayed but nobody recognized hi.m. 26 His body was then burned. 
It is to be noticed that Kalanisi makes no mention of 
instigation. Many people immediately blamed the Nizaris, and most 
of the chroniclers share this view. 27 Ibn al-Athir explains the 
26. Kalanisi, pp.140-1; this vivid and detailed account suggests 
that Kalanisi may have been an eyewitness to the assassination; 
we may at least be sure that he interviewed eyewitnesses, such 
was his diligence as a historian. 
27. Athir, RHC. Or., I, pp.289-290; II, pp.35-6; Anonymous Syriac 
Chronicle, trans. Tritton and Gibb, JRAS (1933), p.85; 
Abu'l-Fida, RHC. Or., I, p.11; Abu'l-Mahasin, RHC. Or., III, 
p.497; Bar Hebraeus, trans. Budge, (Oxford, 1932), p.245. 
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Nizari motivation in terms of fear, and it is likely that they saw 
Mawdud as a threat to their favoured position under Ridwan and as 
a symbol of Saljuk-Sunnite revival in Syria. But Athir also says 
that others blamed Tughtakin. This explanation attracted a con-
siderable following. Matthew of Edessa preserves the most detailed 
version, which says that Mawdud was plotting to depose Tughtakin and 
seize Damascus for himself, but that Tughtakin gave a condemned 
Persian prisoner five hundred gold pieces to murder the arnir, 
promising him further riches and honour if he succeeded. 28 Athir 
adds that Tughtakin and Mawdud left the mosque hand in hand. 29 
Though this was obviously the explanation which gained widest 
credence at Mosul and Baghdad, where there were many anxious to 
discredit Tughtakin, it fails to stand up against abundant contemporary 
30 testimonies to the friendship existing between Mawdud and Tughtakin, 
and Tughtakin's evident grief and distress at Mawdud's death. 31 
Sibt ibn al-Jawzi categorically denies that Tughtakin was in any 
way implicated, stressing his friendship with l11Iawdud and the public 
mourning he conducted for some time afterwards. 32 Tughtakin could 
28. Matthew of Edessa, RHC. Arm., I, pp.107-108; William of Tyre 
follows this explanation as well; X, 26, and XI, 23, trans. 
Babcock and Krey, I, pp.495-6, 501. 
29. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.290, ignoring Kalanisi 1 s clear account. 
30. Kalanisi, pp.117, 119, 134, 139; see also Kamal, RHC. Or., III, 
p.601 and Sibt, RHC. Or., III, p.543. 
31. Kalanisi, p.141. 
32. RHC. Or., III, p.551. 
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have teigned mourning, of course, but it is difficult to see how 
any amount of riches and promised honours could conceal from his 
Persian prisoner, if there was one, that this would inevitably be 
a suicide mission. 
Though we cannot dogmatically assert that the Nizaris killed 
Mawdud, cifcumstances strongly suggest that they were responsible, 
and this in turn implicates Ridwan. Both had equally strong 
independent motives for Mawdud's elimination, largely derived from 
fear of Mawdud 1 s greater power and his embodiment of Saljuk militancy 
and Sunnite dominance; he was, after all, the Sultan's brother. 
Furthermore, Mawdud's assassination has all the elements of the 
classic Nizari operation; a notable Saljuk victim, a very public 
murder demanding great nerve and split-second timing, with the full 
realization of a swift and ho:t:rible death to follow, and a plausible 
scapegoat at hand in the victim's host. It is not unlikely that 
the Nizaris themselves helped spread the rumours blaming Tughtakin, 
as one of their 11 cover-stories 11 • 33 .Assassinations among the ar(lirs 
were usually, by contrast, furtive closed-door affairs, and if 
Tughtakin had wanted to be rid of Mawdud for any reason he would 
surely have taken care to equip himself with an effective alibi. 
If, then, we may credit the Nizaris with Mawdud's de~th, this 
was by some distance the greatest exploit to date of the Syrian 
daCwa. The consequences of his death reverberated far beyond 
33* See Lewis, "The Sources for the History of the Syrian Assassin,s 11 , 
SEeculum XXVII (1952), p.48g. 
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Damascus, causing great perturbation at Baghdad and Mosul. The 
Sultan Muhammad conceived a deep suspicion of the Syrian amirs, 
especially Tughtakin, and there were no further Saljuk-inspired 
expeditions against the crusaders for some years to come. Mawdud 1 s 
territories in Mesopotamia were given to Aksunkur Il-Bursuki, who 
was encouraged to take as his overlord the able young amir Zanki, 34 
with incalculable consequences for northern Syria in future decades. 
As for Tughtakin, he had lost an ally who had helped him inflict 
serious reverses on the kingdom of Jerusalem; he was now forced to 
return to his former policy of truces with the Franks. 
At Aleppo, Ridwan was overjoyed to hear of Mawdud's death, and 
thoughfuis is no proof of his or the Nizaris' complicity, we may 
expect him to have been in an expansive mood for a time. The 
Nizaris seem to have capitalized on his good humour, for we are 
told that towards the end of 1113 they asked for and were given the 
little fortress of Qalcat ash-Sharif. This w~s more of a fort than 
a citadel, situated just outside the city walls of Aleppo, to the 
south, and separated from the walls by a ditch and a rampart. 
It had been built by one of the leaders (sharif) of the ahdath in 
1085, when faction strife within the city became too dangerous for 
him to remain there.35 
We are not told who made the request on behalf of the Nizaris, 
34. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, p.551. 
35. Ibn ash-Shihnah, Ad-durr al-muntakhab fi ta,rikh mamlakat Halab, 
trans. Sauvaget, Les Perles Choisies (Beirut, 1933), pp.26-7; 
Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.268. 
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but it might not have been Abu 'l'ahir, the recognized chief~· 
According to Kamal al-Din, the Nizari leader in Aleppo at this 
time was his son, another Abu'l-Fath.36 Whether Abu Tahir was 
elsewhere visiting followings in rural areas or whether his son 
had seized the leadership, we cannot so much as guess, but it is 
interesting that mention is made of another leader who arrived in 
Aleppo in 1113 and to.whom the Nizaris rallied. This is the Turk, 
Husam al-Din ibn Dimlaj, the commander of the Nizari ahdath or 
militia.37 Because we are unaccustomed to the luxury of such 
additional details from the usually very brief references to 
Nizari activity in the chronicles, it would be rash to interpret 
this as evidence of an intestine struggle for the leadership of 
Much more plausible is the consideration that the 
Nizari ahdath had so much come to represent Nizari power in Aleppo 
in recent years that its commander was perhaps regarded by the 
uninitiated as the Nizaris' leader more than the senior daci himself. 
The year which saw a peak of success for the da'wa in the 
assassination of Mawdud finally drew to an end on a note of uncert-
ainty and foreboding. Early in December 1113 Ridwan died, overcome 
by various chronic illnesses, and the government of Aleppo passed to 
his sixteen year-old son, Alp Arslan. 38 This unstable youth at once 
3~. Cited in Quatrem~re, p.343, and Defr~mery, p.393· 
37. Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.268, apparently following Ibn al-Furat. 
38. Kalanisi, p.144, and Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.602, both give 
10 December; Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.290; Sibt, RHC. Or., III, 
p.548. 
118. 
arrested many of his father's principal officers and seized the 
property of others. In a grim repetition of his father's action 
at the start of his fule, Alp saw fit to have his two younger 
brothers murdered. He chose as his chief adviser one of Ridwan's 
eunuchs, Lu'luc al-Yaya, who quietly began to gather power into his 
hands. 39 own 
Obviously, a serious problem facing the new government was what 
to do with Ridwan's chief allies, the Nizaris. Several chroniclers 
remark on the size and strength of their following in Aleppo at 
this time, Kalanisi stating that they were feared because of their 
numbers and their corporate strength, which enabled them to protect 
each other. Kamal says that they gathered round the commander of 
their~~~ Husam al-Din ibn Dimlaj, after Ridwan's death. Now 
that Ridwan's patronage had ended, the ahdath was their sole 
protection against the city factions. 40 
It seems likely that Alp Arslan initially maintained a show of 
friendship and support for the Nizaris, because at this time Husam 
al-Din ibn Dimlaj is reported to have sent one of his Persian 
lieutenants,the daci Ibrahim al-LAjami, to take possession of al-
Kulaia, a small fort at the gates of Balis. 41 We cannot be sure if 
39. Kalanisi, p.144; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.603. 
40. Kalanisi, p.145; Kamal RHC. Or., III, p.603, and from the 
Bughyat, RHC. Or., III, p.730; Abu'l-Fida, RHC. Or., I, p.12. 
41. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.603; Quatrem~re, p.344; Defr~mery, 
p.393; Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.268. 
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this was Alp's gift or an arrangement made by Ridwan before his 
death, but this little fortress was strategically well-placed, 
b . th . d b Al d E d 42 e1ng on e ma1n roa etween eppo an aghda • 
Aleppo's new ruler was shortly to be reminded, however, of his 
proper duty. The Sultan Muhammad, when he heard that the Nizaris 
had occupied al-Kulaia sent a letter to Alp Arslan whibh Kamal 
quotes as saying, "Your father never listened to my orders concern-
ing the Eatinis, but you, my son, I would like to think will 
43 
exterminate them." 
With this encouragement, the kadi Abu 1 l-Hasan ibn Khashshab and 
the ra>is, sacid ibn Eadie, who was also the police-chief (sahib 
al-shurta) and commander of the Sunnite ahdath, 44 made representations 
to Alp Arslan, complaining of the excesses of the Nizaris and demand-
45 ing that their dar al-dacwa be closed and the city cleared of them. 
These two notables overcame Alp's reluctance sufficiently to obtain 
his consent to the arrest of the Nizari leaders. They~eated this 
virtually as a carte blanche. 
Ibn Eadie pursued his task with delighted ~eal, arresting some 
two hundred prominent adherents of the sect, not just the leaders; 
42. R. Dussaud, Topogra hie histori ue de la Syrie anti ue et 
medievale (Paris, 192'7 , p. 53, cited in R. Grousset, 
H~stoire des Croisades et du Royaume Franque de Jerusalem 
(Paris, 193~-6), I, p.~'79. 
43. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.603. 
44. See Cahen, "Mouvements popula:i.res et autonomisme urbain dans 
l'Asie musulmane du Moyen ,Age," Arabica, V (1958), p.2L~2. 
45. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, p.549. 
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Abu Tahir, his son Abu'l-Fath, the~ Ismacil, and the brother 
of al-Hakim al-Munajjim are named among those summarily executed. 
The government's intentions were no longer in doubt, and many 
Nizaris apparently began to flee the city. This mass exodus seems 
to have prompted Ibn Badi' to give his ahdath and the citizens of 
Aleppo the opportunity they had long awaited; orders were given 
that any Nizari found in the streets could be slaughtered. The 
chroniclers report that about three hundred Nizari men, women and 
46 
children died in the outburst of popular hatred which followed. 
Even if the chroniclers are not exaggerating, as they often 
do with numbers, this is a surprisingly small total compared with 
those arrested, suggesting perhaps that the bulk of the Nizaris 
had managed to escape. Certainly, not all the prominent members of 
the sect were arrested; Husam al-Din ibn Dimlaj succeeded in 
escaping when Abu 1 l-Hasan ibn Khashshab's men stormed Qalcat ash-
Sharif.47 Husam al-Din fled to Rakka where he died not long after. 48 
One of Abu Tahir's pupils, a freedman named Shahdi, also escaped 
arrest, for he turns up some years later as a prominent Nizari in 
Damascus. 49 Abu'l-Fath was caught and killed at the eastern g~te 
46. Kalanisi, p.145; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, pp.603-4; Ibn Asakir, 
quoted in Kamal's Bughyat, RHC. Or., III, pp.729-730; Sibt 
ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, pp.549-550; Athir, RHC. Or., I, 
p.291; Ibn al-Furat, cited in Sauvaget, Al~E (Paris, 1941), 
p.98, and Quatrem~re, p.344, and Defr,mery, pp.394-5. 
47. Ibn ash-Shihnah, trans. Sauvaget Les Perles Choisies, p.27. 
48. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.6o4. 
49. Kalanisi, p.193. 
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of the city, which suggests that he was attempting to flee in the 
same direction as Busam al-Din ibn Dimlaj.50 Even more remarkable 
is the treatment accorded those actually arrested. We could 
reasonably expect them all to have been slaughtered, and indeed some 
were tortured and thrown from the top of the citadel, but we are 
told that others were interceded for and set free, while others merely 
51 had their goods confiscated and were banished from the city. 
Thus it seems likely that a large remnant of the dacwa's achieve-
ment at Aleppo was preserved intact. The survivors, Kalanisi tells 
us, dispersed abroad, some even seeking refuge in Frankish.territory. 52 
This is perhaps not as impressive as it may sound, for the nearest 
most logical place for the survivors to seek shelter would be with 
their brethren in'the towns and villages of the Jazr, which was then 
under the control of the Franks of Antioch. 53 
The Sunnites of Aleppo made great capital out of the Nizaris' 
discomfiture; the heads of the slain were paraded through the streets 
and that of Abu'l-Fath was sent through all the neighbouring villages 
as evidence that the Nizaris had been expelled. 54 
50. Quatrem~re, p.344, presumably following Ibn al-Furat. 
51. Kalanisi, p.145; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.6o4. 
52. Kalanisi, pp.145-6. 
53. It is easily overlooked that intercourse between Muslim and 
Crusader territories was perfectly normal, even while 
campaigns were in progress. Some excellent examples of this 
are available in the observations of the Spanish pilgrim Ibn 
Jubayr later in the century; see the English translation by 
R.J.C. Broadhurst, The Travels of Ibn Jubayr (London, 1952), 
pp.300-301, 313, 31 -7. 
54. Ibn ash-Shihnah, trans. J. Sauvaget, Les Perles Choisies, p.27, 
and Quatrem~re, p.344. 
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No source assigns a definite date to these events, but in view 
of Alp's initial prevarication and his visit to Damascus soon after-
wards, the Nizari debacle probably occurred in January or early 
February 1114. 55 
An immediate and significant consequence of the Nizari downfall 
was the end of the estrangement between Aleppo and Damascus. Alp 
Arslan now visited Damascus, was received with honour, and accomp-
anied back to Aleppo by Tughtakin, who stayed until the middle of 
March 1114. 56 On his advice, Alp arrested more of Ridwan's former 
officers. Most striking of all, the power of the ra)is Sacid ibn 
Badrwas curtailed as abruptly as he had curtailed that of the 
Nizaris; he was arrested and imprisoned, and his properties were 
confiscated. He tried to commit suicide while in prison, and was 
finally allowed to go into voluntary exile for a time at Qalcat 
Ja'bar. 57 Ironically, the Nizari downfall benefitted the moderate 
Shi'ites even more than the Sunnites. Twelvers were again given 
access to the main mosque, and certain great families, notably the 
Banu'l-Jarada, could again profess their Shicism openly, without 
55. Kalanisi, p.146, and Kamal, RHC. Or., III, pp.604-605, supply 
the relevant dates; Alp went to Damascus in Ramadan 507, 
which extended from 9 February to 10 March 1114 (not January -
February as in the Recueil) and returned on 1 Shawwal, which 
was 11 March (not 28 February, as the Recueil has it). 
56. Kalanisi, p.147. 
57. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.605; Ibn Eadie seems to have returned 
to Aleppo after Alp's death, however. See below, p.137. 
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fear of Sunnite accusations of complicity with the Nizaris. 58 
As for the Nizaris remaining outside Aleppo, their dismay did 
not long delay them from reasserting themselves. 
When news of the arrests and executions of Aleppo reached Balis, 
perhaps next morning, the daci Ibrahim and his companions abandoned 
the fort of al-Kulaia and fled to seek asylum at Shaizar. 59 The 
Banu Munkidh were justly renowned throughout Syria for their tolerance 
and hospitality, 60 but it is odd that Ibrahim chose a long and 
hazardous journey south-west when he could more easily have fled 
eastwards, as did Husam al-Din ibn Dimlaj. His reasons must somehow 
be related to the fact that barely two months after the debacle of 
Aleppo, the Syrian Nizaris attempted to seize Shaizar for themselves. 
Ibrahim's role in this coup is not explained by any of our 
sources. He may have conceived the attempt himself, as Abu~l-Fath 
had conceived the attempt on Afamiya in 1106; once he had ingratiated 
himself with the Banu Munkidh, he could easily call on a force of 
Nizaris from nearby centres and help them seize the place. In this 
respect it is significant that the Nizari volunteers all came from 
towns in the Jazr; 61 there is no hint of aid or direction from 
Aleppo, not that any could be expected in 1114. Thtis it looks as 
58. Ibn al-Furat, cited in Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.268. 
59. Kamal al-Din, RHC. Or., III, p.604. 
60. Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle, Introduction, p.18. 
61. Kalanisi, p.147. 
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if the attempt on Shaizar was a hastily organized bid to compensate 
for the sudden loss of Aleppo as 62 the headquarters of the da'wa. 
Yet it may not have been so hasty or unpremeditated. Ibn al-
Kalanisi carefully emphasizes that "this attack had been organized 
a long time before 11 • 63 It is not impossible that the attempt to 
seize a castle of their own which had failed in 1106 was about to 
be repeated at Shaizar by the Nizaris of the Jazr, and that Ibrahim 
merely hastened to join the plot and speed its execution in view of 
the sudden collapse of the _Qa'wa at Aleppo. 
Sufficient time had passed for the Nizaris to have recovered 
their strength in the Jazr, and after Afamiya, Shai~ar was the 
next mast logical place for a Nizari coup. Its rulers were friendly 
and tolerant, so it would be easy to infiltrate an advance party to 
open the way for a larger assault, and once in Nizari hands, 
Shaizar would be ideal for their purposes. It occupied an important 
strategic position at the only safe crossing point on the Orontes 
between Hama and the Ghab. The upper town (al-Balad) was built on 
a narrow north-south ridge whose steep eastern and northern sides 
were encompassed by a bend of the river. On the southern and 
western sides, a deep man-made fosse separated the ridge from the 
rest of the plateau. The massive citadel with its numerous towers 
straddled the southern end of the ridge, connected with the barbican 
at the northern end by high curtain walls enclosing the upper town. 
62. Ibn al-:F'urat, cited in Cahen, Syrie du. ~~. p.268. 
6'>. 48 / Kalanisi, p.1 · , which could mean anything from two months to 
two years. 
The only entrance to the castle and the town was through the 
barbican. Access to the barbican was by means of a sloping stone 
ramp over the fosse, leading down to the main bridge across the 
Orontes. Here lay the lower town (al-Madinah), and a small fort, 
6Lf 
Hisn al-Jisr, guarding one end of the bridge. 
Of the immediate preliminaries to the coup~ the sources tell 
us virtually nothing. We know that Ibrahim was made an honoured 
guest of the Banu Munkidh, and it is likely that his companions 
had found lodgings in the upper town. Ibrahim would undoubtedly be 
in contact with the local Nizaris further north, and a date was soon 
set for the attempt. This was the Christian Easter (29 March 1114), 
an obvious choice because it was well-known that the Banu Munkidh 
went out in state to grace the Christian festival with their presence 
before going off to hunt or to visit neighbouring castles for the 
65 
rest of the day. 
64. E. Honigrnann, "Shaizar", EI, iv, pp.288-9; P.K. Hitti, Memoirs 
of an Arab-Syrian Gentleman (New York, 1929), Introduction, 
pp.4-6. An impression O:fthe site and remains of the castle 
(about 1938) may be gained from plates 47-49 in W. MDller-
Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders (English edition, London, 1966). 
65. Most sources agree on 507 I 1113-14, though Ibn al-Athir gives 
502 I 1109 (RHC. Or., I, p.272) which Abu'l-Fida faithfully 
capies (RHC. Or., I, p.10). Ibn al-Furat gives 517 I 1124 
(Quatrem~re, p.347) but since he is reported to place the 
coup immediately after the Aleppo debacle, this is probably 
a simple error of 517 for 507. (Defr~mery, p.397). Kalanisi, 
our most reliable contemporary source, gives Easter (p.147) 
but Fura t gives Palm Sunday ( 22 !Vlarch). Cahen, .Syri e du Nord, 
p.268 ignores both these dates and offers Christmas 1113, 
which is not mentioned in any source available to me. 
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The Nizari assault party appears to have arrived quite openly 
and been received by the Banu Munkidh as their guests. Kalanisi 
gives their number as 100 footsoldiers, 66 so the most obvious and 
time-honoured explanation for their appearance would have been that 
they were on their way somewhere else. Ibrahim apparently spoke 
for them, obtaining permission for them to rest awhile, because 
Kalanisi says that the Banu Munkidh showed them every kindness ''when 
they came on their errand of mischief. 116'1 
Besides their number, Kalanisi also tells us precisely where 
they came from; Sarmin, Afamiya, Macarrat Misrin and Ma'arrat al-
68 Nu'man. This is indeed precious information, for it is our only 
insight into the distribution of Nizari strength in the Jazr in 
these years. Obviously, there had been a remarkable recovery from 
the dislocations caused by Tancred's campaigns in 1105 and 1110. 
For the Nizaris to be active and numerous again in p~aces from which 
they had been forcibly evicted only a few years before is eloquent 
testimony to their tenacity and determination. 
The success of the coup at Shaizar depended on how swiftly 
the Nizaris could penetrate and occupy the citadel, for this was 
the key stronghold on the ridge. Their task appeared to be made 
easier by the fact that most of the townsfOlk accompanied the men of 
66. Kalanisi, p.14'1. 
6'1. Kalanisi, p.148. 
68. Kalanisi, p.14'1. 
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the Banu Munkidh and their troops to watch the festivities outside 
6 the lower town. 9 The initial assault on the barbican was brilliantly 
successful. The handful of guards were either killed or driven out, 
and the massive gates were barred shut as soon as the Nizari soldiers 
were all inside. The attackers then advanced through the upper town 
towards the citadel. Naturally, not all the inhabitants had gone 
down to watch the festival, and these loyal citizens now proved to 
be the Nizaris' undoing. On hearing the noise of the assault on the 
barbican, some townsmen had rushed to the citadel and secured one of 
the outer towers. From this they let down ropes to raise the women-
folk of the Banu Munkidh to the defensible upper floor of the citadel, 
just as the Nizaris stormed the ground floor. 70 
The women of the Banu Munkidh quickly showed the townsmen where 
to find weapons, and a running battle developed for possession of 
the towers. 71 Meanwhile the men of the castle realized that an 
assault was in progress and hurried up to the barbican, only to 
find the gates closed. We are told, however, that the men climbed 
up to join their womenfolk, so perhaps the ropes did duty again. 
69. Quatrem~re, p.348. 
70. Kalanisi, p.148; though Gibb's translation apparently corrects 
a confusion in earlier translations which had the women 
pulling the men up from the windows (Hodgson, p.94, n.33), 
his suggestion of the barbican for this outer tower does not 
make sense if, as he says, the women were being pulled up 
from the citadel, where one would logically expect the harem 
apartments to be. 
71. Usamah ibn Munkidh, transl. P.K. Hitti, Memoirs of an Arab 
Syrian Gentleman (New York, 1929), p.154. 
128. 
There they joined their loyal subjects and together attacked the 
Nizaris in increasing numbers. Many were killed, and the remainder 
forced to scatter to various parts of the castle where they were 
?2 tracked down and slaughtered one by one. But to judge from 
Usamah's recollections of "the day on which we were engaged in 
combat with the Ismacilites in the castle of Shaizar", the conflict 
was bitter and protracted.?3 Not a few of both parties appear to 
have been thrown from the battlements, and the Nizaris may have 
accounted for nearly their own number in dead and wounded defenders. 
One of Usamah's most vivid recollections is of his mother seating 
her daughter on the balcony overlooking the precipitous drop to the 
?4 
river on the eastern side of the tower, ready to push her over "rather 
th h t . . th h d f th t d . l: " ?5 an see er cap 1ve 1n e an s o e peasan··s an rav1s.1ers • 
The Nizaris were slaughtered to a man, and all those in the 
?6 town who sympathized with their doctrines were also put to death. 
The fate of the daci Ibrahim is not recorded, but on the other hand, 
nothing is heard of him again. Among the dead were probably several 
?2. Usamah describes how one was found in a stable, while another 
fought single-handed in a cul-de-sac against all-comers until 
one of Shaizar's ablest swordsmen managed to despatch him. 
(Hitti, Memoirs ••• , pp.190, 192-3.) Hitti assumes that 
73. 
?4. 
?.5. 
76. 
there were several Nizari attempts on Shaizar; Usamah's own 
accounts, as they are translated, all point to a single episode. 
Hitti, !Vlemoire . 
-----
. 
. ' 
p.192. 
Hitti, !VIemoirs . . 
. ' 
pp .10?, 146. 
Hitti, Memoirs . 
. ' 
p.15L~. 
Kalanisi, p.148. 
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of the Nizari leaders in the Jazr, one of whom Usamah names; one 
cAlwan ibn Harrar, 77 about whom we know nothing beyond Usamah's 
anecdote. 
This loss of what was surely a picked force of volunteers, the 
cream of Nizari manpower in the Jazr, must have been a crippling 
blow to the already weakened dacwa. Recovery from the double 
catastrophe of 1114 would be slow and painstaking. 78 
It is therefore not surprising that we hear very little of 
Nizari activity in northern Syria for several years after 1114, but 
I am not convinced that this year saw the end of a distinctively 
Aleppine "phase" in the history of the Syrian dacwa. 79 There ts 
nothing to suggest an abandonment of the area, and no hint of a 
80 
move elsewhere for at least another five years. The main focus of 
the dacwa's interests and existence remained in and around Aleppo. 
The immediate concern of the remaining Nizari dacis would be 
the consolidation and gradual expansion of surviving followings, 
and we have seen that these had indeed survived in the Jazr and 
77. Lack of diacritical marks in the MS. make this reading 
conjectural; upwards of half a dozen different spellings 
are possible. (Hitti, Memoirs ••• , p.153). 
78. Accounts of the attempt on Shaizar are found in Kalanisi, 
pp.147-8; Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, p.548; Athir, 
RHC. Or., I, p.272; Abu'l-Fida, RHC. Or., I, p.10; 
Quatrem~re, pp.347-8; Defr~mery, pp.395-397; Cahen, Syrie 
du Nord, p.268-9. 
79. B. Lewis, Assassins, p.100; this convenient but simplified 
analysis into "phases" of establishment seems to me 
positively misleading for the period 1114-1124, as I hope 
will be apparent from the following chapter. 
80. See below, pp.14-o-141. 
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Jabal Summak. This return to clandestine preaching and conversion 
would inevitably escape the notice of the chroniclers, so their 
silence cannot be regarded as conclusive proof of a halt in the 
life of the da'wa and its activity after 1114. A remnant survived, 
which would have included many refugees from Aleppo, around which 
the dacwa could be rebuilt. 81 
81. Cahen, Syrie du Nord, pp.268-9. 
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CHAPTER V 
ALEPPO and DAMASCUS, 1114-1125 
It seems unlikely that the Syrian da'wa received significant 
aid or reinforcement from Alamut after the double disaster of 1114, 
if the leadership of the da'wa is any indication. The leaders who 
perished at Aleppo were replaced by dacis already working in Syria, 
though these were, of course, Persiari and originally from Alamut. 
We have already encountered one of them, Abu Muhammad, who was 
active in the Jabal Summak from about 1107. Though one of the most 
senior daCis of those surviving, the leadership of the datwa did not 
go to Abu Muhammad in 1114; this honour fell to another Persian 
whom we have not hitherto encountered, Bahram al-Asadabadi. 
Bahram had been active in Syria at least five years longer 
than Abu Muhammad. He came of a traditionally Shi'ite family which 
had adopted the Nizari cause. His maternal uncle, a high-ranking 
courtier and representative of the Sultan, was for a time a secret 
Nizari in the heart of the Saljuk imperial administration. He was 
1 denounced, however, and executed in 1101 on Barkyaruk's orders. 
Bahram fled to Syria immediately after his uncle's execution, 
1. Ibn al-Athir, cited in Hodgson, p.89. An editorial note in 
RHC. Or., I, p.367 briefly comments on Bahram's uncle; the 
relevant passage in the Kamil, like so many other Iraki items 
(for which Athir is generally more reliable than Syrian 
affairs), is omitted from the Recueil version. The Recueil 
editors also prefer an alternative reading for Bahram's 
surname; al-Asterabadi, which is the modern town of Gurgan, 
just south-east of the Caspian Sea. 
132. 
and entered the service of the dacwa at Aleppo. He appears to have 
become an itinerant daci, charged with a roving commission to travel 
from district to district, preaching, converting, and perhaps keep-
ing an eye on subordinate da<i • 2 He seems to have shown himself more 
capable than most in this role, and with the elimination of the 
dacwa's leaders in 1114, found himself the senior da<i in Syria} 
As for the activities and policies of the first few years of 
Bahram's leadership, we can only speculate. The emphasis would be 
on consolidation of numbers, so preaching activities probably 
claimed most of the da<wa's energies. There are no reports of 
further attempts to seize castles; the dac~ would not have had the 
necessary manpower for at least a few yetrs, and it is more than 
likely that many fortress commanders emulated the example of the 
Banu Munkidh, who, we are told, "kept a strict watch" against any 
Ll. 
repetition of the 1114 coup. 
But until the ~~ could secure defensible headquarters of 
its own, growth would always be limited and vulnerable. The strategy 
of direct castle seizure had been tried and had failed. Until the 
~ was stronger, the only feasible policy was that originally 
employed at Aleppo, namely to seek the favour of a ruler who would 
protect the 1novement until it was strong enough to capture a castle, 
2. Kalanisi, p.179; Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.367. 
3. I,ewis, llri'he Ismacilites and the Assassins," in the Pennsylvania 
History of the Crusades, I, p .115. 
4. Kalanisi, p.148. 
and who might even be persuaded to cede a castle to them. Aleppo 
was still the likeliest place for this policy to succeed, but the 
Nizaris were to wait five years before the city acquired a ruler 
suitably disposed to favour them. 
In the meantime, we may be sure that the Nizaris did not 
neglect their opportunities, for the city had sunk to a state 
bordering on anarchy not long after Ridwan's death. His successor 7 
the weak and erratic Alp Arslan, was murdered in September 1114, and 
[-
power was openly assumed by the eunuch Lu'lu~. 7 L~ l~'s position 
was so precarious that he did not dare to venture forth from the 
citadel. 6 The defences of the city were neglected now that the 
Franks of Antioch under Tancred's nephew Roger no longer made 
constant raids, and we are told that parts of the walls began to 
fall into ruin.7 Years of warfare and economic dislocation had 
made Aleppo a far less glittering prize, and the Saljuk and Artukid 
amirs to the east were content for the t:Lme being to treat the 
impoverished city as a pawn in their disputes with the Sultan and 
with one another. 
An illustration of this is available from 1115. In that year, 
a quarrel between Aksunkur 11-Bursuki and Il-Ghazi the Artukid led 
the Sultan to deprive Bursuki of Mosul and Il-Ghazi to flee to 
5. Kalanisi, pp.148-9; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.6o6. 
6. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.6o8. 
7. Ibn ash-Shihnah, trans. J. Sauvaget, Les Perles Choisies, p.27. 
Syria where he joined forces with Tughtakin of Damascus. 8 This new 
combination threatened Aleppo, and Lucluc appealed to the Sultan 
for protection. The prospect of an army from the east caused Il-
Ghazi and Tughtakin to seek the alliance of Roger of Antioch. This 
caused even more anxiety in Aleppo, and when in August 1115 Bursuk 
ibn Bursuk descended on Syria at the head of the Sultan's army, 
Lucluc suddenly changed his mind and joined the Syrian alliance. 
Deprived of his expected base of operations and indeed of his main 
reason for entering Syria, Bursuk was reluctant to join battle. The 
inconclusive manoeuvers which followed finally led to the dispersal 
of the Syrian alliance. Tughtakin went home, but while the eastern 
army was aimlessly plundering in the Jazr, Roger and Baldwin of 
Edessa fell on them near Danith on 14 September and inflicted a 
crushing defeat. 9 
This defeat left Aleppo badly exposed to the Franks of Antioch 
and Edessa. Yet though the Franks occupied territory almost up to 
the city walls, Roger showed no desire t6 besiege Aleppo itself. 
Content with regular payment of tribute, Antioch, mounted no major 
attacks against the city for the next two years, while the anarchy 
within Aleppo continued unabated. 
8. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.294. 
9. Kamal al-Din, RHC. Or., III, pp.608-609; Athir, RHC. Or., I, 
pp.297-8; Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, pp.554-5; 
Usamah ibn Munkidh,trans. Hitti, Memoirs ••• , p.102; Bar 
Hebraeus, trans. Budge, pp.247-8; Walter the Chancellor, I, 
2-3, RHC. Occ., V, pp.85-89; William of Tyre, XI, 23-25, 
trans. Babcock and Krey, I, pp.500-505. 
At this juncture, the Persian Nizaris achieved a notable 
success at Baghdad, which offered not a little indirect benefit 
for the Syrian dacwa. 
Tughtakin was still under suspicion after Mawdud's assassination 
and in April 1116 he made a special trip to Baghdad to seek 
reconciliation with the Sultan. He did not return to Damascus until 
25 July. 10 Sometime towards the end of his stay, Tughtakin attend-
ed an audience at court with other prominent ami~. In the audience-
chamber he was seated beside Ahmad-Yal, the Kurdish prince of 
Maragha in Azerbaijan. While they were talking, a man approached 
them with a petition in his hand, ostensibly to ask for it to be 
presented to the Sultan. But as Ahmad-Yal reached for the petition, 
the man drew a dagger and stabbed him. Despite this, Ahmad promptly 
threw his assailant to the floor, but he was then attacked and 
killed by the petitj.oner's two companions. AlJ three assassins 
11 
were immediately slaughtered by guards. 
Tughtakin fled the audience-chamber in great fright, convinced 
that the assault had really been intended for him; we are told 
that though the assassins shouted encouragement to each other in 
P . tt. d d ,, . 12 ers1an, 11ey were resse as oyr1ans. Many people sympathized, 
thinking that the Sultan had attempted to wreak vengeance on 
10. Kalanisi, pp.151-3. 
11. Kalanisi, under A.H. 510 / 1116, cited in Hodgson, p.94 
(Gibb's abridged translation omits this item); Sibt ibn 
al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, pp.556-7; Defr~mery, pp.397-8. 
12. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, p.556; Defr~mery, p.397. 
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Tughtakin for Mawdud's death. 
However, suspicion lifted from the Sultan when the assassins 
were recognized as Nizaris, 13 for Ahmad-Yal was notorious as one 
of the Persian Nizaris' most determined adversaries. He had besieged 
their castles more than once, and may have been involved in the war 
of attrition against Alamut which had been in progress since 1108. 
He had figured prominently in Mawdud's Syrian campaigns a few years 
earlier, and at Aleppo had earned the hatred of the local Nizaris 
for his dealings with their sworn enemies the Banu'l-Khashshab. 14 
The Nizaris had ample reason to eliminate Ahmad-Yal, but 
because he had been more active in Persia than in Syria, the attempt 
was probably organized from Alamut. It is perhaps significant that 
the Saljuks at last mounted a full-scale siege of Alamut in the very 
next year, 1117. However, the assassinatioh may have been made to 
appear Syrian in origin. The Nizaris planned their major attempts 
very carefully in order to achieve maximum public impact. The two 
people most likely to be impressed on this occasion were the Sultan, 
to show him that the fida)is could penetrate even his audience-
chamber, and Tughtakin, If the ruler of Damascus thought that there 
were Nizaris in Syria capable of such deeds, perhaps next against 
himself, he might treat more indulgently any Nizaris who appeared in 
Damascus. What we know of Hasan-i Sabbah makes such contingency-
planning quite plausible. 15 
, .. ·-------------------------------------
13. Kamal, under A.H. 509, cited by Hodgson, p.112, n.38. 
14. Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.262. 
15. Dafr~mery, pp.397-8; Cahan, Syria du Nord, p.262. 
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For the present, however, the main hopes of the Syrian da<-wa 
still seemed to be fixed on Aleppo where Lucl~'s rule was now 
drawing to a close. 'rhe former ra) is Ibn Eadie had apparently 
returned to the city after Alp Arslan's death, for he is now 
depicted as fomenting bitter local opposition to the eunuch's rule. 
Faction fights in the streets, this time between supporters of 
Luc luc and Ibn Eadie, again became commonplace. 16 But Ibn Badi'- was 
not the only threat to Luc lu·• s dwindling power. A more powerful 
and potentially dangerous interest in Aleppo was that taken by 
Aksunkur Il-Bursuki of Mosul. Not surprisingly, in April 1117, 
Lutlu'gave up the unequal struggle and fled. On reaching Balis, 
he was murdered by Turks of his own entourage. It was said that 
Bursuki had bribed them; if so, he derived no immediate return from 
his investment for the government of Aleppo was taken over by 
another eunuch, Yaruktash. 17 However, the rule of Yarauktash lasted 
no more than a few months. He tried to conciliate the Franks by 
giving them al-Kubba, but this so roused popular feeling that he was 
forced to retire when a coup installed the Damascene Abu'l-Mali 
ibn Milhi as regent. Ibn Milhi's first action was to expel Ibn 
Badi~ who probably took refuge once again with Malik ibn Salim at 
16. Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.277. 
17. Kalanisi, pp.155-6; Kamal al-Din, RHC. Or., III, pp.610-611. 
Q ] ' t J '-b 18 a. a, a ar. 
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Ibn Milhi now had to contend with Bursuki's most powerful rival 
for control over Aleppo. Il-Ghazi the Artukid, prince of Mardin, 
w~s not only powerful but somewhat more in need of additions to his 
territory than Bursuki. He is of importance here, because he was 
to become the Nizaris' new patron. 
Il-Ghazi appeared at Aleppo in the middle of 1117 and appropriated 
the fort of Qaltat ash-Sharif as his residence, but when he found 
that the district utterly lacked provisions for his troops and horses, 
he was forced to withdraw. 19 On his way he installed his own 
garrison at Balis, and these troops now began to make occasional 
20 
raids towards Aleppo. Accordingly, when Ibn Milhi received over-
tures from Khirkhan of Hims, he readily accepted them, but while 
Khirkhan was prevented from coming to Aleppo by Tughtakin, Ibn Milhi 
was unexpectedly overthrown by another eunuch, Karaja. 
In view of the instability and ineptitude of government by 
these eunuchs, the defence of the city had been assumed by the kadi, 
Abu'l-Fadl ibn Khashsbab, and when Il-Ghazi returned to Aleppo in 
18. Ibn alJ.i'urat, cited in Cahen, "Mouvements populaires . • " 
Arabica, V, (1958), p.242, which says Ibn Badrwas expelled 
by a new Damascene regent and succeeded as ralis by Ibrahim 
al-l''urati in 511 / 1117. B. Lewis, "The Ismacilites and the 
Assassins'', in the Pennsylvania History of the Crusades, I, 
p.114, said that Ibn Bad~ was expelled in 1119 by Alp Arslan; 
but Alp was assassinated in 1114. Lewis, Assassins, p.104, 
retains 1119 but carefully omits mention of who expelled Ibn 
Badic.. 
19. Kalanisi, p.157, giving the date as June-July 1117. 
20. Kamal al-Din, RHC. Or., III, p.611. 
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1118, it was this notable with whom he negotiated. Ibn Khashshab 
reflected the opinion of the leading families of the city, who were 
apprehensive of Il-Ghazi's power, and the amir had actually moved 
off in disgust before the notables changed their minds and let him 
into the city. Il-Ghazi installed himself in the citadel, expelled 
the eunuchs' sycophants and even some remnants of Ridwan's entourage, 
paid up the arrears of tribute owing to Antioch, and wrote to 
Tughtakin confirming their alliance. 21 
Il-Ghazi was not only Aleppo's strongest ruler since Ridwan; 
he was also disposed to tolerate the Nizaris, and for much the same 
motives as Ridwan. The curious xenophobia of the citizens isolated 
h . f' 1 l f ll ' 22 d . f' th N' . ff d h' 1m .rom any oca o ow1ng, an 1· - e 1zar1s o ere 1m 
support, he had no religious scruples to prevent him accepting it. 
From the Nizaris' point of view, he seemed an even better patron than 
Ridwan. In the first place, he was an Artukid, not a Saljuk, and 
therefore had no strong ties with the Sultanate. Secondly, he was 
not utterly dependent on Aleppo as Ridwan had been; Il-Ghazi's main 
interests lay in the Jazira beyond Edessa, in Mardin and Diyarbakir 
where he had been busy filching territory from petty Saljuk governors. 
This made him a more powerful ally, and opened up the prospect of 
expanding the dacwa into new areas under his control. 
Though Il-Ghazi seemed to be even friendlier than Ridwan he 
was in fact simply a very shrewd ruler. He could encourage the 
21. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, pp.613-615. 
22. J. Sauvaget, A~, p.98. 
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the Nizaris to think he was their devoted patron and protector at 
Aleppo even while building a Sunnite madrasa at Mardin, and, what 
is more, justify himself to the satisfaction of both parties. 23 
Though evidence is scanty, Il-Ghazi appears to have made cautious 
use of Nizari support in 1118 and 1119, even while courting the 
support of the Banu'l-Khashshab. It was now that the Nizaris 
probably reappeared openly in Aleppo, and as Bahram ingratiated 
himself with Il-Ghazi, the sectaries doubtless returned to their 
old tactics of terror and intimidation against their Sunnite 
adversaries in the city. 24 
It was probably also at this time that da'is began to travel 
north-east and extend the preaching into Il-Ghazi's territories on 
the upper Tigris, for only a few years later a sizeable Nizari 
"presence" is reported in the area. 25 The lesson of the 1114 
debacle at Aleppo had surely not been lost on Bahram; the dacwa 
must expand into new areas and avoid the earlier concentration of 
activity in one main area, so that if a similar reverse occurred 
again, the da~wa would not suffer s1lch a crippling blow. Il-Ghazi 's 
alliance with Tughtakin seems to have suggested to Bahram an even 
more exciting challenge than the Diyar Bakir; expansion into 
southern Syria, into Damascus itself. 
23. 
24. 
2 ... .) . 
Cahen, "Le Diyar Bakr au temps des premiers Urtukides," JA 
(1935) p.237; on Il-Ghazi and the Artukids in general, the 
' most up to date outline is Cahen1 s article, "Artukids", 
EI 2, i, pp.662-6. . 
Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.367; Ibn al-Furat, cited in Defr~mery, 
p.3L1.8. 
C. Cahen. "Le Diyar Bakr au temps des Premiers Urtukides", JA 
(1935), p.237, citing Ibn al-Furat. 
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Though Damascus was renowned as a trenchantly Sunnite city, 
Shicites were tolerated there and Bahram would have known that there 
was a Fatimid colony in the city. 26 Ridwan's patronage at Aleppo 
had shown that with the ruler's protection a dar al-dacwa could be 
set up even in the midst of a hostile populace. There were prospects 
for expansion in the districts around Damascus as well; we have 
already noted the Druzes and Nusayri communities in the Mount Hermon 
area who were far closer to Ismacili doctrine than the Sunnites and 
Twelver Shi'ites in the city itself. 27 
Il-Ghazi visited Dama~cus towards the end of 1118, In December, 
Tughtakin accompanied him back ~o Aleppo, where they agreed to spend 
the winter together gathering troops in the Jazira for a major 
campaign against the Franks in the summer of the following year. 28 
On their way from Aleppo, they paused at Qalcat Ja'bar to put their 
alliance into formal terms and to write appeals to other amirs, 
urging them to join in holy war. They appear to have stayed here over 
December-January 1118-1119. 29 
This seems the lj.keliest opportunity for Bahram to press Il-
Ghazi to make approaches to Tughtakin on his behalf. What passed 
between the two rulers we do not know, but what issued from their 
discussion is well-attested. Il-Ghazi prevailed upon Tughtakin to 
26. See S.M. Stern, "'rhe }i~pistle of the Fatimid Caliph al-Amir •• 
JRAS (1950), pp.30-31. 
27. See above, pp. 63-4-. 
28. Kalanisi, p.158; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.615. 
29. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.616. 
II 
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give Bahram a letter of recommendation which would enable him to 
take up residence at Damascus and conduct his preaching activities 
there without molestation.3° 
Tughtakin's motives are nowhere adequately explained except for 
a suggestive phrase in Kalanisi which says that Tughtakin protected 
them and humoured them "in order to ward off their malice 11 .31 We 
lack means to read men's minds; perhaps Tughtakin had been more im= 
pressed than he cared to admit by the assassinations of Mawdud and 
Ahmad-Yal so close to his own person. 32 
Treaty-making was not the only significant happening at Qal~at 
JaCbar that month. Whether as a display~ encourage Il-Ghazi and 
Tughtakin to be generous towards Bahram, or as an expression of their 
new confidence after receiving Tughtakin's assurances, the Nizaris 
assassinated the former raJis of Aleppo, sa~id ibn Badi: as he was 
stepping into a boat to cross the river and ask Il-Ghazi to rein-
state him at Aleppo. His two sons who were with him struggled with 
and killed the two assassins. Both sons were wounded and one died 
30. Kamal, RHC. Or.~ III, p.616; Kalanisi p.179 is explicit about 
the letter arid the agreement which had been made, but gives 
no date. It must have been before Il-Ghazi's death in 1122, 
and it is significant that the Nizari leader at Aleppo in 
1120 was Abu Muhammad, not Bahram. In the light of what we 
know about the movements of Il-Ghazi and Tughtakin, their 
sojourn at Qal•at Ja<bar seems by far the likeliest oppor-
tunity for such an agreement, especially since Kamal spec• 
ifically says they made a treaty there. 
31. Kalanisi, p.187. 
32. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.367 goes so far as to assert that 
Tughtakin took Bahram into his own entourage, but no other 
source mentions this. 
almost at once, but the other was carried to a nearby fort only to 
be set upon and killed by a third Nizari. The guards caught this 
Nizari and took him to Il-Ghazi and Tughtakin. It is said that 
they did not even torture him, but were content merely to lock him 
up; unusually mild treatment for a murderer caught in the act. But 
the assassin wqs not to be deprived of his glory; he found a way 
to throw himself from the battlements into the river where he 
drowned. 33 
Ibn Badi's assassination was obviously the tactical elimination 
of a powerful enemy who could have caused the Nizaris great harm 
if he had returned to Aleppo. It was, as well, an example ilif Nizari 
retribution, for we have seen the share Ibn Badi~had in the slaughter 
of Nizaris at Aleppo in 1114. Their revenge was sure, if at times 
a.little tardy. 
Shortly after Ibn Badi's assassination, Il-Ghazi and Tughtakin 
left on their troop-raising campaign. The army they collected 
entered Syria in June and encamped at Kinnasrin to await Tughtakin's 
return with the army of Damascus. 
Roger of Antioch had been promised aid from Jerusalem, but was 
impatient, and marched out to meet this new threat before Tughtakin 
returned to join Il-Ghazi. The result was one of the most crushing 
and sanguinary defeats the Franks ever experienced in Syria. On 
28 June 1119, virtually the entire army of Antioch was destroyed in 
37. :;. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.616; Quatremere, pp.3Lf5-6; and 
Defr~mery, pp.398-9, both quoting Ibn al-Furat. 
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the slaughter known to the Latin chroniclers as the aser sansuinis. 34 
The confused manoeuvering which followed and the inconclusive 
battle with the relieving forces from Jerusalem and Tripoli, fought 
near Danith on 13 August, could not detract from Il-Ghazi's tremen-
dous victory. But illness prevented him from following it up, and 
while he convalesced at Aleppo his booty-laden levies melted away 
into the Jazira.35 
The Nizaris' choice of patron seemed now to be an inspired 
stroke of brilliance, but unfortunately Il-Ghazi was not prepared 
to make Aleppo his capital. His main interests were to the north-
east and though he was again at Aleppo in May and June 1120, he 
appointed his son Shams al-Dawla Sulaiman to be governor of the city 
)6 
and one Mikki ibn Kurnass as police-chief in September of that ye~r. 
This 0ppears to have disquieted the Nizaris; perhaps they were 
doubtful of Sulaiman's capacity to maintain his father's protection. 
Whatever the immediate cause, the Nizaris at Aleppo suddenly felt the 
need of som~ additional security. 
Sometime in 1120 or early 1121, the Nizari leader at Aleppo, 
34. Kalanisi, pp.159-161; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, pp.617-620; Usamah 
ibn Munkidh, trans. Hitti, Memoirs ••• , pp.148-149; Athir, 
RHC. Or., I, p.324; Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, pp.560-
561; Walter the Chancellor, II, 2-6, RHG~ Occ., V, pp.201-
211; Fulcher, III, 3, RHC. Occ., III, p.442; William of Tyre, 
XII, 9-10, trans. Babcock and Krey, I, pp.528-531; Matthew 
of Edessa, RHC. Arm., I, pp.122-3. 
35. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, pp.620-622. 
36. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, pp.622-3, 627. 
the daci Abu Muhammad, sent an envoy with gifts and a letter to Il-
Ghazi at Mardin. The letter asked if Il-Ghazi would cede to the 
sectaries the little castle of Qalcat ash-Sharif, just outside the 
south wall of the city, which the Nizaris had occupied briefly at 
the end of Ridwan's reign. Il-Ghazi's reaction, if our sources are 
to be relied on, reveals both his capacity for adroit and skilful 
handling of a compromising situation and perhaps his true attitude 
towards the Nizaris. He replied to the envoy without hesitation that 
he had just issued orders for that castle to be demolished because 
it could prove a liability in the hands of a besieging army, but 
that if the demolition had not begun, the Nizaris were welcbme to 
it. He then directed his secretary to offer the envoy refreshment 
while the necessary papers were drawn up. As soon as the envoy had 
gone out, Il-Ghazi quickly sent orders to Aleppo by pigeon post 
for Sulaiman to demolish part of the fort and settle as many people 
within the ruins as he could. This had been done by the time the 
envoy returned to Abu Muhammad at Aleppo. When Abu Muhammad offered 
to rebuild the place, Il-Ghazi replied that this would involve too 
many disputes with the families already settled there. No doubt 
enjoying the rich irony, he gently chided the Nizaris for not 
approaching him secretly in this matter: 37 
37. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.628 which has Sulaiman and Ibn Kurnass 
conducting the demolition. Dhahabi, cited in Quatrem~re, 
pp.346-7, and Defr~mery, pp.399-401, has another version in 
which the demolition was undertaken on the initiative of the 
citizens and especially the kadi Ibn Khashshab, Kamal has 
515 I 1121 but the other sou~ cited by Quatremere and 
Defr,mery agree on 514 I April 1120- March 1121. See also 
Cahen, Syrie du Nord, pp.346-7. 
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The fact that Abu Muhammad is named as the Nizari leader in 
Aleppo at this time strongly suggests that Bahram had already gone 
south to Damascus in pursuance of the agreement between Il-Ghazi 
and Tughtakin, He need not have settled there permanently as yet, 
however, because the sources say that he continued to travel widely 
in Syria, attending to the affairs of the dacwa, 38 but it is possible 
that he was in Damascus and perhaps even involved in a curious 
episode which occurred there before April 1121. 39 
An Aleppine named Ibn Fashim was attacked and killed in broad 
daylight on a crowded city street by a Nizari who shouted that this 
man had been spying on the Syrian Nizaris and passing information to 
no less a person than the Fatimid wazir al-Afdal himself. Passersby 
apparently tried to prevent the slaying, but were reluctant to 
arrest the assassin when he declared himself to be a Nizari, for fear 
f th t , I 40 o e sec ar1es vengeance. 
Allowance must be made for the possibility that the murderer had 
nothing to do with the Nizaris and simply claimed the connexion as 
a useful alibi, but for the chroniclers to single out this instance 
from the many which would have been attributed in anger or ignorance 
to the "Batinis", must surely give us pause. It would not be unusual 
for a Fatimid agent to be keeping a wary eye on Nizari activity, and 
even less unusual for the Nizaris to seize an opportunity to hurt the 
(----------------------------
38. Kalanisi, p.179. 
39. The end of A.H. 514. 
LfO. Quatremere, p.347; Defremery, pp.402-40.3. See a1so Hodgson, 
p.105e 
imposter caliphate of Cairo3 But far more interesting is the 
implication that there was already a Nizari following in Damascus 
at this time; the fear of the bystanders is most suggestive. 
However, Ibn F'ashim's Aleppine origins could also indicate that 
his work had been in the north and that he had been followed to 
Damascus by a fida)i ordered to eliminate him. In the absence of 
further details or even a shred of corroboratory evidence, we cannot 
judge how strong the Niz.aris may have been in the south at this time. 
What ~s clear, if the story is true, is the deep and continued 
estrangement between Nizari and Mustaclian forms of Ismacilism. 
Not unnaturally, when the Fatimid wazir al-Afdal was himself 
assassinated in December 1121, the Nizaris were blamed immediately. 
They would almost ce~tainly have been glad to see dead the man who 
had deposed Nizar and perverted the imamate, but there are strong 
indications that they were not responsible for al-Afdal's death. 
Kalanisi is adamant on this point; he says the accusation against 
the Nizaris was 11 an empty pretence and an insubstantial calumny 11 • 
The real cause, he says, was the quarrel between al-Afdal and the 
Caliph al-Amir, who was kept in virtual confinement. When news 
came of al-Afdal's death, the caliph is said to have manifested 
unrestrained delight before all his courtiers. 41 
Kalanisi had no cause to make excuses for the Nizaris; he is 
grateful of opportunities to abuse them and show up their perfidy, 
but he always tries to be fair. Even the later chroniclers who do 
41. Kalanisi, pp.163-4. 
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blame them are sufficiently aware of the doubts involved to give 
Lf2 
alternative explanations for al-Afdal's murder. That the instigation 
belongs to al-Amir seems almost certain, and it is unlikely that al-
Amir would debase himself so far as to ask for Nizari aid in the 
Lf 3 
execution of his plans. 
The Nizari schism was obviously still a live issue for the 
Fatimid government, and in December 1122, exactly a year after al-
Afdal's death, a remarkable public meeting was convened to hear 
official affirmations of the legality of the Mustaclian imamate. 
The star performer at this gathering was Nizar's own sister, who 
made a public renunciation of her brother's claims. The Caiiph at 
once had a sijill (proclamation) drawn up embodying the findings of 
this meeting, to be read throughout Egypt, and an expanded version 
sent out to Mustatlfan communities elsewhere as a hidaya or official 
'-f'+ Jetter. 
We are fortunate to possess a copy of the letter sent to the 
Fatimid IsmaLili concregation at Damascus, for it has a most import-
1+5 
ant and illuminating appendix added by the Fatimid datj_ there. 
42. Athir, RHC. Or., I, pp.342-3. 
43. Ibn Muyassar, cited Hodgson, p.108, says that al-Amir himself 
professed to blame the Nizaris. See also Defr"'emery, pp. LI03-
405 for details of the growing estrangement between al-Afdal 
and al-Amir. 
44. Ibn Muyassar, cited in .S.M. Stern, "'rhe Epistle of the Fatimid 
Caliph al-Amir (al-Hidaya al-Amiriyya) - its Date and its 
Purpose", JHAS, (1950) pp.22-23. 
45. Arabic text edited A.A.A. Fyzee, al-Hidayatu 1 l Amiriya (Oxford, 
1938),Islamic Research Association .Series, No.?. 
This daci relates that when the letter was read out to the congregation, 
a Nizari who was present asked if he could show the document to his 
leader. When the letter was read out at the Nizari gathering, it 
apparently caused an uproar and thier chief daci was moved to write 
a refutation in the blank space at the end of the manuscript. The 
Nizari then took the letter back to the Fatimid meeting, and read 
his master's refutation to them; this also caused an uproar. The 
Fatimid daci then added his account of the exchange and sent the 
letter back to Cairo asking for advice on how to silence the sectaries. 
He notes the exact date of the meeting, and if it follows the year 
in which the great public gathering was held in Egypt, it would be 
26 February, 1123. 46 
The implications of this fortuitous insight are extremely 
interesting. They indicate that a body of Nizaris J.arge enough to 
support a daci qualified to pronounce on the imamate was present in 
Damascus at this time and was known and recognized by the Fatimids 
there. Though there is no supporting evidence which might tell us 
how many of them there were, or the daci's name, it is possible that 
such an important refutation may have been written by Bahram himself. 
The most that can be ventured on such scanty but precious information 
is that Bahram's preaching since he left Aleppo seems to have borne 
fruit in a strongly Sunnite setting and that at least the nucleus of 
L16. Stern, "Epistle . . • " pp. 30-31, where he discusses the dating. 
It should be mentioned at this point that the violently 
polemical second half of this letter contains one of the very 
few extant instances of the term hashishiyya used as an 
abusive designation for the Syrian Nizaris. (Hodgson, pp. 
136-7.) 
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a new branch of the Syrian datwa had been established in Damascus 
by 1123. 
The wisdom of Bahram's decision to extend the da<wa southwards 
was made increasingly clear by events in the north after 1122. Il-
47 Ghazi was not noted for moderation in food or drink so nobody was 
surprised to hear that in July or August 1123 he had fallen ill with 
an acute stomach disorder at Aleppo. He was immobilized for two 
months until he felt well enough to return home to Mardin, but the 
rigours of the journey overcame him and he died on the way, not far 
. 48 from Diyar Bak1r. 
The Artukid territories then witnessed a rapid reshuffle of 
rulers. Il-Ghazi's eldest son Shams al-Dawla Sulaiman went to 
Mayyafarikin, leaving his cousin Badr al-Dawla Sulaiman in charge 
49 
at Aleppo, while Mardin was seized by a younger brother, Timurtash. 
Watching all this with alert interest was Il-Ghazi's nephew, Nur 
al-Dawla Balak, who saw in Il-Ghazi's domains the logical extension 
of his own growing territories jn the Jazira. This ruthless and 
ambitious prince had already won great prestige by capturing Joscelin 
of Edessa in September 1122; he now repeated the exercise with the 
far more significant capture of King Baldwin himself in April, 1123. 50 
47. Kalanisi, p.149 says that when he got drunk, 11-Ghazi would 
remain in a blind stupor for several days afterwards. 
48. Kalanisi, p.166 gives 8 November; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.633-4 
gives 3 November; Matthew of Edessa, RHC. Arm., I, p.132. 
49. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.634. 
50. Kamal, RHC, Or., III, p.635-6; Matthew of Edessa, RHC. Arm., I, 
p.133; William of Tyre, XII, 17, (not 11 as in Runciman II, 
p.162, n.2) trans. Babcock and Krey, I, pp.539-541. 
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These were chance successes however, and Balak's ambition was 
not to deal a death-blow to the Franks but to seize as much as he 
could of the Artukid inheritance. Aleppo was the most obvious and 
vulnerable of all Il-Ghazi's former domains. In May 1123 Balak 
blockaded the city and devastated its districts. On 26 June, the 
city capitulated and Balak took possession of the citadel. He exiled 
~ 
Ridwan s young son Sultanshah to Harran to take the wind out of any 
. 51 loyalist factions, and set about imposing his rule on the c1ty. 
In place of Il-Ghazi's shrewd diplomacy, Aleppo now tasted 
52 Balak's preference for brute force. The Nizaris must have felt 
the wind beginning to change as soon as Il-Ghazi fell ill and died, 
because his patronage of their cause had been severely ~ticized 
by the citizens, and anti-sectarian feeli.ng was beginning to mount. 
Not altogether unconnected with this rise of opinion was the 
demolition or conversion into mosques of all remaining Christian 
churches in Aleppo in October 1123, at the urging of the kadi Ibn 
53 Khashshab. The Nizaris would have realized that Balak had no need 
of their support and that their position in the city was once again 
dangerously vulnerable. 
Balak finally moved against the Nizaris in January 1124, but 
curiously enough there was no bloodbath. The chroniclers leave us 
in ignorance of the events which led up to it, but on 15 January, 
51. Kalanisi, pp.167-8; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.636. 
52. See Kamal, HHC. Or., III, p.637 for Balak's massacres of 
prisoners and peasants. 
53. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.638. 
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as Balak was returning to Aleppo from a visit to the Jazira, he 
arrested the agent of the chief daci and sent orders ahead for the 
sectaries to leave the city at once. This was at least preferable 
to being massacred, for there were now strong centres of Nizari 
activity in the north-east and in the south as well as the older 
centres in the Jazr to which the refugees could flee, Manpower was 
too precious to waste in futile resistance, so the Nizaris of 
54· Aleppo quietly sold their furniture and their houses and departed. 
The Nizaris were not the only ones affected by Balak's 
tightening-up campaign. He also expelled the kadi Ibn Khashshab 
and the ra'is Fadacil ibn Sa'id ibn Bad~ in a vain attempt to 
quieten the city factions.55 On the contrary, Aleppo plunged again 
into instability and faction strife. Fadacil was succeeded as ra,is 
by a Persian, Salman ibn Ahd al-Razzak, who was murdered in March 
1124. He was in turn replaced by a notable from Harran, one of 
54. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.640; Quatrem~re, pp.348-9; Defr~mery, 
p .1108. Kamal says the man arrested at the border was "the 
agent of Bahram the Batini leader at AJeppo''· This need 
not contradict my assumption that Bahram had by this time 
established a following in Damascus; Aleppo was still the 
seat of the whole Syrian dacwa and Kamal would naturally 
assume that the head of thed.acwa was resident there. 
Kalanisi p.179 ways that Bahram continued to travel widely; 
it is logical that Aleppo would figure prominently in these 
traveJs, and it is nbt impossible that he was actually visit-
ing the city early in 1124. 
55. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.640; Ibn al-Furat, cited in Cahen, 
"Mouvements popu1aires ... " Arabica, V (1958) p.243 for 
the succession of Ibn Badi's son Fada<il to the ri~a~~; see 
also Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.298. 
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Balak's pro~egees, Sa 1 dan ibn Sa 1 danah.56 
The Nizari refugees from Aleppo, however many there were, 
probably scattered to join Nizari followings elsewhere. Some may 
have gone to join Bahram at Damascus; many would have stayed in the 
north or gone up to Diyar Bakir to join the brethren there. 
Yet again, the ~acwa had been deprived of its operational head-
quarters, but the loss was not so acute this time, and certainly not 
unforeseen. The main energies of the da'-wa now lay elsewhere, and 
in A.H. 518 / 1124-25 one of those areas attempted to show its 
strength. In that year, the Nizaris of Diyar Bakir (Amid) staged a 
coup to seize control of the city. The attempt failed miserably, 
and in the confusion which followed some seven hundred Nizaris are 
reported to have been massacred. 57 
Even allowing for the customary inflation of chroniclers' 
numerical estimates, this seems to have been as great a holocaust as 
that at Aleppo ten years earlier. It is much to be regretted that 
no further details are available, other than one which helps explain 
how the Nizaris had expanded so remarkably in the Diyar Bakir. 
Besides Il-Ghazi 1 s patrohage before 1122, the N:Lzaris apparently 
56. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.641; the assassination of Salman is 
probably the one Cahen refers to as yet another little-known 
Nizari exploit (Cahen, Syrie du Nor~, p.348) but there is no 
evidence to implicate them or show why they would want to 
murder him. The Nizaris had no monopoly over political 
killings. 
57. Cahen, "Le Diyar Bakr au temps des premiers Urtukides", JA 
(1935) pp.237-8; Defr~mery, p.405 (both citing Athir and 
Sibt, but the Recueil versions of these two sources omit 
all mention of this episode); Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.348. 
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enjoyed the support of the rich and well-established Nisanid family 
at Diyar Bakir. They were still being castigated for their support 
of the sectaries in Saladin's time.58 
Expulsion from Aleppo and massacre at Diyar Bakir need not 
necessarily have ended Nizari activities in northern Syria. What 
really seemed to spell the end of any further prospects there was 
the new ruler at Aleppo. After Balak's death at Manbij in May 1124, 59 
Timurtash had regained control and foolishly released King BaldwJn, 
who promptly allied with the Bedouin chieftain Dubais ibn Sadaka to 
besiege Aleppo in October 1124. The citizens, in desperation when 
Timurtash fled, appealed to Mosul, whose ruler set out at once, 
60 
relieved the siege, and was welcomed in the city on 29 January 1125. 
Aksunkur Il-Bursuki was a ruler of far different mettle from 
either Ridwan or 11-Ghazi. He had regained favour with the new 
sultan, Mahmud (1117-1131), and was anxious to show himself as a 
champion of Islam. He won great renown for his prompt action in 
saving Aleppo, and became popular in the city for his justice and 
efficient government. Kamal al-Din notes that once he had set 
affairs in order and made the roads safe, caravans again began to 
frequent Aleppo and trade revived. 61 In addition to fj~m government 
and economic revival, Bursuki's rule brought a resurgence of 
58. Cahen, "Mouvements populaires 
59. Kamal, nne. Or., III, p.6l+2. 
60. Kamal, Tmc. Or., III, pp.647-9; Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., 
III, p.565. 
61 • Kamal, HHC. Or., III, p.650. 
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orthodox feeling to Aleppo, foreshadowing the greater revival of 
orthodoxy that was to come under Zanki and Nur al-Din. The Nizaris 
could not, therefore, hope for favours from Bursuki. One witness 
testifies that he so strongly opposed the 11 Batinis 11 one would have 
had difficulty finding even a sympathizer anywhere in Bursuki's 
62 
army. Bursuki's reputation for piety stands high among the later 
h . J 63 c rornc .ers. 
Though their prospects for open power in Aleppo were now defin-
itely curtailed, the Nizaris still seemed capable of reaching their 
adversaries there. Sometime during 1125, the for~er kadi Ibn Khashshab 
was assassinated after dark near his house in the city. The culprits 
were not caught, but it was readily assumed that Nizaris had killed 
him. Always allowing for the possibility of some private quarrel or 
an unknown faction struggle, the Nizaris certainly had ample cause 
to murder Ibn Khashshab. He had been their most determined adversary 
since their very first appearance in AJ.eppo, and with Satid ibn Badi' 
had been the main instigator of the 1114 massacre. 64 
62. 
6. L f • 
Abu 'Tahir al-Salafi, quoted in Kamal al-D:Ln's Bughyat, RHC. Cr., 
III, p.725. 
See Abu'l-Fida, RHC. Or., I, p.16. 
Ibn ash-Shihna (citing a lost chronicle by L:;ayn al-D:i.n ibn Abd 
ar-Hahim), trans. Sauvaget, Les Perles Choisies (Beirut, 1933) 
p.65; Cahen, Syrie du Nord, pp.347-B, citing Furat and Ibn 
Muyassar. Some writers assume that Ibn Khashshab di.ed for 
his part in the demolition of Qalcat ash-Sharif in 1120, but 
this involved no loss of Ni7,ari lives, and the sources are 
not agreed that he was actually involved. (Quatrem~re, 
p.3i17; Defrernery, p.4·01; lewis, 11The Isma'-'ilites and the 
Assassins'', in the Pennsylvania History of the Crusades, I, 
p.115.) 
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Ihn Khashshab's assassination made a profound impact on Aleppo. 
The Nizaris had been expelled, yet seemed still to be powerful and 
in the midst of affairs. Little wonder, then, that one of the 
notable families of the city openly professed adherence to the 
Nizaris for fear of suffering the same fate as the kadi. 65 
Their fear was groundless, however, for this appears to have 
been the Nizaris' parting gesture. Nothing. more is known of Nizari 
activity in Aleppo after 1125. 
65. Ibn al-E'urat, cited in Sauvaget, Alep (Paris, 1941) p.98. 
CHAPTEH VI 
DAMASCUS, 1125-1129 
15?. 
The main focus of the da_:Yifa had quietly shifted southwards, 
to Damascus. In the year following Ibn Khashshab's assassination, 
Kalanisi has an entry which states that the influence of Bahram 
a.l-Asadabadi had grown so formidable he was "a power to reckon with" 
in Aleppo and Syria. Since Balak had expelled the Nizaris from 
the city two years before, and nothing is heard of Nizari activity 
in Aleppo after 1125, it seems likely that Kalanisi is making a 
retrosp~ctive summary of Bahram's activity in Aleppo; a favourite 
device of the chroniclers to overcome the rigid annalistic sub-
division of events into their respective years. He had, Kalanisi 
continues, lived in "extreme concealment and secrecy", often in 
disguise, before coming to Damascus with the letter of recommendation 
Il-Ghazi had persuaded Tughtakin to give him. He was received with 
honour at Damascus; "every consideration wa,s sbown him and protection 
was assured him after suffering many vicissitudes of fortune. 191 
No date is given for Bahram's first open appearance in Damascus, 
but as we have seen in the previous chapter there are a few 
indications which point to an earlier date than 1126, the year under 
which KaJanisi makes these observations. Kalanisi himself suppljes 
one of these indications by depicting Bahram in yet another phase 
of travel, after he had arrived in Damascus: 11 He moved about from 
1. Kalanisi, p.179. 
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place to place and gained a following among the ignorant and witless 
mob, and foolish peasantry, men lacking both intel.J igence a:nd 
religion . 112 
Because we have no further evidence which would enable us to 
pinpoint the start of Bahram's operations in the south, we again fall 
back on guesses. I prefer the earlier dating mainly for the reasons 
outlined above, 3 but also because the Nizaris seemed to take some 
time to build up strong followings even in traditionally Shicite 
areas. We might rea.sonably expect this to take longer in a tradi t-
ionally Sunnite such southern Syria. 
lf 
area as 
In Damascus it.self, Bahram could hope for little more than 
formal recognition from Tughtakin. Whether from fear or a sense of 
honour which kept him faithful to his agreement with Il-Ghazi or 
something of both, Tughtakin tolerated the Nizaris as potentially 
dangerous adversaries who were better humoured and kept quiet than 
needlessly provoked. 
Nonetheless, Bahram soon found an influential ally at Damascus 
who was prepared to help the Nizaris more positively. This was the 
2. Kalanisi, p.179. 
3. See p.1~2, n. 30, 
4. My views on Bahram's arrival at Damascus are at varjance from 
those of Professor Bernard Lewis, who not only states (in 
Assassins, p.105) that Bahram first appeared there late in 
1126 but that he had 11 a letter of recommendation, from Il-
Ghazi, the new ruler of Aleppo 11 • 'rhis is indeed curious, 
since Il-Ghazi had died in 1122. The new ruler of Aleppo 
in 1126 could only be Bursciki or his son Izz al-Din Masud. 
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waz,ir, Abu cA1i 'l'a.hir ibn Sa' d al-Maz.dakani. 'I'here is no suggestion 
that he was ever actually converted to Ismacilism; Kalanisi observes 
that he helped Bahram 11 even though he was not of his way of think-
c:: ing 11 .~ Like Ridwan, Mazdakani supported the sectaries for his own 
political advantage. 'l'he ~az,i r could not employ 'J1 ughtakin' s troops 
for his personal protection, and his rank placed him above the 
localized loyalties of the city factions. The prospect of possessing 
an efficient and disciplined band of supporters within the city would 
have appealed very strongly to Mazdakani, both as an instrument and 
a defence for his private schemes. He could not otherwise develop 
a loyal following of his own; the instability of the Damascus mob 
was notorious, 6 and the ahdath bands were firmly controlled by the 
city's leading families. The foremost of these, the Banu'l-Sufi, 
also happened to be Mazdakani's most determined political adversaries. 
Their head, Thiqat al-Mulk Abu'l-Dhuwad Mufarrij ibn al-Sufi, was 
the ra 1 is of Damascus, and at least one source testifjes that 
Mazdakani supported the Nizari.s simply for fear of the Banu'l-Sufi's 
considerable power in the city. 7 
On the other hand, since the wazir was I the atabeg s personal 
representative and the chief officer in his government, supervising 
5. Kalanisi, p.179. 
6. Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle •.. Introduction, p.27. 
7. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, p.567; Defr~mery, p.413 cites 
Abu'l-Mahasin for the same point, but the heavily abridged 
version of this source in the Recueil omJ.ts all mention of 
Nizari activity in Damascus. 
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all the various _9;}wans or departments of state, the Nizaris found 
themselves closer to sources of patronage and influence than any of 
the city factions. Mazdakani's favour was publicly demonstrated 
when they were given a dar al-dacwa or town house, like that given 
to them in Aleppo by Ridwan. 8 
Though Mazdakani openly helped them, the Nizaris did not neglect 
opportunities to show their usefulness to Tughtakin. Towards the 
end of 1125 Baldwin II of Jerusalem assembled forces to invade the 
Hau:ran and raid the outskirts of Damascus. 9 Tughtakin appealed 
as far afield as Irak and Mesopotamia for troops to meet this threat, 
and was joined by some 2000 Turkish cavalry, but aside from his 
•askar and these reinforcements Tughtakin's forces were mostly Syrian 
levies and volunteers. Kalanisi describes them as a great host 
from the ahdath and untried youths of Damascus and surrounding 
districts. But in addition, ~nd Kalanisi makes specific mention of 
this, there were the armed bands of the Nizaris, the 11 I3atiniya". 10 
It is striking that Kalanisi, usually so ready to dj_smiss the 
Niz.aris 11 as so many half-wits and vile scum, goes out of his way to 
mention that these Batini armed bands were Ylnoted for courage and 
8. Kalanisi, cited in Lewis, "The IsmaCiJites and the Assassins", 
the Pennsylvania History of the Crusades, I, p.116, from the 
Arabic edition by Amedroz (Leiden, 1908); omitted from 
Gibb's translation. 
9. Fulcher, III, 46, RHC. Occ., III, pp.473-4; William of Tyre, 
XIII, 18, trans. Babcock and Krey, II, p.27; Kalanisi, p.174. 
10. Kalanisi, p.175. 
11. Kalanisi, p.180. 
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gallantry''· Perhaps this was not the first time they had been of 
assistance to Tughtakin. The armed bands were not merely foot-
soldiers; we are told that they included cavalry as well, and 
Kalanisi distinguishes between these relatively disciplined forces 
and the mere rabble "who h.ad volunteered out of religious zea1". 12 
Even more valuable is Kalanisi's information regarding the places 
of origin for this great host. He firstly mentions the armed bands 
and youths "of Damascus, the Ghuta, the Jvlarj, and the outlying 
districts". Then he mentions the Nizari armed bands 11 from Hims and 
elsewhere, and from al-Aqaba, Qasr al-Hajjaj, and al-Shaghur, both 
footmen and horsemen fully armed". 13 'l'he last three places are 
suburban districts just south of Damascus, indicating that Bahram's 
preaching had won a response around the city as well as inside it. 
The reference to Hims is most precious, being a unique indication 
of Nizari activity in central Syria at this time. 
The Nizaris' support of Tughtakin on this occasion was, 
however, a very costly gesture. Battle was joined at Tell as-
Saqhab on 25 January 1126, and after initial success the Muslim army 
was routed by the famous massed charge of the Frankish knights. 
Kalanisi says that the Franks then "turned against all the footmen 
who were an immense number and put them to the sword until they made 
12. Kalanisi, p.176. 
13. Kalanisi, p.175. 
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an end Of. them"~ 1 L~ \'·' h f . h . • ~e ave no means o assess1ng ow ser1ous a 
loss this was for the Syrian dacwa; for a minority movement, any 
loss is serious. Nonetheless, we may be sure that Bahram made 
much of this Niz.ari "sacrifice" in Tughtakin 's service, and would 
be quick to remind him of it when asking for further favours. 
To the Syrian da'wa, Aksunkur Il-Bursuki must have seemed an 
insuperable barrier to any revival of their activity in the north. 
Even more alarming, given his decidedly anti-Nizari attitude, was 
his growing amity with Tughtakin. The two amirs made plans for a 
grand campaign together against the Franks when Tughtakin visited 
Bursuki after his abortive siege of Atharib in August-September 
1126. The Nizaris doubtless feared that Bursuki might try to change 
Tughtakin's lenient attitude towards them. But nothing came of 
this visit. Tughtakin fell ill and returned to Damascus. Further 
campaigning that year was unlikely, now that the brief Syrian 
autumn was at an end, so Bursuki appointed his able son Izz al-Din 
Masud as governor of Aleppo and set out for his capital, Mosul, to 
spend the winter there. 15 
14. Kalanisi, pp.176-7; Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.372; Fulcher, III, 
50, RHC. Occ., III, pp.477-8; William of Tyre, XIII, 18, 
trans. Babcock and Krey, II, pp.28-30; Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, 
RHC. Or., III, pp.565-6 who follows Kalanisi but piously 
omits mention of the Nizaris' role. 
15. Hamdan ibn Abd ar-Rahim, quoted in Kamal, Bughyat at-talab, 
RHC. Or., III, p.726; Kamal, Zubdat, RHC. Or., III, pp.653-4. 
At Mosul, Bursuki was awaited by an unsuspected but long-
prepared Nizari reception committee. 
Bursuki arrived at Mosul on the morning of Friday 26 November 
1126, perhaps having delayed his journey purposely so that his first 
public appearance would be at the midday service. He and his 
officers were still armed and dressed for travelJing when they 
entered the Great Mosque. 
As the ruler of the city and the Sultan's representative, it was 
Bursuki's privilege to take the Friday service. As he left his 
bodyguard to ascend the steps of the minbar, however, a group of men 
dressed as reJigious ascetics fell upon him, stabbing him repeatedly. 
Bursuki defended himself ably, managing to dispatch three of his 
assailants, hut several of his officers and guards were wounded as 
they rushed to help him. All but one of the assassins were seized 
and held while Bursuki was carried to his palace. The congregation, 
needless to say, had fled in panic. When Bursuki died of his wounds 
later that afternoon, the assassins were tortured and executed, and 
the citizens displayed their grief and outrage by massacring about 
eighty people who just happened to be on the streets in the same 
Sufic garb that the assassins had worn. 16 
16. The most detailed version 1s that of the lost contemporary 
chron1.cle by Hamdan ibn Abd ar-Rahim, quoted in Kamal's 
Bughyat, HHC. Or. 1 III, pp.726-7; Kalanisi, p.177, a brief 
notice (Gibb says he has omitted details of the assassination 
from his translation); the Anonymous Syriac Chronicle trans. 
by Tritton and Gibb, JRAS (1933), p.96; Matthew of Edessa, 
RHC. Arm., I, pp.145-6; Athir, RHC. Or., I, pp.364-5, and 
RHC. Or., II, p.58; Abu'l-Fida, RHC. Or., I, p.16; Bar 
Hebraeus, trans. E.A.W. Budge (Oxford, 1932), p.252; William 
of Tyre, XIII, 20, trans Babcock and Krey, II, pp.31-2. 
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According to the Saljuk historian Bundari, Bursuki was 
assassinated on the orders of the wazir Kiwam al-Din Nasir, a secret 
Nizari, in revenge for Bursuki's persecuti6n of Nizaris in previous 
'17 years. However, it is far more likely that this assassination was 
organized by the Syrian daCwa. From the first, suspicion fell on 
the Syrian Nizaris; Bursuki's son, Izz al-Din Masud, desperately 
wanted to lead a punitive expedition into Syria because he was con-
vinced his father's murderers came from Hama. 18 Ibn al-Athir names 
C' • th . f . . f f t f. d ) . 19 d h 0arm1n as e place o · or1g1n ·or some o he 1 a 1s, an we _ave 
striking evidence that at least one of them came from Aleppine 
territory. 
A fragment from the otherwise lost contemporary chronicie of 
Hamdan ibn Abd ar-Rahim offers a fascinating postcript about the 
one assassin who got away. He was a lad from Kafr-Nasih, a village 
near Azaz, north of Aleppo. Our chronicler was told by an inhabit-
ant of this village that the boy had an elderly mother who knew her 
son was one of the fida 1 is stalking Bursuki. When news came of his 
assassination and the death of all his assailants, she rejoiced and 
darkened her eyelids with antimony powder as if it were a festival. 
But when her son came home a few days later, her joy turned to sorrow 
and she shaved her hair and blackened her face as if in mourning. 20 
17. Cited in Defr~mery, p.410. 
18. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.655. 
19. Cited in Lewis, "The Ismac:Ll.ites and the Assas.sins", the Pennsyl-
vania History of the Crusades, I, p.116; this point is omitted 
from the abridged Recueil version. 
20. Kamal, Bughyat, mrc. Or., III, p.727. 
If it is to be relied on, this is indded a rare insight into 
the Nizari mentality. Whatever our prejudices, we must here 
acknowledge an astonishing group-spirit and supreme devotion to a 
cause. 
Bursuki's assassination made a profound impression on the Syrian 
and Mesopotamian parts of the Muslim world. Not surprisingly, 
various colourful stories soon found currency, the best of which is 
preserved by several of our sources. The story goes that Bursuki 
had a dream the night before he was assassinated in which he was 
attacked and mortally wounded by a pack of dogs, three of whom he 
managed to kill while defending himself. 1Nhen he spoke of this 
dream to his officers, they begged him not to appear in public for 
several days, but he insisted on his duty to lead the Friday prayer, 
When they remonstrated further, he opened the Kur>an at random in 
in search of guidance and found the verse, "Allah's will must needs 
be d ,21 one. 
Ibn al-Athir also tells us a much more credibl.e and significant 
story about the aftermath of the murder. He says that when Izz al-Din 
Masud came to Mosul to be confirmed in his father's inheritance he 
ordered a thorough investigation of the affair, and his agents were 
able to trace the assassins to a house in the street of the cobblers. 
-Its owner confessed under torture that he had sheltered these 
21. Surat XXXIII, line 38; from the translation by N.J. Dawood, 
second edition (London, 1966); Kamal, RHC. Or., III, pp.654-5; 
Athir, RHC. Or., I, pp.364-5, and II, p.58; Anonymous S~!iac 
Chronicle trans. Tritton and Gibb, JRAS (1933) p.96. See 
also Hodgson, p.123 n.?. 
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Nizaris for several years while they studied Bursuki 1 s movements 
and waited for the most opportune and public moment to strike. 22 
This is a precious insight into the fida 1 is' methods, if it is true, 
for the patience and devotion needed for such protracted stalking 
is remarkable. So too is the vehemence of the Sunnite response; the 
unfortunate cobbler was cruelly mutilated then stoned to death. 
Bursuki's assassination was the Syrian datwa's most striking 
achievement since Mawdud 1 s assassination in 1113. It must have 
cheered the Persian Nizaris at Alamut, who in 1126 were again be-
sieged in a renewed Saljuk counter-offensive led by the Sultan 
Mahmud and joined even by Sanjar who had shown surprising leniency 
23 towards them in previous years. For the second time the Syrian 
Ni~aris had removed the most powerful Turkish ruler west of Irak 
who owed allegiance to the Saljuks, and incidentally given the 
Franks of Antioch and Edessa. an unexpected breathing space. 
Bursuki's alliance with Tughtakin had barely had time to show 
results, and if he had lived a little longer it is conceivable that 
the Latin states would have faced a threat at least comparable to 
that posed by Mawdud. Given Izz al-Din Masud's deep and violent 
hatredfur all things Syrian, that alliance was now unlikely to be 
24 
renewed. 
The impression made on Tughtakin by Bursuki's untimely death 
22. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.366. 
23. See Hodgson, pp.100-102. 
24. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.655. 
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is nowhere recorded, but he cannot have failed to remark on the 
Nizaris 1 capacity for efficient elimination. Perhaps it was caution 
bred of added fear after Bursuki's death, or perhaps Bahram had been 
reminding him of the Nizaris' sacrifice on his behalf at Tell as-
Saqhab in January 1126, or something of both, which induced Tughtakin 
to grant the Nizaris at Damascus a very great favour before the year 
was out. Bahram asked for and was given what the da'-wa had been 
working to obtain since its inception; a castle in which the Nizaris 
could establish an independent headquarters, free of all patronage 
;25 
and reliance on others. 
The castle given to the Nizaris was Banyas (Qaltat Subeibe), 
and Bahram took up residence there sometime in November or December 
1128. Once he was established, a large number of his followers 
joined him, we are told, 26 but he wisely retained the dar al-dacwa 
at Damascus, appointing a deputy to lead the brethren remaining 
there. 27 
Banyas was a splendid acquisition. It was large and well-
fortified, fully comparable in size with many of the castles being 
built by the crusaders in Palestine and the ~ransjordan. The 
25. Kalanisi, p.18o. Athir, RHC. Or., I~ p.367 says the wazir 
Mazdakani prevailed on Tughtakin to give the Nizaris Banyas. 
26. Kalanisi, p.180, describing them in characteristically pious 
terms as a "rabble of varlets, half-wits, peasants, low 
fellows, and vile scum". 
27. Defr6mery, p.411; the deputy is not named. 
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castle itself occupied a high and extensive spur in the southern 
foothills of Mount Hermon. The village which shared its name lay 
28 
some distance below in the valley. The strategic importance of 
Banyas may be gathered from the frequent mention made of it in both 
Arabic and Latin sources for the crusades period. The main road from 
Damascus to the Mediterranean coast passed the foot of the castle, 
~nd Banyas had long been the major communications link between Tyre 
a~d Damascus. 29 With the advent of the crusaders, Banyas became a 
favourite stepping-off point for both Muslim and Crusader armies 
when campaigning against each other, and it was at Banyas that 
30 Tughtakin had anxiously followed the progress of the siege of Tyre. 
Whoever held Banyas could in theory dominate the lowland 
stretching north from Lake Huleh, but in fact the Franks had occupied 
nearly all the territory around Banyas, and the castle was being 
increasingly threatened by them. Tughtakin very likely hoped that 
in appeasing the Nizaris by ceding the castle to them he would at 
the same time preoccupy them with some useful border defence for 
Damascus. 31 
28. For a ground plan and photograph of remains, see W. MUller-
Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders (London, 1966), pp.45-6 and 
plate 22; see a]so the very different aspect of the photo-
graph in R .. Jl'edden, .S~ria and Lebanon (l.ondon, 1965), 
opposite p.164. Earlier views of the ruins before they were 
reduced by earthquakes and local vandals are available in 
Charles Wilson's Picture~ue Palestine 1 Sinai 1 and Ji;gypt 
(London, 1882?), II, pp.11l1, 116-117. 
29. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, pp.545-6. 
30. Kalanjsi, p.171. 
31. The Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, trans. Tritton and Gibb, JRAS 
(1933), pp.98-99 says he gave them Banyas because he could 
not hold the place himself. 
From Banyas, Bahram sent out da'is in all directions, winning 
over "a great multitude" of peasant folk in the towns and villages 
)2 
of southern Syria.- Extremist tactics of terror and intimidation 
spread further afield, and local rulers and magistrates are said 
to have feared supporting any opposition to the Nizaris, with the 
result that they could apparently commit crimes with impunity. 
This implies that the daggers of the Nizaris had again become busy. 
Their ~ictims would have been too insignificant for notice by the 
chroniclers; local religious leaders, learned men and lawyers marked 
. 33 by their orthodoxy and their hatred for the sectarles. "This 
public establishment of their cause created a grievous calamity and 
a public terror; men of learning, piety and religious authority 
were wore distressed and none of them dared say a word about these 
people or complain about any man of them ...• for they set about 
killing all those opposed to them and supporting all those who gave 
t l, • t . tl . . . ,,34 rlem assls ance 1n 1e1r 1mp1ous ways. 
Besides propaganda and intimidation, the Nizaris now had 
military preoccupations as the owners of a major fortress. We are 
told that Bahram undertook a programme of repairs and rebuilding 
at Banyas to improve the defences, 35 and we may suspect that the 
Nizari miJ.itia was expanded and perhaps trained in the defensive 
32. Kalanisi, p.187. 
33. Quatrem~re, p.349. 
3L t • Kalanisi, p.180. 
35. Kalanisi, p.187. 
170. 
skills of a fortress garrison. Being so exposed to Frankish 
possessions, the occupants of Banyas could not afford to be without 
an organiz~d and equipped troop of cavalry, for scouting and retal-
iatory raiding. 
As Damascus had been but a springboard for the acquisition of 
Banyas, so too Banyas was to be the means by which other fortresses 
would now be gained. In this respect - the impl$mentation of the 
Persian Nizari pattern of interdependent strongpoints - Banyas was 
poorly placed. It was isolated, because there were scarcely any 
comparable sites in this area not already occupied by the Franks. 
The coastal ranges of the Lebanon were dominated if not already 
occupied by the barons of Tripoli and the coastal cities, and the 
high rolling hills of the Anti-Lebanon lacked fortresses. The 
nearest ideally-suitable area for the Persian Nizari strategy of 
fortress-seizure lay even further north, across the plain of the 
Buqaicah. 
Here lay the lower end of that wild and broken mountain back-
bone stretching southwards from Antioch between the Orontes and the 
coast. It was known in this period as the Jabal Bahra. The 
topography of the Jabal Bahra bore striking resemblance to the main 
areas of Nizari expansion in Persia. The barren ranges were deeply 
eroded into innumerable ravines and deep canyons. Each valley, each 
spur and hilltop, constituted a potentially closed area if defended 
by a fort or a tower. Travel through the area was difficult and 
slow on roads always tortuous and often impassable in winter. 
Centralized control of the whole area was virtually impossible, and 
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many invaders before the crusaders had learned that the Jabal Bahra 
was a formidable obstacle to regular troops. 36 
The crusaders had easily secured the coastal plain, and castles 
such as Hisn al-Akrad, Safita, Marqab, Kharibah and Barin (Montferrand) 
on its outskirts, but the core of the Jabal Bahra had remained 
inviolate, where a number of castles, great and small, sheltered tiny 
amirates such as the Banu'l-Amrun or the Banu Muhris and a crowd of 
independent petty warlords and brigands. 
How h~ :did it we shall proHably never know, but we are told 
that Bahram obtained possession of Qadmus, the property of the Banu 
Muhris, sometime after he had established himself at Banyas.37 It 
was sold to him by one Ibn al-Hirz, about whom nothing is known. 38 
Qadmus was one of the most important of the central group of fort-
resses in the Jabal Bahra, but apparently it was not the only one 
taken by the Nizaris at this time. The sources clearly state that 
Bahram made himself master of several castles in the mountains. 39 
It is striking that Qadmus is singled out for mention, just as Rims 
was noted by Kalanisi as a source of Nizari militia early in 1126. 
Though this is slender enough evidence, we have nothing more, and 
at the risk of being misled by the chance survival of these two 
36. Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.170. 
37· Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.383; Abu'l-Fida, RHC. Or., I, pp.17-18; 
Quatremere, p.349; Defremery, p.411. 
38. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, p.567. 
39. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.383. 
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names, it would seem that Bahram's main area of expansion after the 
acquisition of Banyas was central Syria. 
It is much to be regretted that so little is known of this very 
. . f' t h f . 40 s1gn1 1can p ase o expans1on. 
For two years, the Syrian dacwa grew in strength and confidence, 
but the year 1128 began ominously with the death on 11 February of 
the ruler of Damascus, Zahir al-Din Tughtakin. The Nizaris do not 
appear to have attached much ~ignificance to the event, for every-
thing seemed to remain normal and prospects bright. Tughtakin's 
son and successor, Taj al-Muluk Buri, made it plain that he intended 
no departures from his father's policies. He confirmed all his 
father's officers in their posts, even increasing their salaries in 
some cases, and on the wazir Mazdakani he showered gifts, honours, 
and new sources of income. Reassured, Mazdakani maintained his 
protection and patronage of the Nizaris. 41 All seemed well. 
In fact, Buri was biding his time. Kalanisi tells us that he 
had observed the growing power of the sectaries under his father's 
40. Which seems to have been overlooked since Defr~mery questioned 
Athir's dating (p.411 n.2); the only objection offered is 
that (~admus was taken "from the Muslims" in 1129 by Bohemond 
of Antioch. By this date, the dacwa had collapsed at 
Damascus and Banyas had been turned over to the Franks. I 
endeavour to show below (p.176) that the garrisons of the 
castles in the Jabal Bahra probably abandoned them sometime 
in 1128 to reinforce the badly depleted garrison at Banyas, 
so that Bonemond would logically have taken Qadmus from 
''Muslims" rather than "Batinis" in 1129. 
41. Kalanisi, pp.183-4, 186-8. 
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calculated indulgence, and strongly disapproved of the wazir's 
open agreement with Bahram. Buri had, we are told, made a secret 
resolve about these dangerous and lawless fanatics, and was pre-
pared to close his eyes, 11 with whatever pain 11 , to their malevolent 
behaviour until the time was ripe to strike. 42 
Buri 1 s skilful dissimulation gave the Nizaris nothing to be 
alarmed at. They were doubtless relieved enough that there had 
been a change of ruler without a massacre. Feeling secure and 
confident, their activity redoubled; "their evil power •.. increased 
and the true nature of their false doctrine made manifest; their 
hands and tongues were lengthened with slander and abuse a~ainst 
the men of repute .. • . and with greed and spoliation against 
lonely travellers on the highways, whom they seized with violence 
and used despitefully, and with the slaying of men outrageously and 
unjustly. 1143 
Bahram's assurance was such that he chose this time to subdue 
by fear one of the most powerful families of the Wadi'l-Taim, a few 
miles north of Banyas. The Banu'l-Jandal were a small Muslim 
dynasty held in high esteem by their mixed Druze and Nusayri 
subjects. The head of the family, Dhahhak ibn Jandal, was locally 
renowned as a brave warrior, and it was through his younger brother 
Barak that Bahram tried to intimidate the family. 
Kalanisi has the fullest account of this episode, but is 
42. Kalanisi, pp.187-8. 
43. Kalanisi, p.188. 
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plainly at a loss to explain Bahram's motivation. Barak had not 
hurt or opposed the Nizaris in any way warranting retribution, so 
Kalanisi simply awards Bahram a perverse desire to go against the 
law and the Kur> an. 
It seems that Bahram lured the you~h to Banyas on some pretext, 
then seized him, put him in fetters, and had him murdered in cold 
44 blood. We have had occasion to observe earlier that the Nizaris 
45 
rarely killed without a purpose. In this case, we do not know 
whether \ the Banu'l-Jandal had offered open opposition to the 
Nizaris, but it is likely both that Bahram hoped for converts in the 
Wadi'l-Taim and that Nizari activity would be regarded by the Banu'l-
Jandal as a threat to their delicately balanced ascendancy over 
these turbulent tribesmen. Barak's murder sounds like a carefully 
calculated warning of the consequences of opposition to the Nizari 
campaign rather than the first blow of a bid for territorial 
conquest. If Bahram had intended military conquest, he would 
scarcely have given advance notice, nor waited until the Banu'l-
Jandal mustered forces for revenge. Either way, his ~ction seems 
curiously foolhardy, because Kalanisi says the murderers were well-
known and the death of such a handsome and gallant youth was every-
46 
where lamented. 
44. Kalanisi, p.189. 
45. See Hodgson, pp.111-112. 
46. Kalanisi, p.189. The suggestion of military conquest comes 
from l.ewis, "The Isma"-l.li tes and the Assassins'', in the 
Pennsylvania ~ory of the Crusades, I, p.116. 
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It was only after the outraged family had made a solemn pact 
of vengeance and gathered forces from the Wadi'l-Taim and from 
Damascus and other places that Bahram realized his calculated 
intimidation had backfired. 47 
In a belated attempt to forestall the pending onslaught on 
Banyas, he hastily mustered all available Nizari soldiers and 
marched towards the Wadi'l-Taim. The Banu'l-Jandal were ready, 
however, with a force estimated at over a thousand. 48 They waited 
until the Nizari ~rmy had pitched camp for the night and was off 
its guard, then enqircled it and swept down from all sides in an 
attack which achieved complete surprise. Bahram's scouting was 
gravely deficient. He was in his tent with his officers when the 
attack came, and like most of the Nizari soldiers scarce+y had 
time to run to arms before being slaughtered by the men of the 
Wadi'l-Taim. Out of the whole Nizari force, only a handful escaped 
to bring news of the disaster to Banyas. 49 
Bahram's body was chopped to pieces, and one enterprising 
peasant-soldier took the head, a hand and a ring and carried them 
to Egypt to present them to the Fatimid caliph, al-Amir. The 
soldier was congratulated and rewarded for his pains with a robe of 
of honour and his grisly trophies were paraded through the streets 
47. Kalanisi, pp.189-190; Quatremere, p.350. 
48. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.383. 
49. Kalanisi, p.190, giving A.H. 522 (ended 25 December 1128) but 
no month; Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.383; Abu'l-Fida, RHC. Or., 
I, p.18; Quatr~m~re, pp.349-350; Defr~mery, p.412. 
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of Cairo and Fustat.5° 
The remaining Nizaris at Banyas and Damascus were almost as 
concerned at this outrageous behaviour by the Fatimid Caliph as 
they were at the very serious loss of their leader and nearly all 
their troops. They were very fortunate that the Banu'l-Jandal were 
content with vengeance and did not follow up their victory with an 
attack on Banyas, for the castle had been all but stripped of 
defenders. The gravity of the loss may be judged from Kalanisi who 
says that the Nizaris gathered at Banyas "from all provinces and 
districts •.• , all those of them who were scattered throughout the 
country. 1151 We have no direct evidence of the extent to which this 
reduced Nizari numbers in the areas of recent expansion, but it 
seems more than likely that the garrisons of the new castles in the 
Jabal Bahra would have been recalled to Banyas, and that Qadmus and 
other recent acquisittons reverted to local Muslims at this time. 
The leadership of the dacwa had been provided for, however. 
Bahram had left one of his chief dacis as his deputy at Banyas when 
he set out for the Wadi'l-Taim, and this daci, Ismacil al- cAjami, 
now assumed headship of the Syrian dacw~.52 We have little with 
which to assess Ismatil as a leader, but Kalanisi observes that he 
11set about enticing the witless, exactly as Bahram had done, and 
50. Kalanisi, pp.190-191; Quatremere, p.350. 
51. Kalanisi, p.191. 
52. Kalanisi, p.191; Athir, RHC. Or., I, pp.383-4. 
even surpassed him in folly ••• 11 53 IsmaC.il lost no time in 
resuming the preaching campaign, for he began sending out da'is 
from Banyas almost at once.54 
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The Nizari following at Damascus appears to have remained more 
or less intact through the crisis of 1128, for the wazir Mazdakani 
soon wrote to Isma(il assuring him of the same support and protection 
that he had extended to Bahram. 55 It is not impossible that Isma~il 
had in fact been the leading daci in Damascus before being called to 
take care of Banyas, because we are also told that the wazir 
appointed a new leader for the Damascus Nizaris at this time; one 
Abu'l-Wafa. The choice was evidently a wise one, for under Abu'l-
Wafa's energetic leadership the Nizari following increased sub-
stantially in the year following Bahram's death. Some of this may 
be accounted for by Nizari refugees from outlying areas no longer 
protected by Bahram's militia, but Abu'l-Wafa's personal reputation 
grew remarkably, until the common people thought him more powerful 
than Buri himself.56 
The crisis of 1128 had not, therefore, seriously undermined the 
da~wa as a whole. With new leaders and the continued support of the 
wazir, the Nizaris began 1129 full of vigour, working hard to make 
up their losses. Once again, Kalanisi has occasion to observe that 
53. Kalanisi, p.191. 
54. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.384. 
55. Kalanisi, p.191; Quatremere, p.350. 
56. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.384; Abu'l-Fida, RHC. Or., I, p.18; 
Quatrem~re, p.350; Defr~mery, p.413. 
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"the complaints of the people, men of rank and commons alike, con-
tinued to multiply, and their losses at the hands of the deluded 
fanatics to succeed one another 11 .57 
The dacwa had unquestionably been weakened however, and the 
Nizaris did not lack adversaries who now pressed Buri for prompt 
action before they recovered strength again. The two men who most 
strongly urged this upon Buri were the ra)is, Thiqat al-Mulk ibn al-
Sufi, and the military governor, Yusuf ibn Firuz. They were not 
motivated entirely by a pious desire to curb the excesses of the 
sectaries; both were political adversaries of the wazir Mazdakani 
and saw an opportunity to be rid of him at the same time as removing hl$ 
dangerous supporters. Buri seems to have taken some time to be 
persuaded to action, but at last it was agreed that he should arrange 
for the wazir to be murdered and that this would be the signal for 
the ahdath and the mob to be let loose on the Nizaris. 58 What 
finally prompted Buri to action is nowhere stated, but one source 
suggests that he was deeply resentful of the Nizari acquisition of 
Qadmus because he desired that castle for himself. We know that 
the Franks of Antioch took Qadmus sometime during 1129. Since he 
was in no position to work off his pique on the Franks themselves, 
this may have been the final straw which provoked Buri to destroy 
th r.r• • 59 e !~J.zar:ts. 
57· Kalanisi, p.191. 
58. Kalanisi, pp.193-4; Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.384. 
59. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, p.567. 
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The date was set for Wednesday 4 September 1129. The wazir 
Mazdakani attended council with all the other officers of state 
as was usual, in the Rose Pavilion at the Palace. When the meeting 
ended, the other officials left the Pavilion in ascending order of 
rank so that the wazir, as the most senior government official, was 
last to leave. Buri gave a prearranged signal to one of his body-
guards, and the wazir was struck down and decapitated. His head and 
body were thrown on the ashheap at the Iron gate. 
At this, the ahdath and the rabble of the city, armed by the 
Banu'l-Sufi, set to work. They spread swiftly throughout the city, 
slaughtering all Nizaris they encountered, and sacking all known 
Nizari dwelling places. The occupants were dragged out and butchered, 
regardless of sex or age, in what must have been an unimaginably 
frightful bloodbath. Nobody interceded for any of the victims, for 
fear of the vengeance of the inflamed ahdath; the roles of violence 
were truly reversed now. Persons known to have sheltered with the 
Nizaris were also slaughtered, and we may suspect that many non-
Nizaries died as old scores were settled in the general carnage and 
confusion. The Nizari dar al-dacwa was of course the first main 
target for the mob, and those who resisted are said to have been 
tortured most cruelly. 
Something of the depth of pent-up Damascene hatred may be 
gathered from the example of a woman whose husband and daughter had 
associated with the Nizaris; she killed them both and hung their 
heads in the doorway as a sign of her zeal. Kalanisimmes only one 
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of the victims, the freedman Shahdi, Whom he describes as a former 
pupil of Abu Tahir, the former chief dati at Aleppo. Kalanisi 
accuses Shahdi of a major share in causing trouble in Damascus; he 
was one of the many Nizaris who were crucified on the battlements of 
the citadel. 
Estimates of the total slain vary considerably, from 6,000 to 
20,000, and even allowing for the enthusiastic exaggeration of the 
chroniclers, several thousand appear to have perished that Wednesday. 60 
There is no mention of preliminary arrests, as there were in 
Aleppo in 1114, which might have given warning of what was to come. 
The massacre appears to have been swift and complete, for there is 
a remarkable silence in all the sources as regards survivors. 
News soon reached Banyas, where Isma'il'~ immediate fear was 
probably that troops were coming from Damascus to seize the castle 
and slaughter its occupants. His decision was prompt. Perhaps he 
was low in provisions as well as manpower; whatever the reason, he 
judged his position to be untenable and sent word to Baldwin II at 
60. Kalanisi, pp.192-3, probably an eyewitness account, which forms 
the basis of all subsequent versions (Gibb's translation may 
be somewhat abridged); Athir, RHC. Or., I, pp.384-5 who gives 
6,000; Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, p.567 (the Recueil 
translation gives his estimate as 20,000; Lewis, "The 
Ismatilites and the Assassins", in the Pennpylvania Hist£~ 
of the Crusades, I, p.117 says Sibt has 10 1 000); the anonymous 
Bustan (Arabic text, edited by Cahen, p.21), cited by Lewis in 
the Pennsylvania History of the Crusades, I, p.117, which 
estimates 20,000; Bar. He~raeus trans. Budge, p.254; 
Quatremere, pp.350-1; Defremery, pp.413-4, citing among others 
Abu'l-Mahasin, whose account is omitted in the Recueil version 
of his chronicle. 
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Jerusalem, offering to hand over the castle in return for asylum for 
himself and his. followers. It was the most practical way to 
preserve something on which the dacwa could be rebuilt. Baldwin 
gJ.adly accepted the offer, and had no reason to delay sending a 
troop to secure the castle, so we may assume that is was only a 
short While before Ismacil and his companions "slunk away from Banyas 
in to the F'rankish territories". 61 
Such a magnificent windfall must have seemed to the Franks 
divine confirmation of their plans for a campaign against Damascus. 
As soon as Tughtakin died, envoys had been sent to Europe to gather 
troops for this campaign, and these reinforcements were now arriving. 
Swelled by troops from Tripoli, Antioch, and Edessa, it was a vast 
host which gathered at Banyas in October 1129 and moved out to en-
camp before Damascus early in November. The Franks refused, however, 
to be drawn into combat because they lacked provisions and pack 
animals for a prolonged siege. A large part of the army was sent 
into the Hauran to gather supplies but got out of hand and was 
virtually annihalated by Buri's alert and well-informed cavalry. 
Without the expected supplies, and with such a serious loss of man-
power, Baldwin had to abandon camp, and withdraw hastily to Banyas 
. t th . t . t . 62 JUS as e w~n er ra~ns se ~n. 
61. Kalanisi, p.194; Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.385; William of Tyre, 
XIV, 19, trans. Babcock and Krey, II, p.77. 
62. Kalanisi, pp.197-9; Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, pp.567-8; 
William of Tyre, XIII, 26, trans. Babcock and Krey, II, 
pp.40-43. 
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This campaign seems to have inspired a colourful but quite 
uncorroborated explanation for the Nizari massacre which more than 
one modern historian has accepted at face value. 63 The story has 
it that the Franks were encouraged to attack Damascus when the 
wazir Mazdakani secretly offered to open the gates of the city in 
exchange for the seaport of Tyre. The Franks were to present them-
selves one Friday, and occupy the city while the populace, at mid-
day prayer in the Great Mosque, were confined therein by the Nizaris. 
The plot supposedly reached the ears of Buri who then had the wazir 
64 
murdered and the Nizaris massacred. 
Athir's story seems highly improbable. The Franks had only 
recently captured Tyre after a long and costly siege, and part of 
the city had been ceded to the Venetians in return for their assist-
ance. It is inconceivable that Baldwin would agree to hand over 
such a vital stronghold to a band of dangerous sectaries feared and 
distrusted by Christians and Muslims alike, and it would be extremely 
na1ve of Mazdakani and the Nizaris to think that he would. Kalanisi 
was well-placed to know the truth. If such a plot had existed, he 
would have been glad to reveal the full extent of Nizari involvement. 
The story may have originated as idle gossip or perhaps as a 
63. The most recent example being R.L. Nicholson, ''The Growth of the 
Latin States, 1118-1144'', in the Pennsylvania History of the 
Crusades, I, pp.430-431. 
64. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.384; Abu'l-Fida, RHC. Or., I, p.18,who has 
the Nizari leader Abu'l-Wafa negotiating with the Franks,and 
telescopes about two months to have the Franks appear at 
Damascus the day after the massacre. 
justification for their removal of the wazir put about by the 
Banu'l-Sufi.65 
The 1129 massacre at Damascus and the subsequent loss of Banyas 
very nearly destroyed the Syrian dacwa. It is impossible to 
estimate what indigenous elements may have remained in places like 
Hims or the Jabal Bahra, or even older areas such as the Jazr and 
Jabal Summak. Many of these people may have migrated to Damascus 
after Bahram's death and perished in the massacre, and we cannot 
overlook the possibility of unrecorded local massacres inspired by 
the main one at Damascus. But it is likely that some remnants 
remained in central Syria, and to these the refugees from Banyas 
doubtless hastened. We do not know whether this group was a small 
garrison or a host of several hundred, but it is unlikely that they 
would be welcomed or encouraged to settle in Latin territory. 67 
A movement of Nizari refugees northwards to more sympathetic 
areas would have been hastened by the final blow to strike the dacwa 
in December or early January 1129-30. The chief daci Ismacil fell 
ill and died of dysentery, and was fittingly laid to rest beside the 
castle which had so recently symbolized the most splended achievement 
of the Syrian dacwa. 68 
65. H.A.R. Gibb refuted Athir's tale years ago in ''Notes on the 
Arabic Materials for the History of the Early Crusades'', BSOS, 
VII (1935), pp.751-2. It is significant that Mazdakani's 
successor was none other than Tiqat al-Mulk ibn al-Sufi. 
(Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, RHC. Or., III, p.568.) 
67. See William of Tyre's comments, XIV, 19, trans. Babcock and 
Krey, II, p.77. 
68. Kalanisi, p.194. 
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CHAPTER VII 
ESTABLISHMENT IN THE JABAL BAHRA 
The reputation of the dacwa outside Syria does not appear to 
have been much tarnished by the catastrophe of 1129. In the very 
next year, A.B. 524 (December, 1129 - December, 1130) we hear of 
an interesting episode concerning a diplomatic mission to Egypt by 
one Hamdan ibn Abd ar-Rahim, a scholar and notable of Ma'arrat al-
Nu'man in the service of the ruler of Aleppo. At Cairo, the Fatimid 
Caliph al-Amir was only reluctantly dissuaded from the conviction 
that Hamdan was a secret Nizari. He had assumed, the Nizaris having 
expanded so greatly in that area over the past thirty years, that 
. f th ·1 N · · 1 anyone com1ng rom ere was necessar1 y a 1zar1. 'rhough the 
Caliph was mistaken, his anxiety suggests that the Fatimids were 
still concerned by the Nizari schism and its potential threat to 
their security. Their fear was well-founded, as we shall soon see. 
For the moment however, mention of the ruler of Aleppo recalls us 
to consider what prospects existed for a Nizari recovery there after 
the debacle in the south. 
The main consequence of Bursuki's assassination for Aleppo and 
the north had been two more years of chronic instability. 2 His 
successor Izz al-Din Masud had appointed a governor named Tuman, but 
1. Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.42; citing in MS Kamal's Bugh;lat, 
Ibn Asakir, and Ibn Muyassar, A.H. 524; see also Hodgson, 
p.?O. 
2. J. Sauvaget, article "Halab 11 , EI2, iii, p.87. 
he proved as ineffectual and self-seeking as his three rivals for 
control of the city. In a confused tangle of coups and counter-
coups, in which the citizens played no small part, Aleppo passed 
from Tuman to the Sultan's envoy Kutlugh, to Il-Ghazi's son Badr 
al-Dawla Sulaiman, then to Ridwan's son Ibrahim. To complete the 
city's misery, it was subjected to a harsh blockade by the Franks 
of Antioch from October to December, 1127. 3 
Aleppo's weakness alarmed the governor of Jatbar, who sent 
word to the new atab~ at Mosul, the Sultan's replacement for 
Izz al-Din Masud who had died suddenly. This was the ruthless and 
energetic Imad al-Din Zanki, who sent a force to relieve the siege 
and restore order, but in reality as well to secure the place to 
his control. He made his own triumphal entry on 18 June 1128. 4 
While the Nizaris at Damascus and Banyas were suffering the 
worst reverses of their dacwa's history, Zanki had begun consolidating 
his power in and around Aleppo. In September 1129 he received the 
submission of Hama, but was unsuccessful in his siege of Rims. 
Nonetheless, he imposed his authority over most of the territory 
h 
stretching between Aleppo and Hama,~ which included many of the 
3. Kalanisi, pp.182-3; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, pp.655-656. 
4. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, pp.656-7; Cahen, Syrie du Nord, pp.306-7. 
5. Kalanisi, pp.200-202; Kamal, RHC. Or., III, pp.658-660, whose 
dates are advanced by ~ne year for these events; Athir, 
RHC. Or., I, p.380; William of Tyre, XIII, 27, trans. Babcock 
and Krey, II, pp.43-4·; Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.348. 
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areas where the Nizaris had won significant support in Ridwan's 
reign. 
Bursuki's control of Aleppo, as we observed earlier, seriously 
inhibited any further Nizari prospects at Aleppo. Zanki's rule was 
to have precisely the same effect. Zanki was as zealous a Sunnite 
as any of the Mesopotami~n amirs, yet his primary ambition in extend-
ing his power into Syria was not, as Ibn al-Athir seeks to portray, 
to wage holy war against the Franks. Zanki's major campaigns in 
Syria were directed against other Muslims, against Rims and 
Damascus. He was intent on the creation of a strong principality 
based equally on Mosul and Aleppo. There was no place in Zanki's 
well-ordered state for dissident or potentially disruptive elements 
such as the Nizaris. 6 
The circumstances which had originally enabled the Nizaris to 
establish themselves at Aleppo were not likely to reappear so long 
as Zanki ruled there; 11 l'anarchie en Syrie du Nord ne devait plus 
r~appara1tre 11 .7 Of the two main areas to which refugees from 
Banyas may have fled, the districts of Aleppo and the Jabal Bahra, 
the latter seems now to have been their likeliest choice. The 
Jazr and Jabal Summak were so closely tied to Aleppo that Zanki's 
power would always threaten annihalation on any open recovery there. 
The Jabal Bahra was sufficiently remote from the centres of Muslim 
6. On Zanki see H.A.R. Gibb, 11 Zeng:i. and the :8'all of ];:;dessa" in 
the pennsylvania History of the Crusades, I, pp.449-462. 
See also Stevenson, pp.121-4. 
7. Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.307. 
and Latin power in Syria to provide both a safe refuge and a 
favourable place for consolidation and even expansion. 
There are, then, reasonable grounds for assuming that what was 
left of the Syrian dacwa became concentrated in the Jabal Bahra. 8 
Nonetheless, it would appear that for a time the dacwa was numbed 
disorganised. Only two items of Nizari activity are reported in 
the years immediately following the 1129 reverses, and both of 
them seem to be attributable to Alamut. 
On 5 October 1130 the Fatimid Caliph al-Amir was assassinated 
in the course of a journey between Cairo and ono/of his many pleasure 
palaces across the Nile. The number of his assailants is variously 
given as nine or ten, and they were positively identified as 
partisans of his uncle Nizar. 9 There is nothing to indicate 
precisely where the assassins came from, however. Though Syria was 
closest, and the Nizaris there had ample provocation after the 1123 
exchange at Damascus and al-Amir's reception of Bahram's relics in 
1128, the false imam-Caliph of the Fatimids would always have been 
a long-term target for the parent dacwa at Alamut. In view of the 
8. There is a misprint in Lewis, "The Ismacilites and the Assassins 11 , 
the Pennsylvania History of the Crusades, I, p.119 which 
describes this area as being north-west of Aleppo; the error 
is corrected in Lewis, Assassins, p.108. 
9. Gibb's version of Kalanisi has no mention of this episode; 
Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.390; Abu'l-Fida, RHC. Or., I, p.19; 
The Recueil versions of Ibn Muyassar and Abu'l-Mahasin also 
omital-Amir's assassination. For full references, see Lewis 
"The Isma~:.·ili tes and the Assassins", the Pennsylvania Histor;r 
of the Crusades, I, pp.118-119. 
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dislocation of the Syrian dacwa and its regrouping in the north, it 
seems more credible to regard 01-Amir's assassination either as a long-
range mission from Persia or perhaps as a completely indigenous 
Egyptian affair. We are told that the ordinary people rejoiced to 
hear of al-Amir's death, 10 and it is possible that Nizari partisans 
were protected and encouraged by al-Amir 1 s enemies. Perhaps the most 
persuasive argument against this being a mission by the Syrian dacwa 
is suggested by the second item of Nizari activity, the attempt on 
Buri in 1131. If the Syrian dacwa was incapable by itself of taking 
vengeance on the perpetrator of the 1129 massacre, how much less 
capable was it of penetrating the Fatimid security screen to 
eliminate the spiritual leader of Musta<lian Isma<ilism? 
Kalanisi has a surprisingly circumstantial account of the 
attempt on Buri's life. He relates how Yusuf ibn Firuz and Thiqat 
al-Mulk ibn al-Sufi feared Nizari vengeance after 1129 and adopted 
elaborate precautions, wearing heavy armour and surrounding them-
selves with large numbers of armed bodyguards. It is evident that 
people considered the Syrian Nizaris crushed beyond all hope of 
recovery, for vengeance was feared not from Syria but from Alamut, 
which Kalanisi accurately describes as ''the centre of the Batiniyya 11 • 11 
He has an imaginative reconstruction of the arrival at Alamut of news 
of the dacwa's collapse at Damascus and the selection of two 
Khurasanian fida'is to go there and devise means of eliminating Buri. 
10. Defremery, pp.415-6. 
11. Kalanisi, p.194. 
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This proved easier than expected, because Buri's personal 
bodyguards were mostly Khurasanis, and the two fida>is found old 
acquaintances among them who vouched·for them and had them admitted 
to the troop on a regular allowance. Kalanisi notes that they had 
come wearing appropriately Turkish garb, and their countrymen had 
no suspicion of their real intentions. Because they had been 
recommended, they were regarded as being completely trustworthy. 
Their chosen moment to strike came on 7 May 1131, not quite 
two years after the massacre. The two fida~ may have been waiting 
some time, for we are not told when they were sent from Alamut or 
when they arrived in Damascus. Buri was returning to the citadel 
on horseback from a visit to a bath-house in the city, escorted by 
his Khurasani and Daylamite cavalry. Once inside the citadel, the 
escort disbanded at the gate of Buri's palace, all but the two 
Nizaris, who lept on Buri just as he was preparing to dismount. 
Though he sustained a flesh-wdmnd at the neck and a deep knife 
in his flank, Buri flung himself from his horse and m8.naged to 
escape to safety. The escort at once returned and seized the 
assassins. 12 Buri was taken to have his wounds sewn up. 
Alamut's vengeance for the massacre of the Syrian dacwa~ 
wound 
Damascus seemed to have been bungled, for Buri survived and in the 
weeks that followed resumed his normal duties, riding with his 'askar 
12. Kalanisi 1 pp.202-203. 
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and holding audiences for his officers and ministers. 13 But the 
wound in his side refused to heal and his strength began to ebb. 
Just three weeks after the attempt, he had his eldest son Abu'l-
Fath IsmaCil formally invested as his successor in case he succumbed 
to his injury. 14 Buri surprisingly survived for almost a year 
longer, but he grew more and mo~e feeble and finally wasted away, 
dying on 7 June 1132. 15 
Just as the assassination of Ibn Khashshab at Aleppo in 1125 
seemed to signal the final end of Nizari influence there, so too 
Buri's death closes the Damascene phase of Nizari activity in Syria. 
The sectaries never reappeared there in sufficient numbers to 
warrant notice by any chronicler. 
In the year following Buri's death, we have our first clear 
indication that the da<wa was recovering from its near extinction. 
By an odd coincidence, at about the same time that Buri's successor 
Isma<il was recovering from the Franks "the castle of Banyas which 
13. Kalanisi, p.204. 
14. Kalanisi, pp.206-7. 
15. Kalanisi, pp.208-9; Gibb has 6 June, but we are told that Buri 
died in the first hour of 21 Rajab 526 (8 June) which would 
be the evening of Sunday 7 June. (See Stevenson, Appendix A, 
pp.358-9 for a discussion of the discrepancies between 
observed dates and calendar dates in the Arabic sources.) 
Ibn Asakir, quoted in Abu'l-Mahasin, RHC. Or., III, pp.501-2; 
Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.393; Abu'l-Fida, RHC. Or., I, pp.19-20; 
Anonlm~us Syriac Chronicle, trans. Tritton and Gibb, JRAS 
(1933), p.273; Defr~mery, p.416. 
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had been given to them by the IsmaCilis'1 , 16 the Nizaris regained 
possession of Qadmus, which they had occupied briefly before Bahram's 
death in 1128. It was not seized, either by assault or stratagem; 
they bought it. 
Qadmus was sold to the Nizaris by the lord of al-Khaf, Saif 
al-Mulk ibniAmrun, who had recovered it only a year before from 
some mountain folk. They had apparently seized it from its small 
Frankish garrison in the uncertain months following the death of 
Bohemond II of Antioch. 17 The Nizari to whom the castle was handed 
over is named as Abu'l-Fath. 18 Kamal describes him simply as a 
missioner. Whether he was the chief ~ at this time or not, we 
have no means of determining. 
Kamal seems to offer a clue to a more precise dating for the 
occupation of Qadmus; he says that the lord of Qadmus then went to 
Antioch to raise an army against Sawar. This was the campaign which 
culminated in the battle of Kinnasrin. However, it has been pointed 
out that Kamal here copies an error from Al-Azimi, and the entry 
should read al-Kuds (Jerusalem) instead of Qadmus. In any case, the 
16. Ibn Asakir, quoted in Kamal, Bughyat, HHC. Or., III, p.696. 
,17. Kamal, HHC. Or., III, p.665, under A.H. 526 (1131-2), but just 
prior to an entry for January, 1134; other sources are agreed 
on A.H. 527; Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.400; Abu 1 l-Fida, RHC. Or., 
I, p.21; Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.353; Defr~mery, p.417. 
Hodgson, p.106, suggests that the mountain folk may have been 
Nuysayris, but gives no references. 
18. Not to be confused with the Abu'l-Fath of Sarmin who died at 
Afamiya in 1106. The name was a common one; Buri's son and 
successor was named Abu'l-Fath Ismacil. 
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sources are at such variance as to the date of Kinnasrin that we are 
safer to keep to the generalized dating of the Muslim year; late 
1132 or early 1133. 19 
Saif al-Din's reason for selling Qadmus was probably quite 
simply that he could not afford the manpower or the expense of 
20 
maintaining a second castle. As was observed earlier, the Jabal 
Bahra was not normally a scene of fierce competition for possession 
of fortresses, and Qadmus was one of the more remote castles in the 
area. It had a very lofty site, with splendid views, but it was 
k d f d t t . t . 21 aw war o access an no easy o ma1n a1n. 
It is suggestive of the dacwa's dislocation after 1129 that 
three years have elapsed before we hear anything directly concerning 
the Syrian Nizaris. After the Aleppo debacle in 1114, an assault 
was made on Shaizar in less than three months. 
Our only hint of the datwa's activity after it had obtained 
Qadmus comes from Athir, who says that the Nizaris established them-
selves there and began to harass both Muslims and Franks, "with 
whom they were continually at war 1', so that Qadmus became a nuisance 
to other nearby castles. 22 We could reasonably expect suspicion 
and hostility to characterize Nizari attitudes towards their neighbours, 
19. Cahan, Syria du Nord, p.353 n.22; for a useful summary of the 
conflicting evidence over Kinnasrin, see the Pennsylvania 
History of the Crusades, I, p.434 n.1. 
20. Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.353. 
21. Cahan, Syrie du Nord, p.1?4. 
22. Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.400. 
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and this was probably reciprocated, but we are at liberty to doubt 
whether the datwa had the strength or the foolishness to pick 
trouble deliberately at this time. 
In point of fact, it is impossible to guess how strong the 
dacwa was by this time. Whether it had achieved a remarkable recovery 
or was still struggling to piece itself together. But one fact is 
plain enough. Qadmus was the first of the Nizaris' permanent 
acquisitions in Syria. The dacwa had at last entered on its final 
phase of establishment. 
Exciting as this may sound, regrettably little can be said about 
it. We know more about each one of the dacwa's first three decades 
than all of the next three decades put together. The chroniclers 
seem almost~ have lost interest in the sectaries. Entries become 
very brief and so scattered that it is impossible to draw from them 
any coherent thread of development. This may reflect a general 
conviction that the movement in Syria had finally been subdued and 
was not worthy of anything more than the briefest notice, but it 
more probably reflects the Nizaris' new isolation. 
At Aleppo and Damascus they had been in full view of the 
chroniclers, but the Jabal Bahra was more like a neglected island 
around which the conflict between Christians and Muslims ebbed and 
flowed, by-passed by the main stream of affairs. In addition to 
this, it is possible that the Nizaris now chose to be more discreet 
and cautious about displays of strength, profiting from the lessons 
of Aleppo and Damascus. Consolidation and survival took precedence 
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for the moment over expansion of numbers, and survival could only 
be guaranteed by the possession of sturdy fortresses. 
What little we hear of the Nizaris in the next few decades is 
almost entirely concerned with fortresses. We lack even a handful 
of those precious retrospective glimpses. so use~l in reconstructing 
the dacwa's history hitherto. We are therefore left with the firm 
impression of a campaign solely to seize fortresses. There is no 
mention of the preaching campaign, though we may be sure this con-
tinued, and there is no mention of tactical assassination in these 
years. 
Several years elapse before we again hear of the Nizaris in the 
Jabal Bahra, this time when the little fortress of al-Khaf is ceded 
to them by Saif al-Mulk ibn Amrun's son Musa in the ~curse of a 
succession struegle with his cousins after his father's sudden death 
in 1135. No further details are given. 23 Kamal notices this young 
prince a few years later, when he was captured by Sawar, as the 
governor of al-Khaf who sold it to the Batinis. 24 The castle was 
doubtless a welcome acquisition for the dacwa, there having been no 
risk or cost of manpower involved, but al-Khaf was as isolated and 
remote as ~admus. It was famous for its adjoining cavern, whose 
only access was by a tunne1. 25 
23. Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.353, citing al-Azimi and Nuwairi. 
24. Kamal, RHC. Or., III, p.68o, A.H. 533 (1138-9). 
25. Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.1?4. 
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Our next notice of the Nizaris occurs in 1137, and finds them 
again interested in a small castle, this time Khariba. Being in 
Frankish hands, they could not expect to buy the place, and an 
assault was necessary. Fortunately for them, the garrison was 
depleted and once the Nizaris had found a means of entry they had no 
difficulty in slaughtering the defenders. 26 Their tenure was brief, 
however. In March or April, shortly after the Nizari assault, the 
governor of Hama, Ibn Salah, captured Khariba while raiding in that 
area.
27 The fate of the Nizaris is not recorded, but Ibn Salah was 
then replaced as ruler of Hama by Zanki's lieutenant, Salah al-Din 
al-Yaghi Siyani, who installed his own governor at Khariba, al-Hajib 
Isa. It was from this governor that Khariba was restored to the 
Nizaris by a stratagem which finally amounted to outright purchase. 
There was no regular garrison at Khariba, only al-Hajib Isa, 
his son, a servant, and a gateman, and the only access was by a 
wooden ladder. The gateman had a friend, one Ibn al-Marji, who 
occasionally came to visit him at the castle. Ibn al-Marji must 
have known of the Nizari attempt a few months before, and saw an 
opportunity for personal profit. We are told that he conferred with 
the Nizaris, who agreed to give him a sum of money and a plot of land 
if he could deliver the castle to them. Ibn al-Marji then presented 
himself at the castle and was admitted by his unsuspecting friend. 
Starting with this unfortunate, Ibn al-Marji murdered all the 
occupants and delivered the place to the waiting Nizaris, who, we 
26. Ibn al-Furat, cited in Cahen, Syrie du Nord, pp.175, 354. 
27. Kalanisi, p.241. 
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are told, fulfilled their part of the bargain. 28 
Khariba was followed a few years later by the most important 
Nizari acquisition in the Jabal Bahra. Masyaf was acquired by the 
same subterfuge as that employed at Afamiya in 1106. The castle 
belonged to the Banu Munkidh, whose head Izz al-Din Abu'l-Asakir 
had bought it from the Mirdasid Nasir al-Din Sabak in A.H. 521 (1127). 29 
The Banu Munkidh had later appointed one of their mamluks, the 
chamberlain Sunkur, as their governor at Masyaf. The Nizaris apparently 
ingratiated themselves with this officer and fostered in him what 
Athir calls a false sense of confidence, until he allowed them free 
access to the castle and his presence. He soon reaped the conse-
quences of this foolishness. The Nizaris chose their moment, killed 
30 Sunkur, and seized the castle for themselves. 
Masyaf was later to become the headquarters of the Syrian dacwa, 
and remained in Nizari hands until 1270. 31 Its site was nowhere 
near as splandid as that of Qadmus, but Masyaf was larger, stronger, 
28. Usamah ibn Munkidh, trans. P.K. Hitti, Memoirs of an Arab-Syrian 
Gentleman (New York, 1929), pp.107-108, where the variant 
spelling al-Khirbah is adopted. 
29. Quatrem~re, p.340. 
30. Kalanisi, p.263, a very brief notice; in A.H. 535 (August 1140 
to August 1141) following a report of a cavalry clash at 
Ascalon in April-May 1141; Athir, RHC. Or., I, p.438; Abu'l-
Fida, RHC. Or., I, p.25; Quatrem~re, p.341; Defr~mery, pp.417-8. 
31. The traveller Benjamin of Tudela reports in 1163 that the Nizari 
"capital 11 was still at Qadmus. (Trans. in 'I'. Wright (ed.), 
Early Travels in Palestine (London, 1848) p.78J 
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and better placed strategically. It sat at the mouth of a valley on 
the eastern slopes of the Jabal Bahra within a day's march of Hama. 
It controlled the road between Hama and Marqab, perhaps the most 
important of the tortuous routes through these mountains. 32 The 
castle itself was built on a low rock outcrop, almost on the same 
level as the village, but Masyaf made surprisingly effective use of 
its site. It was protected on two sides by impenetrable marshes, and 
the compactness of the fortress concealed the fact that there were 
no fewer than three successive outworks or·lines of defence. The 
walls abounded in towers, of all sizes and shapes. Though architect-
urally a bizarre patchwork of styles and building techniques, Masyaf 
was a powerful acquisition for the dacwa. 33 
With the occupation of Masyaf, the subject of this thesis 
properly draws to a close. Masyaf crowned the basic pattern of 
Nizari possessions in the Jabal Bahra, and with Qadmus was to be its 
enduring mainstay. Other fortresses were acquired over the next 
twenty years, but these merely added to the central core already 
established, and we do not know when or how most of them were acquired. 
Various lists are offered purporting to outline Nizari possessions 
in the time of the chief daci Rashid al-Din Sinan (1162-1193), which 
offer the names of Khawabi, al-Munifah, Rusafah, al-cUllaiqah, 
32. Quatrem~re, p.340; Cahen, Syrie du Nord, p.1?4. 
33. Defr~mery, p.418, quoting Burckhardt's 1812 description; see 
also T • .S.R. Boase, Castles and Churches of the Crusading 
Kingdom (London, 1967), pp.75-76; W. MUller-Wiener, Castles 
of the Crusaders (London, 1966), pp.68-9 and Plate 95. 
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al-Qulaicah, and Maniqa.34 
At the end of the decade in which Masyaf was obtained the 
dacwa had recovered strength sufficiently to make an alliance with 
Raymond II of Antioch against Nur al-Din, and to contribute a force 
of cavalry under the command of the Kurd 'Ali ibn Wafa. 35 In that 
same year, the dacwa also obtained its revenge on Bahram's adversary, 
Dhahhak ibn J·andal 1 by assassination, though we have nothing more 
than this terse statement. 36 With the assassination of Raymond of 
Tripoli in 1152,37 and military action against the Franks at 
Shaizar after the citadel was wrecked by an earthquake in 1157, 38 
the dacwa seems to be thoroughly re-established. These are our only 
notices of Nizari activity in Syria at this time. 
By the time Rashid al-Din Sinan takes over from Abu Muhammad 
34. Makrizi, cited in Quatremere, p.341; see also Defremery, pp. 
419-420; Guyard, nun Grand ~1a1 tre des Assassins au temps de 
Saladin 11 , JA, 7e serie, IX (1877), p.351; G. LeStrange, 
Palestine Under the Moslems (London, 1890) p.352 quoting the 
list and descriptions of Dimashki; Cahen, Syrie du Nord, 
pp.175-6, 354; Hodgson, p.187. 
35. Destroyed with Raymond at Inab on 28 June 1149. See Cahen, 
Syrie du Nord, pp.383-4, citing Ibn al-Furat, and Kalanisi, 
pp.290-292. 
36. Kalanisi, notin Gibb's version, but in the Arabic edition of 
Amedroz, p.303, cited in Lewis, 11The Ismacilites and the 
Assassins", in the Pennsylvania History of the Crusades, I, 
p .120. 
37. William of Tyre, XVII, 19, trans. Babcock and Krey, II, p.214; 
Ibn al-Furat, cited in Defremery, p.421. 
38. Kalanisi, p.342; William of Tyre, XVIII, 18, trans. Babcock and 
Krey, II, pp.266-8; Cahen, Syrie du Nord, pp.397-8. 
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as chief daci, sometime about 1162, the phase of establishment is 
clearly at an end, and gives way to consolidation and piecemeal 
expansion within the Jabal Habra. After nearly half a century of 
struggle, of near successes and disastrous reverses, the Syrian 
~had assumed the form it was to retain for more than a century; 
like its Persian parent, a not insignificant territorial state, a 
heterodox retreat on the outskirts of the Muslim world. 
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CONCLUSION 
The stated purpose of this thesis was an examination of the 
early history of the Nizaris in Syria in order to find out why they 
took so long to establish themselves permanently. The significance 
of the Nizaris in Twelfth Century Syria has not been overlooked, but 
a study as brief and incompletely documented as this cannot hope to 
offer more than a few incidental observations on the importance of 
their role between Muslims and Crusaders. The main business of this 
conclusion is to show the way in which the Persian da'is sent into 
Syria had to reformulate Persian Nizari techniques of expansion to 
meet the different opportunities and obstacles of a new area. It is 
the contention of this thesis that a large part of the dacwa's delay 
in getting established derives fro~ the nature of the policy finally 
adopted. 
Syria shared with Persia favourable prospects for the Nizari 
campaign. There were strong indigenous Ismacili elements in 
northern Syria in a setting of extreme social and political frag-
mentation. However, the Nizari dacis found at Aleppo an opportunity 
that was almost inconceivable in Persia or Irak; a local Saljuk 
prince so desperately in need of allies that he was prepared to 
offer the Nizaris protection in t~turn for their support. Ironically, 
techniques of terror and assassination which in Persia were ded-
icated to the overthrow of Saljuk power were in Syria initially 
turned to cultivate the dacwa's alliance with its Saljuk patron. 
The leaders of the Syrian dacwa, as the emissaries of Alamut, 
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would be deeply imbued with notions of seizing fortresses to serve 
as defensible refuges and local centres for the Nizari campaign. 
They would regard the alliance with Ridwan as a strictly temporary 
expedient, ~ exceptional stroke of luck which would shelter the 
dacwa while it grew sufficiently to be able to seize castles for 
I 
itself. 
Unfortunately, the Nizaris' first major attempt at securing a 
suitable stronghold, Afamiya, met with defeat and considerable loss 
of manpower. The dacwa clearly had the ingenuity to gain possession 
of castles, but lacked the strength of numbers and resources to hold 
them. 
The reason for this was plain. Defeat came not from Muslim 
neighbours but from the crusader principality of Antioch. The 
recurrent conflict between Crusaders and Muslims, which had con-
tributed in no small measure to the conditions of distress and dis-
location favouring the Nizari campaign, made territorial acquisitions 
far more difficult in Syria than in Persia. Castles in Syria were 
at a premium, already marked down as the prizes in a much greater 
struggle. The Nizaris could not hope to compete on equal terms in 
the fierce competition between forces far larger and better equipped 
for siege warfare than they. This was the paradox of the Nizari 
campaign in Syria; it was easier to gain a large following than 
castles to shelter it. Apparently it was this consideration which 
made the alliance with Ridwan into something more than a temporary 
expedient. At the time of the attempt on Afamiya, the Nizaris had 
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enjoyed his protection for somewhat more than six years. After 
Afamiya, we hear of no further full-scale assaults on fortresses; 
the brief Ismacili occupation of Kafarlata in 1110 seems to have 
been on Hidwan's behalf, and even at Afamiya, the citadel was taken 
in Ridwan 1 s name. For the remaining seven years of Ridwan's reign 
after Afamiya, the dacwa appears to concentrate on preserving the 
alliance and cultivating Ridwan's favour. 
What had been adopted initially as a temporary expedient, 
simply the most efficient use of an unusually good opportunity, 
seems gradually to have hardened into something approaching a 
policy. What had begun as a means to an end now became an end in 
itself; the alliance with Ridwan took over the normal functions of 
a fortress like Alamut in furnishing the dacw~ with protection and 
a base of operations. Aleppo and its districts became the dacwa's 
field of activity, the city and Ridwan's citadel its refuge, as 
Mawdud's 1111 campaign clearly demonstrated. Though nothing 
approaching a fortress, the Nizaris at least had a place of their 
own in the mission-house or dar al-dacwa granted them by Ridwan. 
Furthermore, the Nizaris enjoyed a certain status and a significant 
role in the affairs of the city as Ridwan's protegees; wielding 
power within the Saljuk-Sunnite establishment may have seemed as 
gratifying as actually overthrowing it. 
Flourishing though it was, the dacwa at Aleppo remained highly 
vulnerable. The Nizaris were feared and hated by the majority of the 
population, and only the added support of Ridwan's personal troops 
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stood between them and bloodthirsty retaliation from their enemies. 
The only possible justification for the da'wa's persistence with the 
policy of alliance was the hope that they could prevail upon their 
patron to cede them fortresses of their own. 
This is what emerges as the recurring pattern of Nizari develop-
ment in Syria in the first three decades of the twelfth century; the 
calculated gamble that a local alliance such as that with Ridwan 
would produce tangible benefits before it collapsed and the dacwa 
lost its temporary source of protection. Whether it can be graced 
with the title of a policy or a strategy, this was how the Syrian 
dacwa went about getting itself established. 
The gamble was only just beginning to show results at Aleppo, 
admittedly fairly meagre ones, when Ridwan's death abruptly termin-
ated the alliance. When his successor permitted a violent anti-
Nizari reaction shortly afterwards, the dacwa's only acquisition 
outside the city, the fort of Qal'at ash-Sharif, was too small and 
too close at hand to withstand the onslaught of the Sunnite ahdath. 
The vulnerability of the policy of alliance was all too clearly 
demonstrated. 
Yet almost immediately the surviving remnants of the da'wa 
made a bid to seize another stronghold, at Shaizar, using the 
Persian Nizari techniques of stratagem and assault employed earlier 
at Afamiya. Again, the Nizaris showed themselves capable of seizing 
but not holding a major fortress, though this time the failure is 
scarcely surprising considering the recent drastic reduction in 
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Nizari manpower in Syria. 
The failure at Shaizar seemed to drain most of the da'wa's 
surviving vigour, making the Persian strategy of direct castle 
seizure even more remote of success, so that when the dacwa again 
revives it is to be observed pursuing the earlier policy of local 
alliance at Aleppo, now with the Artukid amir Il-Ghazi. The Nizaris 
had obviously profited from their experience. To avoid overcon-
centration of their strength in a single vulnerable place, the dacwa 
now diversified its area of activities, northeastwards into the 
Diyar Bakir, and southwards to Damascus. This last development shows 
the dacwa at its most resourceful; using a present alliance as a 
springboard to another with a more powerful ruler in a much more 
important city. 
The Damascene phase of the Syrian da'wa shows the policy 
originated at Aleppo at its very best. With Tughtakin's grudging 
protection and the active support of the wazir Mazdakani, the Nizaris 
created a strong following within a predominantly Sunnite city and 
extended their campaign into rural areas as far afield as central 
Syria. 
There are no reports of attempts on caitles in this period, 
and though we cannot expect the chroniclers to notice the day-to-
day activities of the dacwa, we may be tolerably sure that striking 
military action such as this would have been noticed. At Aleppo, 
the Nizaris asked Il-Ghazi to let them reoccupy Sharif, which he 
adroitly prevented. At Damascus, what we know of Nizari activity 
strongly indicates adherence to the policy of alliance, cultivating 
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the favour of their patron, as in the military action ,early in 1126, 
and building up the strength of the following to a point where 
favours could be asked and granted. 
This policy paid off handsomely in 1126 when the Nizaris were 
given Banyas, and with this fortress as the real centre of the 
dar:wa, the next two years saw the beginnings of further acquisitions 
in the Jabal Bahra. When the death of Tughtakin in 1128 brought 
no immediate anti-Nizari reaction in Damascus, the dar:wa seemed at 
last to be permanently established. The policy of alliance had 
proved its worth. 
What wrecked this achievement was an inexcusable military 
blunder on the part of the chief daci Bahram, not any defect in the 
overall strategy of the dacwa. The catastrophe at the Wadi'l-
Taim severely weakened the da'wa but did not collapse it. That came 
when the enemies of the wazir Mazdakani finally persuaded Buri to 
be rid of him and his Nizari supporters within Damascus. 
The 1129 Damascus massacre deprived the dacwa of the resources 
necessary to hold its recent territorial acquisitions, but the 
groundwork had been well laid in the Jabal Bahra. The dacwa rebuilt 
itself by a slow and painstaking process of purchase and arrangement; 
Qadmus was purchased, al-Khaf was ceded but probably for a consider-
ation, and though Kharibah was seized by assault it was as quickly 
lost again, to be recovered only by purchase. Masyaf was the first 
castle taken and held by the Syrian Nizaris using the techniques of 
stratagem and assault which characterized the Persian dacwa's style 
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of expansion. This took place nine years after the peaceful 
acquisition of Qadmus, and twelve years after the d~bicle at Damascus. 
From this brief recapitulation it should be apparent that the 
delay suffered by the Nizaris in securing permanent establishment in 
Syria is attributable not simply to the severity of the orthodox 
opposition at Aleppo and Damascus but in large part to the method of 
expansion adopted by the dacwa. The policy of obtaining castles 
through a pattern of local alliances rather than by direct assault 
was in its very nature a long-term affair, of waiting, of being useful, 
of finally asking for favours, always at the risk of interruption, 
frustration and delay. Yet given the circumstances obtaining in 
early twelfth century Syria, this was the most sensible course 
available. Strict adherence to the Persian strategy of castle assault 
would in all likelihood have bled the dacwa of its strength more 
quickly than it could be replaced, and led to its early extinction. 
The policy of alliance at least enabled the dacwa to consolidate a 
following, so that when catastrophic reverses occurred there were 
always some surviving elements on which the dacwa could be rebuilt. 
The ultimate establishment of the Nizaris in Syria is there-
fore not merely a reflection of the movemenVs undoubted resilience, 
its capacity to endure losses, to pick up the pieces, and start all 
over again; it is also a vindication of that traditional Isma'ili 
policy of decentralization which left individual da<was unencumbered 
with rigid directives, free to formulate their own solutions to the 
problems of survival and expansion in a new area. 
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The significance of the Nizaris' role in Syrian affairs mainly 
concerns the effect they had on the struggle between Muslims and 
Crusaders. How influential were the Nizaris in this respect? Did 
their localized activities really have any wider relevance? Did 
they indirectly assist the Crusaders by keeping Muslim Syria divided? 
It is easy to assume that the Nizaris must have been a disruptive 
influence, and therefore contributed to the Crusader~' success in 
early twelfth century Syria; more than one writer has taken this 
for granted. Yet were the Nizaris truly disruptive? 
Their influence was basically of two kinds; negative, in their 
elimination of important Muslim leaders, and positive in their policy 
of local alliances. Their support for Ridwan may not seem tremendous, 
but it must be remembered that we normally have no means of assessing 
their numerical strength. What evidence there is suggests that 
Ridwan found the Nizari alliance extremely useful, and that the 
Nizaris made a contribution, however large or small, to the survival 
of Aleppo in its most vulnerable years. The elimination of Janah 
al-Dawlah of Hims was not in fact a divisive action. It resulted 
in the assimilation of Hims to the territories of Damascus, a 
notable reduction of political fragmentation in Syria. True, Afamiya 
was lost to the Franks in 1106 as a result of an attempted Nizari 
coup, yet Khalaf ibn Mula'ib had himself been a disruptive force in 
Syrian affairs. So long as Shaizar remained as a bulwark counter-
balancing the Franks at Afamiya, the loss of Afamiya was not perhaps 
such a high price to pay for the removal of Khalaf. 
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It is not strictly correct, therefore, to accuse the Nizaris at 
Aleppo of creating or prolonging Muslim disunity. The disunity was 
already there, and already deep for purely political reasons. It 
would of course be absurd to imagine that the Nizaris saw their 
actions primarily as advancing or retarding the Muslim cause; their 
motives were thoroughly selfish and opportunistic. Yet the con-
sequences of their actions were clearly not entirely damaging to the 
Muslim cause. This positive aspect is easily lost sight of because 
their most direct and powerful influence on affairs was by means 
of assassinations. Killers they were, yet their support of Ridwan 
helped give Aleppo more stable and continuous government than it 
was to enjoy for the next decade and a half. 
Even as regards assassinations, only two stand out as exerting 
a significant influence on the struggle against the crusaders. 
Both Mawdud and Il-Bursuki were preparing themselves for greater 
efforts against the crusaders, and their deaths undoubtedly retarded 
a concerted Muslim response, yet it could also be argued that 
Bursuki's death hastened Zanki's entry into Syrian affairs and 
speeded the political unification of Syria. Even had he lived, 
Mawdud would have had to overcome political disunity before mounting 
a full-scale offensive on the Crusader states. 
In the final assessment, political disunity was a much more 
important obstacle to the Muslim revanche than religious differences 
in the Muslim camp, and the Nizaris' detractors have dwelt chiefly 
upon their divisive influence in the religious rather than the 
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political sphere. Here, their role seems to have been over-
estimated. They were vigorous and dangerous, but they were after 
all only one of many heterodox groups in Syria, and it is not too 
far-fetched to see the Nizaris as an inducement for Shi'ites and 
Sunnites to sink their differences, which, as we have seen, were 
fairly slight to begin with. It is possible that the Nizaris increased 
Sunnite disdain for the ~hi'ites, but in the long run, ahd especially 
at Aleppo and Damascus, the Nizaris accustomed the two larger groups 
to working together against a common enemy. There are no recorded 
instances of sectarian divisions ever preventing Syrian Muslims from 
uniting against a serious Frankish threat. 
Ji;ven these few observations seem to suggest that the Nizaris' 
role in Syria has been not so much overrated or underrated as 
simply misunderstood. The legend attached to their popular name 
still casts a misleading shadow over our estimation of the da~wa, and 
will continue to do so while the Syrian "Assassins" are given only 
cursory or incidental treatment. Only by thorough and detailed 
examination of the surviving evidence will their importance be 
fully understood. A study as limited in scope as this cannot hope 
to offer any more than a handful of suggestions. What is needed is 
an examination of their whole career in Syria, with parallel con-
sideration of their Muslim and Crusader neighbours, to attempt a 
delicate but necessary task of assessment. This might only reveal 
that the fragmentary nature of our information prevents any clear 
statement, but such a study would at least make our guesses better 
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informed. Until then, historians of the Crusades will doubtless 
continue either to exaggerate or underestimate the significance of 
the so-called Syrian "Assassins". 
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